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"WITH A VERY GREAT BLAME ON OUR HEARTS":'
REPARATIONS, RECONCILIATION, AND AN AMERICAN
INDIAN PLEA FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE
William Bradford
I. Introduction
In a post-September 1lth era riven by ethno-nationalism, territorial
revanchism, and religious terror, the United States has assumed the mantle
of leadership in articulating the moral, political, and legal norms that will
inform reconstruction of global security architecture.2 Defense of human
rights,3 whether motivated by its contribution to the calculus of national
1. The Lakota Indian, "American Horse," commented on the December 29, 1890,
Massacre at Wounded Knee where U.S. Army troops of the 7th Cavalry slaughtered over 300
peaceful Indian women and children after a fruitless search for weapons in their encampment:
The women as they were fleeing with their babes were killed together, shot right
through, and the women who were very heavy with child were also killed. All the
Indians fled in these three directions, and after most all of them had been killed a
cry was made that all those who were not killed or wounded should come forth
and they would be safe. Little boys who were not wounded came out of their
places of refuge, and as soon as they came in sight a number of soldiers
surrounded them and butchered them there. Of course we all feel very sad about
this affair. I stood very loyal to the government all through those troublesome
days, and ... being so loyal to it, my disappointment was very strong, and I have
come to Washington with a very great blame on my heart ....
WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR
HUMAN INJUSTICE 253 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter BROOKS].
* Chiricahua Apache. LL.M., 2001, Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 1995, Northwestern
University; J.D., 2000, University of Miami. Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University,
Indianapolis, Indiana. The author is grateful to Eric Yamamoto, Mari Matsuda, Joe Singer,
Rebecca Tsosie, David Wilkins, Rhonda Magee Andrews, Brian Hehir, and Robert Westley for
reviewing and commenting on earlier drafts. The author takes full responsibility for all opinions
and errors expressed herein.
2. Whereas bipolarity rendered forcible humanitarian intervention practically moot, with
every major post-Cold War deployment the United States has proclaimed defense of human
rights a moral and legal imperative. See, e.g., David Hoffman, Crisis in the Gulf, Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al; Ann Devroy, Clinton Lobbies for
Troops, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at A29.
3. A precise definition of"human rights" is elusive. However, the "International Bill of
Rights" is a term informally employed to denote the various instruments that recognize a series
of rights legally enforceable against state and, arguably, non-state actors. The core components
are the U.N. Charter, which commits member-states to promote "economic and social...
development.., without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion," U.N. CHARTER art.
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interests or as an independent ethical objective,4 is invoked by the United
States and its allies as a basis for ever-more frequent forcible interventions
in the affairs of sovereign states,' and although the world remains beset with
a multitude of oppressions, with intervention by intervention the United
States gives agents of tyranny pause while reinforcing its claim as moral, as
well as political and military, hegemony.6
Ironically, by virtue of its self-anointment as Global Lord Protector of the
oppressed,7 the United States has fashioned itself an increasingly appropriate
55, 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(11 1)(A), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter UDHR], which amplifies the Charter; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR], which prohibits
states from denying ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities the "right ... to enjoy their own
culture, to... practice their own religion, or to use their own language," id. art. 27; International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49-52, U.N. Doc. Al6316. 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1966) [hereinafter
ICESCR], which recognizes that "(a)ll peoples have the right . . . to freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development," id. art. 1.
4. The history of U.S. interventionism is marked by brief periods of messianic zeal
calculated to radically reshape the geopolitical landscape on the premise that "right is more
precious than peace," separated by long stretches of isolationism and aloofness that comport
with the warning, delivered by President George Washington in his Farewell Address, to steer
clear of "entangling alliances." THE LIMITS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION, 19 (Ellen P. Stem,
ed., 1977).
5. The U.N. Charter explicitly provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state" and that nothing authorizes the U.N. "to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state[.)" U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4,
7. However, Articles 1, 55, and 56, read together, establish a primary purpose to promote,
protect, and defend human rights. U.N. CHARTER, art. I (stating, in preamble paragraph, the
purpose of the U.N. to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights"); U.N. CHARTER, art. 55
(stating the U.N. "shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights");
U.N. CHARTER, art. 56 (pledging members to act "for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55."). Given the freedom of maneuver the text presents, arguments defending and
criticizing humanitarian intervention abound. See, e.g., Marc Weller, The Rambouillet
Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT'L AFF. 211 (1999) (positing arguments for and against
intervention); FERNANDO R. TEsON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY (1988) (same).
6. See generally ROBERTO. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POuTICAL ECONOMY (1984) (discussing the concept of"hegemony," or systemic
dominance, in international relations).
7. U.S. intervention can be framed as building nations in its own divine image inasmuch
as American missionaries of the secular faith of liberalism are dispatched to Bosnia and Kosovo
to save heathen ethnonationalists with the blessed sacraments of democratic institutions, legal
regimes, and free markets. William Bradford, What America Has Written: Washing Our Hands




subject for scrutiny.' Even as the progressive development and codification
of human rights norms keeps pace with the increasing frequency of its
humanitarian interventions, the United States clings tenaciously to a cabined
interpretation of the rights inhering in individuals and groups.' Even more
challenging to its elevated moral posture is the dawning sense that, rather
than auto-immunizing treatment of its own domestic ethnic, racial, and
political groups, each successive intervention raises the bar of expectations"°
Linkages between aid and improvement in human rights protection to U.S. legislated-standards
force conversion to the modem secular religion of liberalism. See EDWIN M. YODER JR., THE
HISTORICAL PRESENT: USES AND ABUSES OF THE PAST 56 (1997) ("M~e ... preach on the
subject of basic human rights to those elsewhere who still sit in darkness. It is among our great
American susceptibilities to cherish our myths of exceptionalism and special virtue.").
8. Perceptions of inconsistency have attached to U.S. management of human rights issues
as evidenced by the ejection of the United States from the United Nations Human Rights
Commission. Marc Lacey, US. Attacks Rights Group for Oustinglt, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,2001,
at A4.
9. Although they clearly accept that civil and political rights have penetrated the "veil of
domesticity" that long preserved sovereign prerogatives and denied non-states standing as
subjects of international law, Western states resist rights proliferation beyond the conceptual
boundaries of"first-generation" civil and political rights to "second-generation" economic and
social rights and "third-generation" group rights. See Dean B. Suagee, Self-Determination for
Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the Solar Age, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 671, 683-84
(1992) (describing eighteenth-century diminution of state sovereignty to tap individuals as
subjects of international law, post-World War II introduction of civil and political rights secured
by state nonintervention, and late-twentieth century affirmative protection of group rights); see
also CATHERINE BROLMANN ET AL., PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 121
(1993) (enumerating self-determination, development, and health as third-generation rights);
Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's Rights or Victims' Rights: Reexamining the Conceptualization
of Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 IND. L. REV. 673, 713 (1996)(adding
"international peace and security"). First-generation commitments impede fair consideration
of claims to collective rights central to the religion, culture, and sociopolitical organization of
minority groups. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest,
Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403,424 (1994) [hereinafter
Williams, Legitimation) ("the very [liberal democratic] mechanisms that make cohabitation
possible for some cultures - majoritarianism, the franchise, and individual rights - make
cohabitation impossible for others."); THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE 44 (Morris Frehlich ed.,
1989) [hereinafter FREHLICH] (noting that indigenous social orders define rights as public
goods). Moreover, in a West just beginning to consider that second- and third-generation rights
may fall within the penumbra of obligations enforceable against states, the United States is the
foot-dragger, limiting rights to those necessary to constrain the government in favor of
individuals. Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1783-84 (2000); see also Natsu T. Saito, Beyond Civil Rights:
Considering "Third Generation" International Human Rights Law in the United States, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 387,397-98 (1997) (noting U.S. hostility to third-generation rights).
10. See ATHANASIA SPILIOPOULou AKERMARK, JUSTIFICATIONS OFMINORITY PROTECTION
No. 1]
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while calling into question whether the issue of human rights is to be defined
solely by reference to lands beyond American shores or whether a more
Janus-faced approach is in keeping with the American mission." While it
has staked an unclouded claim as primus interpares in preventing the most
egregious of international human rights violations, the United States
remains less an object of emulation than a subject itself for intervention,
albeit in another form, notwithstanding its belated recognition of its
domestic human rights obligations.' Although the United States is
indubitably an exceptional nation, 3 blessed with virtues too obvious and
numerous to require cataloguing in this Article, 4 and although it is a beacon
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1997) (noting that a series of post-Cold War interventions has
stimulated more expansive considerations of human rights issues).
I1. In Roman mythology, the two-faced Janus, god of doorways, beginnings, and the rising
and setting of the sun, is represented as having one face turned in either direction to remain
perpetually aware of polarities and of contrasting or complementary characteristics. AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 685 (2d coll. ed. 1982).
12. Not until the shocking discovery of the Nazi Holocaust in 1945 were U.S. policymakers
impelled to consider, by analogy, the human rights dimensions of the treatment of domestic
minority racial and ethnic groups in the United States See Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review ofCivil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561,571 (1984)
[hereinafter Delgado, The Imperial Scholar]. Even then, major legislative and judicial acts of
the 1950s and 1960s calculated to improve domestic treatment of minority racial and ethnic
groups were influenced less by the reenvisioning of minority groups as repositories of rights
than by the fact that desegregation enabled the United States to win support for its Cold War
policies from non-white peoples in Third World nations. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation
as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61, 80-93 (1988). Indeed, President Clinton
suggested that de facto resegregation, triggered by market rather than legal forces, may detract
from the U.S. capacity to police global democracy and enforce human rights if the international
community comes to view the United States as insincere in its commitment to equality and
justice. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African
American Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 477, 516-17 (1998) [hereinafter Yamamoto,
Racial Reparations].
13. Critics of U.S. policies often reference the country's exceptionalism as an obnoxious
attitudinal self-perception, lacking substance. See, e.g., Ibrahim J. Gassama, Transnational
Critical Race Scholarship: Transcending Ethnic and National Chauvinism in the Era of
Globalization, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 134 (1999) (urging critical scholars to "puncture the
self-satisfied attitude of [U.S.] national exceptionalism... that now so crudely bestrides the
world"); see also Kevin Cullen, On Eve of Bush Visit, US. Allies in Europe Register Their
Disgust, BOSTON GLOBE, Jun. 12, 2001, at A3 I (describing frustration of European states with
the United States' refusal, despite near-international consensus against capital punishment, to
ban the practice). Nonetheless, one can proclaim the historical accomplishments and
contemporary leadership of the United States while identifying issue-areas where the norms it
champions do not adequately guide its practices. Exceptionalism neither implies perfection nor
obviates the struggle toward it.




to which the world turns for guidance and enlightenment, any claims of
American infallibility are belied by its history, and uncertainties as to the
motivations for and compre-hensiveness of its global commitment to human
rights are compounded by reference to unsettled issues closer to home. ' In
short, the compelling force driving U.S. humanitarian interventionism is
ultimately a function not only of its military power but of the moral
coherence and consistency of the standards to which it is itself willing to
adhere. Should the United States commit to enhanced promotion and
protection of the rights of its own minority groups, persuading others to
follow suit may be less challenging.
A. Age of Apology
Recently the term "Age of Apology" was coined to denote a global milieu
wherein states, corporations, and other actors are reconciling contemporary
aspirations as to the promotion and protection of human rights with past
records of egregious human injustice. 6 Germany," Australia, 8 Canada, 9
and preserve the Union in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, the progressive articulation of
liberal republican values sustaining the great democratic experiment, and the defense of global
freedom are but a few of the treasures of the U.S. cultural patrimony in which all Americans can
take pride and against which other nations must compare their accomplishments.
15. Contradictions between U.S. expectations for the treatment of minority groups beyond
its borders and treatment of its own minority groups have not escaped the notice of tyrants. See
BROOKS, supra note 1, at 262 (noting U.S. policymakers ignored human rights implications of
domestic treatment of Indians until Hitler invoked nineteenth century U.S. practice of ethnic
cleansing asjustification for Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland to gain Lebensraum).
For a broader discussion of the politicization of linkages between domestic and international
human rights and the influence of these linkages on international relations, see THOMAS
BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLD LINE: AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL ARENA (200 1).
16. See BORSTELMANN,supra note 15, at 3,6-7 (defining "human injustice" as "violation
or suppression of rights... recognized by international law, including. .. genocide; slavery;
extrajudicial killings; torture and other cruel or degrading treatment; arbitrary detention; rape;
denial of due process of law; forced refugee movements; the deprivation of means of
subsistence; the denial of universal suffrage; and discrimination... based on race, sex, descent,
religion, or other ... factors").
17. In 1949 West Germany committed to Wiedergulmachung, the principle that "when a
great State... has ... victimized and murdered a group.., on the basis of group membership,
that State... has an unquestionable moral obligation to compensate that group materially." See
Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time To Reconsider The Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 429, 456 (1998). Accordingly, in 1952 West Germany enacted
laws providing more than $40 billion in compensation to Jewish victims, including their heirs.
See Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African Americans, 41 HOw. L. J. 479, 481 n. 17
(1998). In May 2001, slave labor claims were dismissed with prejudice in an executive
No. 1]
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New Zealand,2" the United Kingdom,2' France,' South Africa,23 Austria,24
religious denominations,25 and multinational corporations26 have offered
agreement with the United States providing per capita payments of $6700. Geir Moulson, Vote
Clears Way to Pay Slave Laborers $4.6b, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 2001, at A 12; see also In
re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 382 (D.N.J.
2001) (upholding, on basis of U.S. Statement of Interest stating suit presented nonjusticiable
political questions and that the United States had foreign policy interest in global settlement,
mechanism as exclusive remedy and forum). For a detailed discussion of the Holocaust
reparation movement, see Michael J. Bayzler, Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative
Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 11 (2002). For a discussion of another outstanding claim
for redress for German acts of (neo)colonialist injustice, see Sidney L. Harring, German
Reparations to the Herero Nation, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 393, 396-97, 400 (2002) (discussing
efforts of Herero people to advance claim against Germany for reparations for colonialism, land
expropriation, and genocide).
18. In 1976 Australia granted its Aboriginal population 10,000 square miles in partial
compensation for historical seizures. HENRY REYNOLDS, LAW OF THE LAND 31-54 (1987).
However, despite the 1991 formation of a national Council For Aboriginal Reconciliation, no
apology and no redress has issued for the removal of Aboriginal children from their families or
the systematic destruction of Aboriginal culture. Clyde H. Farnsworth, Australians Resist
Facing up to Legacy of Parting Aborigines from Families, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 1997, at A 18.
Still, while some Australians deride a "black armband" view of history, many march annually
on a national "Sorry Day." Michael Christie, Australia's Stolen Generation Makes the Grade
in UK, REUTERS, Jul. 12, 2001.
19. In 1996 Canada apologized for the cultural and physical destruction of its First Nations
and in 1998 conveyed limited territorial autonomy to the Nisga'a Tribe. See Anthony DePalma,
Canada Pact Gives a Tribe Self-Rule for the First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1998, at Al. In
1999 Canada executed a plan partitioning the Northwest Territories and marking the eastern half
for de facto indigenous control. See Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement
Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada ch. 29 (1993) (Can.) (outlining plan).
20. See infra notes 674-87 and accompanying text.
21. In 1995 Queen Elizabeth apologized to the Maori for nineteenth-century British-
inspired genocide and land theft. See Queen Gives Land Back to Maoris, ATLANTA J., Nov. 3,
1995, at A20 (noting return of 39,000 of 1.25 million acres confiscated in 1863 and payment
of $42 million).
22. In 1992, President Chirac acknowledged French complicity in the deportation of 76,000
Jews of French nationality to Nazi death camps. Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, I J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47, 48 (1997) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Race Apologies].
23. See infra notes 661-73 and accompanying text.
24. In October 2000 the Austrian government established a $380 million fund to
compensate 150,000 elderly individuals, now living in the United States and Eastern Europe,
forced into slave labor by the Nazis during World War II. ASSOCIATED PRESS NE WSWIRE, Oct.
6, 2000.
25. Joining with the Australian government, the Catholic Church apologized for removing
Australian aboriginal children from their families. See REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 31-54. In
the United States, the Baptist Church apologized for its nineteenth century defense of slavery,




public apologia and financial proposals to formally disown past acts and
repair damages. 7 Not to be undone, the United States and its political
People of Color Speak: Healing Our Own, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 108 (2000).
26. See JEAN ZIEGLER, THE Swiss, THE GOLD AND THE DEAD: How Swiss BANKERS
HELPED FINANCE THE NAZI WAR MACHINE 282 (John Brownjohn trans., 1998) (detailing
compensation of Jewish depositors denied access to Swiss accounts); Paul Shepard, Group to
Seek Slavery Reparations: Large-Scale Lawsuit Planned to Acquire Compensation for Black
Descendants, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2000, at AlI (noting Aetna apology for selling policies in
1850s that reimbursed slave owners for death of slaves); Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra
note 22, at 68-86 (cataloging corporate apologia). Still, corporate responsibility is as difficult
to fix as that of States: heretofore, no U.S. court has awarded damages for corporate
participation in human rights violations overseas. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424,462-66 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing suit alleging corporate responsibility in torture
of slave laborers); Roe v. Unocal, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (precluding, under Act
of State Doctrine, adjudication of claim that U.S. company in joint venture with state employed
slave labor). But see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Corp., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (subjecting foreign corporation accused of overseas human rights
violations to personal jurisdiction does not violate due process where significant contacts are
maintained); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002)(holding that
domestic liability attaches to the conduct of private corporations for violations of international
legal norms ofjus cogens, including forced labor, genocide, and war crimes).
27. Widespread "validation of public confession" has reduced the cost perpetrators pay in
admitting responsibility. Elazar Barkan, Payback Time: Restitution and the Moral Economy
ofNations, II TIKucuN, 52,56 (1996). However, Japan has refused redress for most of its World
War ll-era atrocities. See F.J. Khergamvala, Japan Moves Closer to Normal Ties with North
Korea, HINDU (India), Apr. 28, 2000, at Al (listing compensation to Korean "comfort women,"
treaty of reconciliation with Philippines, and waiver of reparations to China); Tong Yu,
Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War 11, 36 HARV. INT'LL.J. 528,538 (1996)
(Japan is "not ... a trusted member of the Asian... communit(y.]"). Japan has also precluded
justice for U.S. POWs brutalized during the Bataan Death March and subsequent corporate
slave labor. LINDA GOETZ HOLMEs, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2001). Litigation is stymied by a
treaty precluding compensation. See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation,
114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Japanese Labor] (relying on Treaty of
Peace with Japan, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. 3169 (1951), as absolute bar to claims and finding only
the United States has standing under Treaty). Although various States have tolled statutes of
limitations, see, e.g., CAL CIv. PROC. CODE §354.6(c) (tolling limitations period for slave labor
claims until 2010), because the question of the effect of the Treaty is a matter of the federal
common law of international relations, Japanese corporate defendants are entitled to removal.
Japanese Labor, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 940; see also Russell A. Miller, Much Ado, But Nothing:
California's New World War 11 Slave Labor Law Statute of Limitations and its Place in the
Increasingly Futile Effort to Gain Compensation from American Courts, 23 WHITTIER L. REV.
121 (2001). Fearing effects on trade, the State Department refuses to press the issue, and
Congress refuses to offset the ruling. See Matt Beer, Powell Agrees: No Compensation for
Japanese War-Crime Victims, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 9, 2001; Mark Fritz, Calling
Japan to Account, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 2001 (noting defeat of bill to permit former U.S.
POWs to sue Japanese corporations). Money, however, is not the issue: most POW slave
No. 1]
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subdivisions have, within the past decade, made a bold foray into the Age of
Apology, expressing formal regret and offering compensation to a number
of groups, including Japanese American World War 11-era internees,2"
indigenous Hawaiians,29 Guatemalans," and African American victims of
the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments, a' Rosewood racial violence,32 and
laborers "just want those [expletive deleted] Japs to apologize!" Interview with Ed
Jackfaert, WWI U.S. P.O.W., in Miami, Fla. (Oct. 16, 1998). For a discussion of the litigation,
see Karolyn A. Eilers, Note, Article 14 (b) of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan:
Interpretation and Effect on POW's ClaimsAgainst Japanese Corporations, II TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 469 (2001).
28. In 1942, pursuant to Executive Order 9066, all persons of Japanese ancestry resident
in designated military exclusion zones in the Western United States were ordered to relocate to
internment camps, an action upheld on grounds of military necessity. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 218, 223 (1944) (upholding internment based on "the judgment of the
military... and of Congress that there were disloyal members of [the Japanese American]
population, whose number and strength could not be.. . ascertained"); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (rejecting constitutional challenges to curfew and exclusion orders
predicting support for invading Japanese force); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (upholding finding of military necessity). In 1983 a Commission, revisiting
the loyalty question, recommended, inter alia, that Congress offer a national apology and
compensate each surviving internee. Sarah L. Brew, Making Amends for History: Legislative
Reparations for Japanese Americans and Other Minority Groups, 8 LAW & INEQ. 179, 187-88
(1989). In 1986 the factual finding upon which E.O. 9066 was predicated was overturned. See
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding, in coram nobis petition,
that U.S. suppressed information proving Japanese American loyalty). The Civil Liberties Act
of 1988, sponsored by Sen. Spark Matsunaga (D-Cal.), finally granted compensation and an
apology. Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988). "[E]ach eligible individual ... of
Japanese ancestry, or the spouse or a parent of [the same]" alive as of 10 August 1988 and who
was relocated, interned, or deprived of property, received $20,000. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-
4(a), (b) (2000). A letter from President Bush accompanying each check stated the following:
A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful
memories; neither can they fully convey our Nation's resolve to rectify injustice
... But we can ... recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese
Americans during World War II. In enacting a law calling for restitution and
offering a sincere apology, your fellow Americans have . . . renewed their
traditional commitment to the ideals of freedom, equality, and justice[.]
The Office of Redress Administration verified more than 80,000 claims before the sunset date
ofthe Act in February 1999. See 28 C.F.R. 74.1-17 (1994); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-3-9 (2000).
29. See infra notes 688-99 and accompanying text.
30. See Richard Chacon, Guatemalan People Still Waitingfor Most Important Apologies;
US., Rebels Regret Civil War Wars, But Government Has Yet to Speak, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
14, 1999, at IA.
31. See Apologize but Don't Forget, AUSTINAMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 16,1997, atAl 7
(noting that African American victims denied medical treatment in syphilis study conducted
under federal auspices at Tuskegee Institute received compensation and presidential apology).




lending discrimination,33 prompting one commentator to opine that the
United States had gone "apology crazy."34 The 1997 appointment of a
panel3" tasked to boost racial harmony36 offered, to African Americans and
the indigenous peoples37 who have inhabited since time immemorial the
white rioters with the consent of public officials. Martha Minow, Not OnlyforMyself: Identity,
Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REv. 647, 679 (1996) [hereinafter Minow, Not Only for Mysel].
In 1994 a claims bill provided redress. Lori Robinson, Righting a Wrong Among Black
Americans, the Debate is Escalating Over Whether an Apologyfor Slavery is Enough, SEATTLE
POST INTELLIGENCER, Jun. 29, 1997, at El. House Bill 591 provided nine survivors per capita
compensation of$150,000 and created a scholarship fund for descendants of 1923 inhabitants.
Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591: Florida Compensates Rosewood Victims and Their Families
for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 503, 518 (1994). Redress "taught
a watching nation about... prejudice, violence, and official complicity." MICHAEL D'ORsO,
LIKE JUDGMENT DAY: THE RUIN AND REDEMPTION OFA TOWN CALLED ROSEWOOD 323 (1996).
33. A class of African American farmers recently settled a suit against the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, alleging failure to investigate discriminatory lending practices, for more than $I
billion. Emily Newburger, Breaking the Chain, HARv. L. BULL., Summer 2001, at 19.
34. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 480 (noting recent "spate of race
apologies").
35. Over the past four decades the United States has launched a series of racial advisory
commissions. See, e.g., Kerner Commission, Exec. Order No. 11,365, 3 C.F.R. 674 (1966-
1970) (established after 1967 urban riots).
36. After a series of conferences, the Advisory Board on Race made the blandly obvious
finding that the United States "still ha[s] a long way to go in eliminating racial
discrimination[.]" See Julianne Malveaux, There's Progress on Race But Much to Do, USA
TODAY, Oct. 2, 1998, at 15A; see Exec. Order No. 13,050,3 C.F.R. 207, 207-08,62 Fed. Reg.
32987 (1997) (directing President's Advisory Board on Race to "advise the President on matters
involving... racial reconciliation").
37. Indigenous peoples are "descen[dants of] the populations which inhabited [a] country
... at the time of conquest or colonisation"). Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, art. l.l.b, 28 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter
Convention No. 169]. The 300 million indigenous peoples are almost always numerical
minorities in their states of residence, and they invariably lack access to political and economic
power. Suagee, supra note 9, at 679-80. Although they now "find themselves engulfed by
settler societies," indigenous peoples have embedded ancestral roots "much more deeply than
the... powerful sectors of society living on the same lands[.]" S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONALLAW 3 (1996); W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights
in International Adjudication, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 350, 350 (1995) ("indigenous peoples...
resisted... assimilation and survived with a distinct... cultural identity"). "Indian," "Indians,"
and "Indian tribe(s)" denote the indigenous inhabitants of the United States in the singular,
plural, and collective forms. James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North
America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 55, 55 (1996). "'Native
American' is a ["politically correct"] term... [that] perpetuates colonial efforts to subordinate
indigenous sovereignty to mere ethnicity, as in the case of African-American or Irish-
Americans." Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking. How
the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
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lands that are now the United States, a vision of hope, as seductive as it was
tardy,3" that a place in the remedial queue might soon open for them.
B. African American Redress
In recent years the Age of Apology has matured to permit consideration of
redress for centuries of slavery9 and segregation,' with African American
REV. 235, 236 n.7 (1997).
38. Legislative efforts to compensate African Americans for slavery began during the Civil
War. The Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1865, vetoed by President Andrew Johnson, would have
authorized sale of forty acre parcels confiscated from Southern landowners. See Act of Mar.
3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. The Southern Homestead Act opened eighty acre plots in
Southern States to settlement. See Westley, supra note 17, at 460. The Freedmen's Bureau was
created to "seize, hold, lease or sell for school purposes" any property of the ex-Confederate
States. See Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 174; see also Westley, supra note 17,
at 461-62 (noting that by 1871 the Bureau had built 600 schoolhouses and eleven Historically
Black Universities and Colleges). Financial institutions were charted to make capital available
to African American enterprise. See, e.g., Freedmen's Savings and Trust Company Act, ch. 92,
13 Stat. 510 (1865). However, in 130 years the United States has refused further redress for
slavery. Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-
American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and OutsiderRemediesDiscourse, 79 VA. L. REV.
863, 882-99 (1993) (detailing history of redress); Vincene Verdun, Is Affirmative Action Fair?
The Only Lonely Remedy, 59 Oreo ST. L. J. 793,800-01 (1998) [hereinafter Verdun, Affirmative
Action] (noting longstanding refusal to redress slavery). As impoverished as is the record of
redress for blacks, "[t]he [U.S.] has never... establish[ed] an honorable and fair means" of
Indian redress. Robert T. Coulter, The Denial ofLegal Remedies to Indian Nations under U.S.
Law, in RETINKING INDIAN LAW 103, 107 (1982). The Indian Claims Commission Act of
1946, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. (70-70(v)(3)) (expired Sept. 30,
1978) trivialized Indian claims. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the
Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992) [hereinafter Newton, Courts of the Conqueror].
Other measures of Indian "redress," such as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43
U.S.C.§ 1601 (2000) [hereinafter ANILCA], and an apology from the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), are just as hollow. See Matt Kelley, Indian Affairs Head Makes Apology, Assoc. PRESS,
Sept. 8, 2000 (apologizing for "legacy of racism and inhumanity").
39. From 1619-1865, the enslavement of Africans "hulled empty a whole race... Every.
.. custom, every ritual, every god, every language, every trace element of... identity, [was]
wrenched from them and ground into a sharp choking dust." RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT:
WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 216 (2000) [hereinafter ROBINSON, THE DEBT]. Slavery also
stole the value-consequences of billions of man-hours of black labor while endowing whites and
their descendants with near-inestimable wealth. See CLARENCE J. MUNFoRD, RACE AND
REPARATIONS: A BLACK PERSPECTIVE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 428 (1996) (claiming value of
expropriated labor between $96.3-97 billion).
40. Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution legally abolished slavery,
informal sociopolitical regimes of segregation and discrimination further instilled inferiority and
powerlessness in generations of African Americans. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537




scholars and activists the avant garde' and the Civil Liberties Act their
lodestar.4 Although efforts at legislative redress 3 have met withering
41. Claims for redress for the African Diaspora have gained adherents, including the
National Coalition ofBlacks for Reparations in America (1969), Organization of African Unity
(1992), the Pan-African Congress (1993), the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (1993), the Congressional Black Caucus (1993), and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (2001). MUNFORD, supra note 39, at 420; Mark Niesse, Reparations,
Profiling Head Rights Group's Agenda Panelists Cite Pain in Racism, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Aug. 7, 200 1, at 5A. Recently, the Reparations Coordinating Committee (RCC),
a consortium of attorneys, politicians, and academics, joined them. Newburger, supra note 33,
at 19 (noting RCC is considering redress for slavery, segregation, racial profiling, and
sentencing disparities). Governments and corporations that benefitted from slavery may be
named in a class action, with blacks as a group the plaintiffs. Id. at 21-22. Although some
members fear compensation would smack too much of"40 acres and a Lexus," RCC seeks "full
recognition . . . of how slavery stigmatized, raped, murdered and exploited millions of
Africans[.]" Id. RCC anticipates "bitter reactions" when it acts in fall 2002. Id. at 22 (noting
correspondence declaring blacks are not due so much as a "bucket ofvomit."); Jamal E. Watson,
Blacks, Jews Found Still to Have Rifts: Reparations for Slavery Said to be an Issue, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2001, at A3 (noting gap between blacks and Jews - groups often allied on
race relations - on reparations). On March 26, 2002, the first class-action lawsuit against
private U.S. corporations demanding reparations for slavery was filed by an African-American
attorney and descendant of former slaves in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York against Aetna, FleetBoston, and CSX, and as-yet to be named additional corporate
defendants. See Reparations Sought From Firms for Slavery, REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2002,
available athttp://www.nyfimes.conmreutersbusinessbusiness-rights-slavery-lawsuit.htm. The
lead plaintiff, Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, has consulted closely over a two-year period with
Professor Charles Ogletree of Harvard Law School, one of the founders of RCC. Fred Kaplan
& Corey Dade, Granddad's Words Echo in Slavery Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31,2002, at A l,
Al8. The suit, although it does not directly implicate the conduct ofpublic or individual actors,
promises to be closely-watched and hotly debated. Id. RCC expects to file a series of
reparations suits on behalf of African-American plaintiffs against corporate defendants in Fall
2002. Tatsha Robertson, Reparationsfor Slavery: Old Idea Goes Mainstream, BOSTONGLOBE,
Apr. 4,2002, at Al, A8. On August 18,2002, supporters of reparations for African Americans
will gather in a Millions for Reparations Rally on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.
Deborah King, Reparations Supporters Will Rally in Capital, INDIANAPOLIS. STAR, Aug. 13,
2002, at A6. For a discussion ofcontemporary African-American reparations theory, see Note,
Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect America's
Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002). For an argument that an independent African-
American state, rather than money, is the proper form for reparations in redress of the injustices
committed against black Americans, see Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of
Reparations to African-Americans, 29 S. U. L. REV. 25 (2001).
42. "Granting reparations to Japanese Americans without granting.., compensation to
[blacks] ... made a previously tolerable condition seem degrading." Vincene Verdun, If the
Shoe Fits, Wear it: An Analysis ofReparations to African Americans, 67 TUL L. REV. 597,659
(1993) [hereinafter Verdun, If the Shoe Fits].
43. In 1991 U.S. Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) introduced legislation to require the United
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resistance along a wide political frontage, opposition is attributable as much
to the model of redress elected - reparations" - as to an inherent
unwillingness to eradicate the legacy of slavery and segregation.45 While a
majority cannot yet recognize African American claims as meritorious of an
apology or trillions of dollars in compensation,' the factual predicate to such
claims is a firm fixture in the national discourse and a source of political
currency upon which claimants can draw.4 Indeed, so deeply ingrained in the
public consciousness is this predicate that many erroneously believe the
States to redress slavery and segregation. H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991). The bill - never
reported from Committee - is reintroduced annually to no avail. See, e.g.,, Commission to
Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997). In 1997
U.S. Rep. Tony Hall (D.-Ohio) introduced a resolution stating that "Congress apologizes to
African-Americans whose ancestors suffered as slaves under the Constitution and laws of the
United States until 1865." H. Con. Res. 96, 105th Cong. (1997). A political firestorm
immolated the proposal. Paul Leavitt & Robert Silvers, Poll: Congress Shouldn't Make
Apology for Slavery, USA TODAY, Jul. 2, 1997, at A5 (61% of Americans disfavored apology).
One irate critic countered that the U.S. should apologize to him for expropriating 435 slaves
from his great-grandfather without compensation. Michael A. Fletcher, ForAmericans, Nothing
is Simple About Making Apologyfor Slavery; Congressman's Suggestion Draws Fire From All
Sides, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1997, at Al. President Clinton sidestepped the issue, fearing
apology might be the gateway to compensation. See Interview of President Clinton by Travis
Smiley of Black Entertainment Television, 33 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1184,1187-88 (1997)
("[L]et this [Advisory Board on Race] do its work and see what they have to say[.]") (quoting
Clinton); Jill Zuckman & Brian McGrory, Talk of Apologizing for Slavery Sparks Debate on
Efficacy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jun. 17, 1997, at AI (reporting Clinton opposition to reparations).
The Congressional Black Caucus disavowed the bill largely because it did not address the
grievances of present-day blacks still affected by legalized segregation and racism. Betsy
Peoples, A Simple Gesture: The Proposed Apology for Slavery Opens a National Discussion
on Race, EMERGE, Sept. 30, 1997, at 42.
44. Reparations is a mode of redress "where a guilty party makes up for an injustice by
paying or otherwise benefitting a victim." Samuel C. Wheeler III, Reparations Reconstructed,
34 AM. PHIL. Q. 301 (1997); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2nd coil. ed., 1982)
(defining reparations as "a making of amends ... for a wrong or injury"); Saul Levmore,
Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1657, 1690 (1999) (defining
reparations as a damage remedy); Robert L. Allen, Past Due: The African American Quest for
Reparations, 28 BLACK SCHOLAR 2, 14 (1998) (justifying reparations as compensation for rights
violations); Sarah Pritchard, The Stolen Generations and Reparations, 21 U. NEW S. WALES L.
REv. 259, 261 (1998) (describing reparations as restitution and compensation in amount of the
harm inflicted).
45. See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 47 (suggesting this generation may
be first to answer the question, "How can racial groups redress historical wrongs inflicted by one
group upon the other to overcome present-day obstacles to peaceable and productive group
interactions?").
46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.




United States "made only one historical mistake - slavery." 8 Although the
Indian experience49 proves that original sin predates slavery in the New
World," "binary thinking"'" undernourishes thought and action with respect
to Indian claims52 and thereby impedes domestic reconciliation and global
rights leadership. 3
48. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell Lecture: Derrick Bell's Toolkit- Fit to Dismantle That
Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 283, 297 (2000) [hereinafter Delgado, Derrick Bell
Lecture].
49. See Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of
Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1653 (2000) (positing a pan-Indian historical
experience) [hereinafter Tsosie, Sacred Obligations].
50. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 233 (chronicling 500-year deprivation of Indian life,
sustenance, culture, language, land, liberty, religions, and self-sufficiency).
51. See id. (defining "binary thinking" as unawareness that discrimination enmeshes
nonblack races and cannot be explained by reference to a reductionist black/white paradigm);
Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society: Affirmative Action
for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 900 (1995) ("no other group compares to [blacks] in the
confluence of the characteristics that argue for [racial remedies]"); Mar Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 335
(1987) (elevating blacks to status of "paradigm victim group" while dismissing Indians as
"another important model").
52. Historians of U.S.-Indian relations counsel that a multihued understanding of the past
is a cardinal objective to present justice. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, INDIAN Policy IN THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 9 (1981) ("One of the goals of writing about Indian-white
relations... [is] to explain that past to white America."). However, by nominating blacks as
the primary victims of racial injury, "nonblack" claims are rendered dependent upon the
subscription of the white establishment. Delgado, Derrick Bell Lecture, supra note 48, at 283;
see also VINE DELORIA, CUSTERDIED FORYOURSINS 168 (1969) [hereinafter DELORIA, CUSTER
DIED] ("By... making race refer solely to black, Indians [a]re systematically excluded from
consideration [for redress]."); Steve Russell, A Black and White Issue: The Invisibility of
American Indians in Racial Policy Discourse, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 129 (1999).
53. While deepening the U.S. commitment to the promotion of rights presumes to a large
extent the fundamental indivisibility of all groups, Indians, by virtue of their existence on
American soil prior to the founding of the United States and the unavailability of a "homeland"
in which they could seek shelter, are arguably entitled to primacy in the consideration and
balancing of their claims for redress. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 5 1, at 358 ("Any discussion
of law, its uses, and its limits in America presupposes the right of those engaged in the debate
to stand on American soil and resolve the questions. Yet... [b]ecause the sovereignty of native
people was never legitimately extinguished, any conclusions the rest of us may come to about
law and social change are subject to the special priority of [Indians]."); Jon M. Van Dykes, The
Political Status of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 95, 138(1998).
("Unlike most other ethnic groups, whose ancestors came to the [U.S.] understanding that they
would be participating in a multicultural community, the ancestors of native people made no
such commitment[.]"); ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES vii-viii
(1970) ("The dominant race can never forget that [Indians] were here first[.]"); Felix S. Cohen,
The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953) ("[O]ur treatment of
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C. Binary Thinking, Ahistoricism, and The American Myth
A daunting obstacle on the road to Indian redress is the blithe ignorance of
the fact that Indian people are the most materially deprived,54 politically and
economically dependent," and legally exposed group in the nation.56
Americans are ignorant, furthermore, of the fact that despite nearly two
hundred years of federal Indian policies57 that engineered their deprivation,
Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our
democratic faith."); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging. The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 337-40, 356 (1986) ("Unlike other American ethnic groups,
Indians cannot rely on perpetuation of their tradition in a home country abroad."). While the
preceding may elicit criticism as advocacy for a "red-white" paradigm of race relations, it is
intended not to substitute one flawed social perspective for another but rather to champion
claims for redress that are no less pressing, crucial, or salient than African American claims.
54. Indian reservations remain among the most impoverished areas in the United States
Whereas between 8-14% of the U.S. population toils below the poverty line, the figure is 40%
of all Indians, with some tribes faring worse. See 138 CoNG. REc. S3426 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1992) (statement of Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.); Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Social and Economic Characteristics, United States 95 tbl. 95, 98 tbl. 98 (listing
poverty rates for nine largest tribes - Cherokee; 22%; Navajo, 48.8%; Sioux, 44.4%;
Chippewa, 34.3%; Choctaw, 23.0%; Pueblo, 33.2%; Apache, 37.5%; Iroquois, 20.1%; and
Lumbee, 22.1%). Indian unemployment hovers at 40%, eight times the national average, while
the median Indian family income is less than half the national average. TERRY L. ANDERSON,
SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS I
(1995). Underfunded reservation schools are the worst in the U.S. See Mathew Atkinson, Red
Tape: How American Laws Ensnare NativeAmerican Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 379, 421 (1998). The socioeconomic status of"urban" Indians - the bulk of
the Indian population - is no better. See Terrel Rhodes, The Urban American Indian, in A
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY, at 259, 262 tbl. 14.1 (data for 1990) (noting only 24% of Indians live
on reservations). Unemployment, infant mortality, suicide, homicide, substance abuse,
homelessness, and poor health are common: by every objective indicator Indians are the most
disadvantaged group in the United States. WARD CHURCHILL, FANTASIESOFTHEMASTERRACE:
LITERATURE, CINEMA AND THE COLONIZATIONOFAMERICAN INDIANS 7 (1992) (Indians are "the
poorest of the poor").
55. Despite abundant natural resources, Indian tribes are stifled by a welter of federal laws
and doctrines restricting access to capital and impeding sustainable development. For many,
economic dependence waxes ever greater, in some cases because of the very federal programs
ostensibly designed to reduce it. See Steven J. Prince, The Political Economic of Articulation:
Federal Policy and the Native American/Euroamerican Modes of Production iv( 1993) (doctoral
dissertation) (on file with University of Utah Library).
56. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation
in Federal Indian Law, I 10 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1779 (1997) (alleging dominantjurisprudence
of federal Indian law remains "inextricably rooted in colonial notions that are simply
inconsistent with any plausible contemporary normative universe").




dependence, and exposure, Indian people, along with their distinct cultures,58
histories, and dreams for a more respectful coexistence, have survived. 9
While the exclusion of Indian claims from contemporary remediation is
partially grounded in the general inaccessibility of a universally known and
compelling symbol of Indian injustice, such as the Nazi Holocaust or Japanese
American internment,' federal refusals to entertain Indian claims for land
theft, genocide,6 and ethnocide62-in other words, for the forcible denial of the
right to self-determination 3 -are rooted less in present ignorance of Indian
sovereignty to forced relocation, genocide, internment, imposition of a guardian-ward
relationship, forced assimilation and underdevelopment, and now limited self-government under
the shadow of the power of Congress to legally terminate their existence. See THE POUTICAL
ECONOMY OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 72 (John H. Moore ed., 1993) [hereinafter MOORE].
58. See RONALD SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN PoucY IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 274 (1975)
(defining Indian culture as "delicately balanced system of attitudes, beliefs, valuations,
conditions, and modes of behavior" and discussing significance to tribal integrity).
59. See John T. McCutcheon, Injun Summer, CaI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1998, (Magazine) at 30
(suggesting because "the Indians died and went away a long time ago now" they are fodder for
casual retrospection or folk memorialization); Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at
1660 ("Indian people have alternately been portrayed as 'noble savages' and as 'bloodthirsty
savages[,]'.. . martyred and rendered virtually invisible...: the 'vanishing redman' myth, the
'Last of the Mohicans"). But see Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 38, at 753
("Indian tribes have refused to disappear despite the genocide of the 18th and 19th centuries,
the neglect of the first half of the 20th century, and the genocide-at-law that continued well into
this century.").
60. Brew, supra note 28, at 200 (noting irony that the "sheer scope and magnitude of
injustices towards... [Indians] deprives them of one single, distinct event behind which they
can unite and to which [non-Indian] Americans... can respond."). Further irony is gleaned
from an analysis of well-chronicled incidents of nineteenth century Indian genocide, any of
which might heuristically stimulate further evaluation of Indian claims. See infra notes 77-109
and accompanying text. Still, one need not be a committed legal realist to recognize that
"[m]odest misgivings are less likely to generate sufficient political interest," and Indian redress
will remain buried under popular ignorance until the "earlier legal regime.., comes to seem
very wrong[.]" Levmore, supra note 44, at 1692. The "real battle" for Indian redress will thus
be waged on the political front. Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U.
COLO. L. REv. 841, 876 (1997).
61. See infra note 91 (defining genocide).
62. See San Jose Declaration, U.N. Education, Scientific, or Cultural Organization, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.1, at 90 (1981) (creating the term "ethnocide" to describe
actions with effect of destroying indigenous peoples as distinct societies, irrespective of intent).
63. Self-determination raises the question of precisely who has the right to decide the
political, legal, cultural, and economic norms and rules that govern Indian tribes. See Felix S.
Cohen, Indian Self Government, in ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIAN's
FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 35 (1971). By exercising their rights to self-determination, Indian tribes
challenge States, transnational corporations, NGOs, and others who impose norms and rules.
See MICHAEL OMNI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 45-50
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claims than in an American Myth" that sanitizes these depredations65 and
subverts justice in favor of strained polyethnic solidarity." Although a
truthful account of U.S.-Indian relations will upset the comforts drawn by a
non-Indian majority from the American Myth67 and challenge the legitimacy
of federal sovereignty and control over Indian tribes, people, culture, and
land,6" the resolution of Indian claims, lest it fail to repair the damage or
prevent future recurrences, must be undertaken in full cognizance of the past
and present effects of that rapacious, bloody, dishonorable history.69
(1994).
64. See THE QUESTFORJUSTICE: ABORIGINALPEOPLE AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS 78 (Menno
Boldt & Anthony Long eds., 1985) [hereinafter BOLDT & LONG] ("Most countries have a
national myth - an account that purports to relate the central events of a country's history in
compressed form, that explains how the country has come to be and what it stands for.").
Despite generations of progressive enlightenment, the United States is still under the sway of
a national myth that holds that, as the Indian is merely a "semi-human savage the extermination
of which [is] in the best interests of [a] noble, democratic, divinely-inspired, Anglo-Saxon
Republic" dedicated to extension of democratic freedoms, no national program designed to
induce them to "disappear... to be remembered only as symbols of a by-gone and primitive
era" or to assimilate them into the body politic can legitimately be contested. AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 39 (Lyman H. Legters & Fremont
J. Lyden eds., 1994) [hereinafter LEGTERs & LYDEN]. The theopolitical imprimatur of this
American Myth offers metaphysical justifications, sounding in Judeo-Christian and Anglo-
Saxon supremacy, for denial of Indian rights while absolving the U.S. of original sin.
65. See TAKAKI, supra note 47, at 100.
66. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, IN THE PAST LANE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN
CULTURE (1997) ("stability is achieved at a price: a tendency to depoliticize the civic past by
distorting the nation's memories of it - all in the name of national unity.").
67. TAKAKI, supra note 47, at 100. For some, the loss of the American Myth might be
destabilizing to their psyches. As Professor Tsosie warns,
Indian nations suffered huge losses, whether measured in lives, lands, or other
resources. In building a theory of intercultural justice, Indian and Euro-American
people must acknowledge their connections to 'what happened here' - on those
lands that were appropriated from Native people and on their reservation lands.
.The history [of] the relations between American Indians and the United States
has been one of tremendous violence, treachery, and yes, pure "evil."
Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1661-62. Nevertheless, all Americans might
benefit from the knowledge that the methods employed by the United States are no worse than
those used by every other European "settler-state." The United States is not the sole nation
owing redress to its indigenous peoples. See Robert Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontier
of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in
the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 673 (1990).
68. See Williams, supra note 9, at 430 (stating that, if Indian tribes are entitled to self-
determination, the process by which the United States came to exercise sovereignty over Indian
people and land - fraud, conquest, internment - is illegitimate as a matter of law).




Nevertheless, even if the non-Indian majority would reject the American
Myth in the interest of mending national fences, the path to Indian redress
winds through terrain unmapped heretofore. Compensation and apologies,
gestures potentially part of an amicable settlement, are not germane to the
resolution of Indian claims for injustices that cannot be remedied save by
reinvestiture of lands and sovereignty in self-determining Indian tribes.70 This
requires not merely an abstract acknowledgment of the value of pluralism but
a comprehensive program of legal reform that dispenses with doctrines and
precedents perpetuating the denial of the human rights of Indian tribes and
people.7 As law, more than any other social variable, has (re)produced the
subordination of Indians in the United States,72 legal reform occupies a central
position in the claim for Indian redress.73
Last, 22 UWLA L. REV. 105, 127-28 (1991) (noting that to obtain redress and prevent future
harm it is necessary to "identify the... wrong" and "produce a report designed to influence the
public ... to accept the theory that statutes, ordinances, and other official actions [are] the..
. source of the [harms.]"); see also Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief
of Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals (June 7, 1945),
reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 178, 184 (1945) (advocating documentation of atrocities "with
such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in
the future[.]").
70. Indian claims are "invariably advanced on behalf of [Indian] communit[ies]" and will
be addressed as such herein. BOLDT & LONG, supra note 64, at 324.
7 1. Events in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, Africa, Afghanistan, and elsewhere
raise "radical questions about the legitimacy of law and the nature of legal order." LAW AS
PouTics: CARL SCHMrrIr's CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 13 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998).
Indigenous peoples across the globe, burdened by legal precedents and doctrines that
"perpetuate the injuries of a historical era now condemned and lamented", have added their
voices to recent debates. See Reisman, supra note 37, at 371. The basis for critical revision of
U.S. law is no less compelling: doctrines and precedents given a permanent place in the legal
pantheon reduce tribes to mere wards under the trust of a fickle Congress with plenary power
to terminate their legal existence. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)
(establishing Indian tribes as diminished sovereigns); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (establishing U.S. trust responsibility to protect Indian "wards"); Frickey,
supra note 56, at 1765 ("The Constitution became possible only by virtue of colonization, and
the document rests awkwardly on top of that history."). While the liberal impulse to escape
politics through law" is apropos in redress of claims wherein the law itself is not implicated as
an instrument of subordination and claimants seek incorporation within and equality before,
rather than wholesale revision of, the legal regime, with respect to Indian claims it is to the
assumptions of Indian inferiority inherent in the law that reform efforts are directed.
72. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARiz. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 51 (1991) (detailing legal subordination of indigenous peoples).
73. "Scarcely an political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner
or later, into ajudicial question." ALEXANDER DE TOCQUEVI1LE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267
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In short, proponents of Indian redress must not only displace a flawed
version of history: they must articulate a proposal for remediation that
transports the American people far beyond the strictures of existing law to
enable the peaceful restoration of Indian lands and powers of self-
government.' Such a transformative mission cannot be accomplished by
positing Indians and the non-Indian majority as adversaries, as would
reparations; rather, redress of Indian claims and the healing of the American
nation - crucial foci of the drive toward perfection - necessitate dialogue,
reconciliation, and joint authorship of a future history of peace, harmony, and
justice."'
Part II of this Article offers a disquieting version of U.S-Indian history that
accelerates erosion of the American Myth and acquaints the non-Indian
majority with the necessary factual predicate to Indian redress. Parts III and
IV contrast the assumptions, procedures, and remedies that distinguish
reparations and reconciliation,76 the dominant contending models of redress
available to group victims of human injustice, and demonstrate that, because
it offers the best hope for a peaceful American coexistence marked by mutual
respect for sovereignty, reconciliation is a more appropriate avenue to Indian
redress. Several preliminary proposals, including the introduction of
traditional tribal peacemaking as perhaps the most appropriate form of
(1832). However, to suggest that legal reform is central to the claim for Indian redress does not
imply a judicial approach: the history of redress in the courts, coupled with principles of
separation of powers, advocate for the legislature. See JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980) (noting strong U.S. preference for political, rather than judicial, resolution of minority
rights questions).
74. Although other aggrieved domestic groups who have advanced claims for redress, such
as African Americans and Japanese Americans, are endowed with distinct cultural identities,
they cannot claim rights to self-determination as politically distinct groups in possession of
territorial sovereignties. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1650-5 1.
75. Although the concept "justice" may be inherently unstable in that it is impossible to
limit to some intuitively clear definition of conduct, this Article is motivated by the belief that
there is some common political and legal theory - starkly different from past theories - upon
which most Americans can agree the present and future relations between the United States and
Indian tribes should be governed, even if complete development of this theory is beyond the
present scope.
76. Reconciliation, the primary paradigmatic challenger, reorients focus toward healing.
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 522. Although reconciliation may be
augmented by compensation, its focus is enhancement of group interdependence, and remedies
are tailored to encourage the dominant group to recognize moral responsibility, to restore the
dignity of the aggrieved minority group, and to effect attitudinal changes that craft a more
symmetrical distribution of economic, political, and legal power. Stephen P. Garvey,
Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1801 (1999). For a discussion of reconciliation,
see infra notes 627-63 and accompanying text.
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reconciliation, will be offered to stimulate thinking.
II. The Claim for Indian Redress: How the West Was Stolen77
Concealed behind the benevolent facade of the American mission
civilisatrice is the brutal reality of invasion, slavery, forced relocation,
genocide, land theft, ethnocide, and forcible denial of the right to self-
determination wholly incompatible with contemporary understandings of
U.S.-Indian history and with the notions ofjustice informing the human rights
regime. It is perhaps impossible to overstate the magnitude of the human
injustice perpetrated against Indian people in denial of their right to exist, on
their aboriginal landbase, as self-determining peoples: indeed, the severity and
duration of the harms endured by the original inhabitants of the United States
may well exceed those suffered by all other groups domestic and
international.78
A. Genocide: "The Metaphysics of Indian Hating"9
1. Conquest
On May 3rd, 1493, Pope Clement called upon Spanish conquistadores to
discover and conquer new lands in the Americas in order to draw "barbarous
nations" to the Christian faith." The subsequent invasion of the Western
Hemisphere, predicated upon ajurisprudential assumption that the indigenous
inhabitants were a distinctly inferior species,8 was governed by the legal
77. This heading parodies THEoDoRE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST (1887).
78. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at 241. The author describes Euro-American treatment of
Indians:
For more than five hundred years attempts have been made to exterminate,
assimilate, or otherwise eliminate [Indians] from the American hemisphere... No
other group within the [U.S.] has been subjected to such cruel, harsh, and
deceptive exploits at the hands of dominant society and for such a long period of
time. Massacres at the hands of military and civilians, slavery, wars, removal,
treaty deceit, starvation, disease, genocide, forced sterilization, and cultural
genocide [were] used in the Euro-American effort to destroy the native peoples
and their cultures[.]
79. The phrase is from the title of a book chapter from a Melville novel that propounds the
view that U.S. Indian policy is a confidence game with the government the confidence man and
U.S. citizens, ignorant of the genocide ongoing against the Indian population, the dupes. See
HERMAN MELVILLE, THE CONFIDENCE-MAN ch. 26 (1857).
80. See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW: THE PAST AND
PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 5 (2d ed. 1995) (citing Inter Caetera).
81. Donald Juneau, The Light of Dead Stars, I I AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 8 (1983).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICANINDIANLA W REVIEW
principles of discovery 2 and conquest. The latter provided as a matter of
international law 3 that a nation became the sovereign of territory its agents
"discovered" provided it subjugated the population and annexed its lands.8
82. The international legal fiction of "discovery" bestowed occupancy and exclusive
negotiating rights to impair the title of a "discovered" Indian nation upon a so-called discovering
European nation. Although Europeans initially affirmed the collective rights of indigenous
peoples, once European military superiority was established state sovereignty trumped claims
to collective rights, and indigenous peoples were relegated to the status of minorities devoid of
legal personality and entitled to protection only as individuals within states. See Lawrence
Rosen, The Right to Be Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest for a Unified Theory, 107
YALE L. J. 227, 242 (1997) (book review). By fiat, discovery permitted European colonial
powers to construct mutually exclusive and distinct spheres of influence and thereby prevent
internecine conflicts. See Johnson v. M'intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 572-3 (1823)
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were
eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire
... [l]t was necessary, in order to avoid... war[,] to establish a principle, which
all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition.., should be
regulated .... This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by
... whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which
title might be consummated by possession[.]
Although the discovery doctrine affected Indian title only via allocation of spheres of influence,
it provided colonial nations sufficient time and space to survey, claim, and defend footholds in
what became the United States.
83. "International law" is an intellectual amalgam of medieval and Renaissance European
philosophers who "perceived a normative order independent of and higher than the positive law
or decisions of temporal authority" and whose "fundamentally humanist, moral perspective..
. withh[e]ld the imprimatur of law from acts of earthly sovereigns found to violate the moral
code." ANAyA, supra note 37, at 10. Natural law philosophers were sympathetic to the plight
of indigenous people struggling to exist and self-determine in the face of conquest. See, e.g.,
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELL ET PACIS (elaborating natural law perspective); BARTOLOME DE
LAS CAsAs, HISTORIA DE LAS INDIAS (Andre Niu Van ed., 1986) (1561), abr. and trans. in
HISTORY OF THE INDIES (Andree Collard ed. & trans., 1971) (describing failed clerical efforts
to protect indigenous peoples by invocation of natural legal theories). However, by the mid-
seventeenth century international law morphed into a Western, state-centric instrument
justifying European colonialism. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1758). The post-Westphalian
era turned the "universal moral code into a bifurcated regime comprised of the natural rights of
individuals and the natural rights of[territorial] states[.]". ANAYA, supra note 37, at 13. By the
seventeenth century indigenous peoples were formally excluded from statehood by virtue of
their failure to exhibit attributes of Western civilization in property relations and trade, and
placed beyond the pale of the protective premises of the positivist law of nations, such as mutual
respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 134-35 (3d
ed. 1920). By the eighteenth century, states, freed from external scrutiny, treated indigenous
people according to domestic law and policy. ANAYA, supra note 37, at 19-20, 131.
84. Juneau, supra note 81, at 8. However, the right to acquire territory by conquest was not




Although prudence restrained pre-eighteenth century aggression in lands that
became the United States,85 conquest was eventually applied in all the
Americas, and the period subsequent to first contact is notorious as the "Age
of Genocide." 6
2. Slavery
In the aftermath of conquests, colonizers offered financial incentives to
corporate slavers to create bounties between tribes, 7 thereby facilitating a
divide and conquer strategy that served territorial objectives while providing
free labor to developing economies. The abomination of the Indian slave trade
played a significant role in both colonial trade and in the
extermination of most of the southeastern tribes ... [T]he Indian
slave trade involved all the colonies and .. .involved all the
horrors long associated with the worst images of slavery, including
beatings, killings, and tribal and family separation. It became
routine policy to separate families, sending the Indian men off to
the northern colonies while keeping the women and children in the
south .... In the east, Indian slaves became a viable component
of trade, along with deer skins and furs; in the west, American
Indians were enslaved by the Catholic Church in order to build and
maintain its missions... Indian slavery was.. . an integral part of
the colonial economy.8"
Although Indian slavery had largely discontinued in favor of African
entered into armed struggle defensively; ... [and as] empire-building expeditions did not
qualify as just wars [the] land[s] obtained thereby did not qualify as legitimately conquered.
.." See Lesley Karen Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the Inadequacy
of the State Land Trusts, 14 HAWAII L. REV. 519, 560 (1992). In practice, however, the formal
legal proscription against conquest was circumvented by claims to self-defense buttressed by
papal imprimatur.
85. See THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVIuZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S, at
191 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984) [hereinafter CADWALADER &
DELORIA] (noting European "conquerors" of militarily superior Indian tribes would have been
handily defeated prior to the mid-nineteenth century); see also M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 543
("Indians. . . were fierce savages, whose occupation was war... [Tihey were as brave and as
high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence.").
86. See DAvID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF
THE NEW WORLD 55-146 (1992).
87. See Prince, supra note 55, at 89.
88. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 242.
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American slavery by the early nineteenth century, Californian Indians, as late
as the mid nineteenth century, were regularly raided by slave-hunters looking
for men to work in mines and women to work in brothels, and extermination
befell many who resisted. 9
3. Transcontinental Ethnic Cleansing"°
The precise number of Indian victims of the genocide" committed by Euro-
American colonizers over the past half-millennium evades quantification.
Estimates of the pre-Columbian indigenous population in what later became
the United States range from five to ninety four million,' yet by 1880
disease, 3 slaughter, slavery, and aggressive wars94 reduced their number to as
few as 300,000 - and declining.9" Although luminaries such as President
89. See Atkinson, supra note 54, at 389. For a detailed discussion of Indian slavery, see
generally L.R. BAILEY, INDIAN SLAVE TRADE IN THE SOUTHWEST: A STUDY OF SLAVE-TAKING
AND THE TRAFFIC IN INDIAN CAPTIVES (1966); CAROLYN THOMAS FOREMAN, INDIANS ABROAD
1493-1938, at 3-21 (1943).
90. See Gassama, supra note 13, at 143 (applying to U.S.-Indian relations the euphemism
"ethnic cleansing," coined during Bosnian war to describe violent depopulation by one ethnic
group of a territory populated by another to facilitate resettlement).
91. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entry into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]. The Convention defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
92. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1662 (stating that between seventy-
four and ninety-four million Indians died during conquest of the Americas compared to the
number of African Americans who perished during slavery - forty to sixty million - and the
number of Jews killed in the Holocaust - six million).
93. See generally JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES (1997) (describing deliberate and indeliberate introduction of European diseases
against which Indians had no immunities); STANNARD, supra note 86 (same); RUSSELL
THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL A POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492
(1992) (providing demographic data on destruction by disease of Indian populations); E.
WAGNER STEARN & ALLEN E. STARN, THE EFFECT OF SMALLPOX ON THE DESTINY OF THE
AMERINDIAN 44-45 (1945) (same).
94. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 241.
95. See Lenore A. Stiffarm & Phil Lane, Jr., The Demography of Native North America:
A Question of American Indian Survival, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE,




Thomas Jefferson denounced the genocide as it unfolded,' the prevailing
racial ideology reassured the public that the disappearance of an inferior
people before the United States' continental advance was a "historical and
scientific inevitability."'97 Initially, a legislative approach effected physical
removal of Indian people from ancestral lands; however, when this proved
politically inefficient," measures more clearly within the inherent powers of
the executive and therefore less susceptible to judicial review were devised:99
Indian genocide became official policy of the United States and its political
subdivisions. 'o
JAIMES].
96. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander von Humboldt (Dec. 6, 1813), in
THOMASJEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1311, 1313 (Merrill Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS] ("the extermination of this race in our America... is therefore to form an additional
chapter in the English history of the same colored man in Asia, and of the brethren of their own
color in Ireland, and wherever else Anglo-mercantile cupidity can find a two-penny interest in
deluging the earth with human blood."). Id.
97. See REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OFAMEmCA
RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONIsM 6 (1981).
98. Of the many forcible relocations, the removal of the Cherokee Nation from ancestral
homes in the Eastern Woodlands is perhaps the most infamous. With a federal statute explicitly
overruling a contrary Supreme Court opinion, the entire Cherokee Nation was forced, in the
dead of winter, on a 1000-mile "Trail of Tears" trek to Oklahoma. See Indian Removal Act of
May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (declaring all Cherokee laws invalid and ordering forced
relocation of Cherokee Tribe) (overruling Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
which held that the Cherokee were entitled to retain possessory interest in their lands and to
exercise reserved rights under treaties of peace). Gloating after passage of the Indian Removal
Act, President Jackson is reported to have remarked, "Marshall has made his decision; let him
enforce it now." See FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 47 (1996).
More than 4000 Cherokee died during the Trail of Tears. Id. at 47.
99. See BORDEWICH,supra note 98, at 44-45 (quoting Georgia Governor Wilson Lumpkin)
("Our government over that [Indian] territory... in order to be efficient, must partake largely
of a military character, and consequently must be more or less arbitrary and oppressive ... ").
100. See Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View ofthe
Native American Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713, 718 (1986) (listing resolutions passed by
State legislatures legalizing murder of Indians by declaring them beyond the protection of the
law); see also STANNARD, supra note 86, at 142-46 (noting private and public actors in several
U.S. States capitalized on earlier Spanish genocide with legalization of Indian murder); see
generally FREDERICKE. HoxiE, AFINALPROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
1880-1920 (1984). For purposes of affixing legal responsibility under the Genocide
Convention, official public policies supporting deliberate murder of Indian individuals, whether
by State laws, federal legislation reasonably calculated to force Indian removal, and attendant
Indian deaths, or massacres by federal agencies, clearly satisfy the requirements of the intent to
kill Indians as a group, in whole or in part, due to their status as Indians, a protected class
whether construed as a racial, ethnic, or national group. See Genocide Convention, supra note
9 1, art. II (a)-(e). Introduction of diseases to effect Indian deaths, although initially indeliberate
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In the aftermath of the Civil War, the might of the U.S. Army was directed
toward Indian eradication. Military and civilian contractors induced
deliberate starvation by destroying primary food sources such as the buffalo, ''
yet Indian tenacity necessitated more direct applications of force. 2 One by
one, the Seminole, Nez Perce, Lakota, Shoshone, Comanche, Apache, and
other tribes were hunted, pursued, cornered, and murdered.' 3 A series of
"massacres" were written in Indian blood on the pages of American history:
Blue River (1854), Bear River (1863), Sand Creek (1864),'0, Washita River
(1868), Sappa Creek (1875), Camp Robinson (1878), Wounded Knee (1890),
and about forty others.0 5 Gruesome, shocking, deliberate exterminations of
defenseless women and children, were perfectly legal exercises of State and
federal authority as the law then stood."° By the conclusion of the "Indian
Wars" in 1890,'07 the pre-Columbian Indian population was reduced as much
when carried by infected "discoverers," constitutes genocide when deliberately transmitted.
101. See Prince, supra note 55, at 186 (noting by the 1870s many thousands succumbed to
starvation occasioned by the loss of the buffalo).
102. Most Indian tribes were not passive subjects of genocide during the dark decades of the
1870s and 1880s. Skilled and courageous armed resistance earned Indian warrior-heroes the
respect and begrudging admiration of adversaries. Still, though theymight be respected for their
military prowess, Indians were the objects of a program of elimination, and, as General George
Crook, U.S.A., a famed "Indian fighter" commented in 1873, "The American Indian commands
respect for his rights only so long as he inspires terror for his rifle." J.G. Bourke, On The
Border With Crook (1892), http://wickiup.com/wickiup/seton.
103. See Atkinson, supra note 54, at 389. Aggressive Indian Wars of the nineteenth century
- campaigns intended to depopulate territory as prelude to annexation - clearly satisfy the
element of deliberate killing of persons belonging to a protected class.
104. In one of the most brutal incidents of genocide on U.S. soil, 105 Cheyenne and Arapaho
women and children were murdered in the village of Sand Creek, Colorado on Nov. 29, 1864,
by Col. Chivington and 700 troops of the U.S. Cavalry. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra
note 49, at 1670; see also STAN HOIG, THE SAND CREEK MASSACRE (1987).
105. Atkinson, supra note 54, at 391.
106. See Strickland, supra note 100, at 718; see also Carol Chomsky, The United States-
Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13 (1990) (describing
collusion of law and force producing one such massacre-by-law of Indian men).
107. In 1886 the surviving three hundred members of the Chiricahua Apache, suffering from
disease, starvation, and the murder of over three thousand of their number, became the last
Indian tribe to surrender. DONALD E. WORCESTER, THE APACHES: EAGLES OFTHE SOUTHWEST
167(1979). The entire tribe was incarcerated for a generation in military prisoner-of-war camps
in which the population was reduced to less than half by disease, hunger, and exposure. See
PERRY, supra note 102 (chronicling Chiricahua Apache conflict, surrender, incarceration,
relocation, and genocide). Upon their release in 1913, the Chiricahua were divided in two and
relocated to reservations far from ancestral lands and surrounded by traditional rivals. See





98%,"°8 and an Indianrein United States was not beyond possibility.'
Although radical depopulation of Indian land may have been merely an
efficient means to capture and annex territory, the United States nonetheless
committed genocide in overtly manifesting a clear intent to kill, and killing,
Indians as such."'
B. Land Theft
The relationship between the land and Indian people is fundamental to their
physical and cultural survival as distinct, autonomous groups. Indian land is
constitutive of the Indian cultural identity"' and designative of the boundaries
of the Indian cultural universe."' Indian land transmits knowledge about
history, links people to their ancestors, and provides a code of appropriate moral
behavior. From the moment of first contact with European "discoverers,"
108. Sterba, supra note 92, at 430.
109. Though a fraction of the pre-contact Indian population survived, the remainder were
corralled on reservations, many infested with vermin and disease and lacking in adequate shelter
and food. Desperate reservation populations were initially forbidden to depart by illegal threats
of renewed military force. See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695,
700-01 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) (holding, contrary to position of War Department, that
Indians are "persons within the meaning of the law" with rights to protest and move freely
throughout the United States).
110. See Genocide Convention, supra note 91, art. II. The crime of genocide does not
require state action and can be committed by individuals, whether in official or unofficial
capacity, as well as states. See id. art. IV. Moreover, the Convention is applicable in war as
well as peace, and with respect to state conduct toward its own, as well as foreign, nationals.
Id. art. I; see also Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 325
(Provisional Order of Sept. 13) (establishing applicability of Convention without respect to
nationality or conflict status). The forced sterilization of Indian women in BIA health clinics
may also constitute genocide under the Convention and thereby give rise to a separate element
in a cause of action. See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, POPULATION CONTROL POLITICS: WOMEN,
STERILIZATION, AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 91 (1985) (noting routine sterilization of as many
as 3000 Indian women per year by the Indian Health Service); Lindsay Glauner, The Need for
Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 The United States Government's Role in the
Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native
Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911,939 (2002) (describing covert and forcible sterilization of
more than 42% of Indian women of childbearing age between early 1970s and 1980's) (citing
Bill Wagner, Lo, the Poor and Sterilized Indian, AMERICA, Jan. 29, 1977, at 75).
111. See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD Is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 122 (2d ed. 1994)
("Indian tribes... identify their origin as a distinct people with a particular geographic site.
This origin place - which may be a river, mountain, plateau, or valley- becomes a central and
defining feature of the tribe's religion and cultural world view[.]").
112. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1640.
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Indians proclaimed a sacred responsibility to preserve and transmit Indian land,
and with it, identity, religion, and culture, to successive generations.' The
discharge of that responsibility was compromised by federal policies of land
acquisition ranging from fraud and deceit to expropriation and outright theft.
Throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, prudence directed
Euro-Americans to formally recognize militarily potent Indian tribes as
independent societies and accord them diplomatic recognition as sovereigns. "4
Even subsequent to the defeats of France in the Seven Years' War in 1763 and
Britain in the War of Independence in 1781, the Euro-American foothold in
North America remained tenuous, and ongoing military insecurity stymied
territorial ambitions while stifling any notions of conquest. Moreover, the
United States' land hunger was largely sated by available space within the
original thirteen colonies, and land acquisitions from Indian tribes were of
necessity accomplished by treaties of cession"' after peaceful negotiations."
113. See BOLDT & LONG, supra note 64, at 22-23 ("Our aboriginal responsibility is to
preserve the land for our children"). So sacred is the Indian obligation to preserve the tribal
landbase for future generations that the loss of Indian land, and the severance of links to
ancestors, religion, and culture, is universally deemed the ultimate catastrophe. See DALE VAN
EVERY, DISINHERITED: THE LOST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 239 (1966).
114. See William N. Fenton, Leadership in the Northeastern Woodlands of North America,
10 AM. IND. Q. 21, 81 (1986).
115. For Indian tribes, entry into treaty relations with the United States was a sacred act
undertaken to secure mutual advantages as well as create kinship bonds of peace and friendship.
See ROBERT A. WILIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS
OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, at 71, 112 (1997) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS]
(describing U.S.-Indian treaties as "multicultural agreements that impart duties of good faith and
fair dealing"). For the United States, Indian treaties were constitutive documents providing the
framework for an ongoing economic and political joinder with mutual sovereigns. Philip P.
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism. and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381,409 (1993). Thus, the Indian treaties of the post-
Revolutionary period, though they ceded Indian land in exchange for U.S. promises, must be
construed not as acts of tribal surrender but as negotiated contracts, governed by international
law, in which Indian tribes reserved those rights not clearly granted to the United States and
acquired other rights and privileges from the United States. Id. at 402.
116. The late eighteenth century U.S. policy with regard to land acquisition from Indian
tribes is seemingly predicated upon a desire for peaceful relations, honorable negotiations, and
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. See Report of Secretary of War Henry
Knox on the Northwestern Indians (June 8, 1789 ("[tlhe principle of the Indian right to the lands
they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and interest of the nation will be advanced by
making it the basis of the future administration ofjustice toward the Indian tribes."); see also
25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000) ("Trade and Intercourse Act") (precluding acquisition of Indian land
except for by cession via a U.S.-Indian treaty). In those rare eighteenth century instances of
military hostilities initiated by the United States to annex Indian land, most campaigns resulted




Still, if during its first several decades of existence the fledgling government was
obliged to recognize the sovereignty of Indian nations and to respect Indian land
titles as a matter of international and domestic law,"7 from the moment of its
creation the United States was crafting legal solutions to the "problems caused
by the ... fact that the Indians were here when the white man arrived[.]""'
1. Fraud and Firewater
The Indian conception of land as utterly incapable of reduction to ownership
as property by human beings" 9 - an essential element of pan-Indian
cosmology 2 ' - crippled tribes in their early negotiations with U.S.
representatives operating within an imported common law tradition
commodifying land.' While Indian tribes generally understood treaties to
create sacred kinship ties entitling the United States to share and settle the lands
117. See Statement of U.S. Attorney General William Wert (Apr. 26, 1821) ("So long as a
tribe exists and remains in possession of its lands, its title and possession are sovereign and
exclusive. . . [and] we have no more right to enter upon their territory than we have to enter
upon the territory of a foreign prince."), cited in Atlinson, supra note 54, at 383.
118. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY 1 (1994). The Indian presence posed not only a military, but a legal, challenge to
white settlement. Although the discovery doctrine purported to grant the United States, as
successor state of Great Britain, the right of occupancy to all Indian lands "discovered" by Great
Britain, the Indian nations "discovered" by Britain retained title to their lands, subject only to
the occupancy of the United States, and as of the early nineteenth century many titles claimed
by whites under original grants by either the United States or Great Britain remained clouded
by prior possessory rights as yet unceded by Indian tribes. See Mitchell v. United States, 34
U.S. 711, 746 (1835) (Baldwin, J.) ("[It is] a settled principle, that [the Indians'] right of
occupancy is ... as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.").
119. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study ofEarlyAmerican History, 94 YALE L.J.
717, 723 (1985) ("Like other hunter-gatherer and horticultural groups, [Indian tribes] believed
that land was no more subject to ownership than was the air, water, sky, or ... spirits[.]").
120. See VAN EVERY, supra note 113, at 239.
121. See CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 15 (1977) (quoting
letter from Chief Sealth of the Duwamish Indians in Washington State to President Franklin
Pierce) ("[the] white man ... is a stranger who comes in the night and takes from the land
whatever he needs. The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and when he has conquered it
he moves on."); see also Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Cli. L.
REv. 73, 87 (1985) (stating that "the audience presupposed by [common law property concepts]
is an agrarian or a commercial people" and these concepts are not well-suited to understanding
land usage of nomadic peoples).
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in question,' the goverment, disinterested in kinship but desirous of no less
than fee simple title, manipulated Indian (mis)appreciations of Western property
rights in treaty texts incomprehensible to Indian negotiators not proficient in the
English language.'23 Moreover, U.S. negotiators, notwithstanding their claims
of moral ascendancy over Indian tribes as the philosophical basis for acquiring
dominion over their lands, secured further fraudulent advantage by dulling
Indian wits with alcohol.'24 Deliberately faulty translations of treaty text and
inaccurate explanations of treaty terms to Indian tribes possessed of limited
language skills and a Weltanschauung in which land is a sacred living thing
incapable of reduction to ownership exacerbated a fundamentally unequal
bargaining position and erased the line between consent and coercion; 25 worse,
122. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Frontiers of Legal Thought III: Translating
Yonnondio by Precedent andEvidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625,637-38
(1990) (noting early inability of Indian tribes to understand and adapt to Western property
concepts).
123. See Newton, Courts ofthe Conqueror, supra note 38 (suggesting language barriers and
variant conceptions of relationship of people to land caused misunderstanding of legal nature
of grants to whites).
124. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26 (1992) (chronicling
history of Indian land transfers by treaties fraught with unconscionability, coercion, and fraud).
125. Twentieth-century federal jurisprudence, in recognition of the fundamental unfairness
prevailing during the creation of many Indian treaties, belatedly adopted canons of construction
to guide interpretation of these instruments and mitigate the severity of their operation against
Indian rights. As the United States is the party with presumptively superior negotiating skills
and knowledge of the language of an Indian treaty, the Court has held that it has the
responsibility to avoid taking advantage of Indians and therefore has interpreted the terms of
treaties liberally in favor of Indian parties. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200 (1999); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 4 3 U.S. 658,675-76 (1979). The canons of construction also
require courts to give effect to the terms of an Indian treaty as the Indians themselves would
have understood them at the time of their drafting. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226, 246 (1985) (providing that "treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit"); Choctaw Nation of Indians
v. United States, 318 U.S. at 423; United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-381 (1905).
Ambiguities in Indian treaties are to be resolved "not according to the technical meaning of its
words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the
Indians[.]" Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 676 (1979), quoting Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 576-577 (1908); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,269 (1992). Still, courts are "without authority to determine the
rights of parties upon the ground of mere justice or fairness, much less, under the guise of
interpretation, to depart from the plain import of the words of the treaty." United States v.
Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 535 (1900); see also South Carolina v. Catawba Indian
Tribe,Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) ("The canon of construction... [does] not permit reliance




later treaties simply codified the results of more pronounced forms of coercion,
including conquest and genocide. In sum, many, if not all, of the Indian treaties
ceding land to the United States are physical embodiments of the fraud, 26
unconscionability,'27 and duress 2' governing their drafting and as such are
arguably subject to revisitation, reconstruction, and even renunciation as void.
29
2. Conquest by Fiction: Johnson v. M'Intosh
By the early nineteenth century the U.S. population was clamoring for more
Indian land 30 even as Indian tribes, increasingly convinced of the insatiability
of white land hunger, began to resist. Original legal protections for Indian land
grew incompatible with white notions of progress, and pressure mounted to
annul the marriage of political convenience and legal principle effected by the
discovery doctrine.' However, even as the United States waxed ever more
militarily potent, Indian tribes retained the capacity to defeat conquest, and thus
it fell not to armed force but yet again to law to wrest away additional Indian
Congress."). Thus, despite the ameliorative influence of the canons of construction, Indian
treaties themselves can impede enjoyment of Indian rights.
126. See Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96 (N.Y. 1912) (elaborating implied duty of
good faith in contracting); see also RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a ("good
faith ... excludes conduct... involving violat[ions] of community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness."); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 49,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 92-1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entry into force Jan. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] (providing as a matter of customary international law that "if a [party] has been
induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another [party], the [party] may
invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty").
127. See, eg., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (holding that unconscionability includes absence of meaningful choice available to one
party coupled with contractual terms unreasonably favoring the other party); see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 126, art. 53 (providing, as an international legal definition of
unconscionability, that "a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a pre-
emptory norm of general international law.").
128. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (providing that duress consists of the involuntary acceptance of terms of another party
where circumstances permit of no other alternative and such circumstances were the result of
coercive acts of the other party); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 126, arts. 51-52 ("A
treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force.").
129. See Friedman, supra note 84, at 559 (arguing that Indian cessions of lands in fraudulent,
unconscionable, or duressive treaties are void or voidable); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE: ATHEORYOFCONTRACTUALOB11GATION 18-20 (1981) (developing basis for judicial
reconstruction or voiding of unconscionable contracts).
130. See CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 85, at 195.
131. PETRA T. SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 113 (1991).
No. 11
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICANINDIANLA WREVIEW
lands. The seminal case Johnson v. M'Intosh.. provided the opportunity
whereby to expand the Euro-American foothold.
Although he acknowledged both the "impossibility of undoing past events
and the fact that the sovereign he represented was born in sin," ' and although
he recognized that Indian tribes were as yet independent political communities
in retention of original rights to property and self-governance, Chief Justice John
Marshall accepted the extravagant arguments that European discovery, not
Indian occupancy, constituted ultimate title to lands in the United States" and
that purchase or, in the alternative, conquest of territories by the discovering
sovereign conferred good title to those lands.'35 While Marshall conceded that
such arguments "may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations," he drew from the doctrine of stare decisis,'36 comparisons to the
practice of other states,'" and ultimately a jurisprudential affirmation of the
"inferiority" of Indian nations' to find that "if [such arguments] be
indispensable to that system under which the [U.S.] has been settled, and be
132. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
133. Joseph William Singer, Well-Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American
Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REv. 481, 489-90 (1994).
134. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574. The Court stated:
[TJhe rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded;
but were necessarily.., impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants
of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it[;J ... but
their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will ... was denied
by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
who made it. While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the
natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to
grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right
of occupancy."
Id.
135. Id. at 588 (noting that while the denial of good title to original Indian occupants was
unjust, "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the
private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the
claim which has been successfully asserted.").
136. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810) (deeming Indian land vacant for purpose of
uncompensated taking by State).
137. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 592 (noting uniform practice of European states in accepting
discovery and conquest as operative in the Americas as support for their operation in U.S.
courts).
138. Id. at 573 ("[T]he character and religion of [Indians] afforded an apology for





adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it ... certainly cannot be
rejected by Courts[.]" 39 Although the progressive Marshall intended to impose
legal limits on the future conduct of conquerors less charitably disposed toward
Indian tribes than he, 4° M'Intosh fueled subsequent claims that "Indians were
conquered as soon as John Cabot set foot on American soil," "that it only
required the inevitable march of history to carry out this preordained outcome,"
and that "tribal property rights are not properly understood as rights at all, but
merely as revocable licenses, or... 'permission by the whites to occupy.""1
41
3. Trust Doctrine: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Subsequent cases further diminished tribal sovereignty over Indian land. In
the 1831 case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,"2 the second in the Marshall
Trilogy, Chief Justice Marshall determined that, despite their retention of a set
of reserved rights and powers to include occupancy of their lands subject only
to voluntary cession,'4 3 Indian tribes were "domestic dependent nations"'" and
"wards" under U.S. "pupilage,"" 5 not sovereign foreign nations or states within
139. Id. at 591-92.
140. See id. at 596-97. The Court discussed its role in Indian-White relations:
The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered, in some respects, as
a dependent, and in some respects as a distinct people,... too powerful and brave
not to be dreaded as formidable enemies, required, that means should be adopted
for the preservation of peace; and that their friendship should be secured by
quieting their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by restraining the
encroachments of the whites ... The authority of this... ha(s) always been
sustained in our Courts.
Id.; see also id. at 574 (making clear that in the absence of conquest, Indian title can only be
lawfully acquired by the United States through a consensual transfer, as Indians were the
"rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it..
."; see also id. at 603 "[The Indian] right of possession has never been questioned. The claim
of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and
to the exclusive power of acquiring that right.").
141. Singer, supra note 133, at 489-90 (noting citation of conquest theories derived from
M'Intosh for proposition that Congress has unlimited authority over Indians) (citing Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955)).
142. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
143. See id. at 17 (" Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable... right to the
lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession").
144. Id.
145. As Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed,
[Indian tribes] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the [U.S.] resembles
that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely
upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address
the president as their great father.
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the meaning of the Constitution,'" and that as a result the Court could not take
original jurisdiction over a case wherein the Cherokee sought to enjoin
enforcement of the laws of Georgia on land guaranteed by treaties.'47 Although
Marshall held that the United States owed a common-law trust duty to Indian
tribes, not only was this duty specifically held to be judicially unenforceable," 8
but an examination of the otherjustices' opinions, construing the U.S.-Cherokee
relationship as that between a conqueror and a subject people,"9 hinted that the
"trust doctrine," true to its roots in medieval Christian xenophobism and
scientific racism, ' would serve as yet another legal tool with which to diminish
Indian sovereignty.' 5' In short order, the United States claimed trust title to all
Indian lands within its borders.
Although U.S. federal Indian policy with respect to Indian land under the trust
Id.
146. Id. at 11-12 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2).
147. Id. at 10.
148. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20 ("If it be true that the Cherokee nation have
rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs
have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which
can redress the past or prevent the future.").
149. See id. at 16 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 32-33 (Baldwin, J., concurring). The
dissent proved more consonant with the trend in international law, which, although it continued
to sanction the creation of consensual guardianships with powers and duties limited by treaties
between sovereign peoples, shortly thereafter abandoned altogether any consideration of
indigenous peoples as political bodies with rights. See ANAYA, supra note 37, at 14.
150. See ANAYA, supra note 37, at 21 (arguing that the trust doctrine is a "form of scientific
racism" that posits that whites have a duty to "wean native peoples from their 'backward' ways
and to 'civilize' them"); see also Friedman, supra note 84, at 563-64 ("From the very beginning,
the federal-tribal trust doctrine... explicitly relied upon the 'primitivism' of natives to justify
interference in their affairs. "); CADWALADER& DELORIA, supra note 85, at 196 (noting that the
trust doctrine was the political will of a white population committed to the notion that Indians
were a semi-barbarous people who ought to yield to white civilization).
151. Such fears proved well-founded when the Supreme Court explained the trust obligation
as the duty to act as "a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race."
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877). The "white man's burden" motivated federal
Indian policy as actualized through the trust doctrine well into the twentieth century. See United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39,46 (1913). The Court revealed its feelings towards Indians:
Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes
of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed
according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, [Indians] are
essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people .... as a superior and
civilized nation [the U.S. has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering
care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders[.]
Id. Manifestations of this odious philosophy now travel in more subtle garb.
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doctrine"5 2 generated a host of express obligations to ceding Indian tribes
undertaken in subsequent treaties, statutes, and executive orders to create and
protect permanent land reservations'53 as against States and private parties,
popular political pressure ensured that thesejudicially unenforceable obligations
were almost never discharged with "good faith and utter loyalty to the best
interests" of the Indian tribes.
54
4. Plenary Power: Worcester v. Georgia
In Worcester v. Georgia,'5 5 Marshall interpreted the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution"6 to hold that Congress had "plenary" power over Indian
152. Over the course of the past two centuries the trust doctrine has been broadened to
encompass a set of duties greater than those pertaining strictly to land, including to "ensure the
survival and welfare of Indian tribes and people" and to "provide those services required to
protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and self-government, and also includes those
economic and social programs which are necessary to raise the standard of living and social
well-being of the Indian people to a level comparable to the non-Indian society." ROBERT N.
WELLS, JR., NATIVE AMERICAN RESURGENCE AND RENEWAL 19 (1994).
153. U.S.-Indian treaties post-Cherokee Nation unambiguously contemplated discrete
reservation land bases where Indian tribes would exercise beneficial ownership while enjoying
political, economic, and cultural sovereignty under U.S. guardianship. See CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14, 16 (1987) (asserting that the central thrust of federal Indian
law has always been to create a "measured separatism"). Indian tribes under the trust doctrine
would remain distinct peoples and continue in a political relationship with the United States
largely based on treaties and on the Commerce Clause, which sets Indian tribes apart from states
and foreign nations as sovereign governments and provides that Congress has the exclusive
authority to regulate trade. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
154. In a democratic republic, a self-interested majority represents a powerful barrier to
honoring treaty-commitments benefitting a discrete minority not formally an organic part of the
body politic yet in possession of vast lands and natural resources. See ELY, supra note 73, at
135-79 ("There will always be a conflict when a government... must act both as trustee in the
best interests of a small segment of the populace and also as a servant of the best interests of the
entire society."); THE FEDERAIST No. 51 (James Madison) (warning of the majoritarian
problem); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (same). As a result, the
paternalistic policies of a non-Indian majority, violative of the moral and legal imperatives
arising under the trust doctrine, add the insult of impoverishment to the injury of expropriation:
the BIA arranges Indian leases, and collects their royalties and usufructuary benefits for their
"protection." See Atkinson, supra note 54, at 405. Moreover, because all tribal land is held in
trust, leases of more than one year are prohibited without permission of the Secretary of the
Interior, and funds generated from such leases cannot be used to purchase land. THE ROAD TO
WOUNDED KNEE 118 (Robert Burnette & John Koster eds., 1974) [hereinafter BuRNETTE &
KOSTER].
155. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
156. See U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 3 (granting power to Congress "to regulate commerce
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affairs.'57 Although the precise meaning of the term "plenary" was not subject
to ready determination, "' Worcester loosed Congressional plenary power
upon Indian tribes, qualifying all remaining tribal powers by express
congressional legislation by 1900.'9 Moreover, by the late 1840s, with the
military power calculus shifting'" and gold discovered out West, "whites
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
157. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 540-42. However, even as it expanded the power of
Congress, Worcester restricted State jurisdiction. See id. at 561 (holding that the "Cherokee
nation... is a distinct community... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force").
158. The "plenary power" doctrine, with origins in medieval-era traditions of "Christian
cultural racism and discrimination against... normatively-divergent peoples," was carried into
the New World by Columbus, developed by successive European arrivals, and reified as moral
imperative in U.S. jurisprudence to permit the "superior" race to exercise whatever power
necessary to "civilize" indigenous peoples. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 177 (3d ed. 1993); see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of
Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's
Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219, 260 [hereinafter Williams, Algebra of Federal Indian
Law] (arguing plenary power "erase[s] the difference presented by the Indian in order to sustain
... European norms and value structures"). Other commentators suggest Marshall's use of the
term "plenary" was not meant to denote "absolute" or "total" power but rather to signify federal,
as opposed to state powers, thereby shielding tribal sovereignty from state legislation. See
Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political
Status ofIndian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 524 (1987). The orthodox view
suggests that "plenary" as used in Worcester implies general police powers, as opposed to the
limited and delegated powers the federal government bears in relation to states, and as such
arrogates to Congress general powers to regulate every aspect of Indian affairs. WILKINSON,
supra note 153, at 78-79. By the late nineteenth century "plenary power" was accepted as the
absolute prerogative of Congress vis-A-vis the Indian tribes. See United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 381-84 (1886) (holding Congress has incontrovertible right to exercise authority over
Indians for their own well-being); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding
Congress, under its plenary power, could abrogate a treaty when doing so would be "in the
interests of the country and the Indians themselves"). Plenary power to dispose of Indian land
is a nonjusticiable political question, and no congressional exercise of regulatory jurisdiction
over Indian affairs has ever been set aside by the courts. See CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra
note 85, at 200 (noting plenary power places Indian policy outside constitutional limits while
rendering all U.S. Indian legislation non-justiciable political questions ab initio); Laura Nader
& Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native American Law, 23 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REv. 13, 20 (1998) (same). Thus, when plenary power threatens their rights, Indian
tribes must seek recourse from the very body posing the threat - Congress.
159. See LEGTERS & LYDEN, supra note 64, at 3 (noting that subsequent to Kagama,
Congress passed the first of more than 5000 laws regulating Indian tribes and individual
Indians).
160. After the Civil War, U.S. military power was so overwhelming that all subtlety in
relations with Indian tribes was abandoned, and armed force was employed against Indian
nations west of the Mississippi. See ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY 115 (1935).
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c[ould] no longer be kept out of Indian country."'' By adding plenary power
to the legal arsenal, Worcester and its progeny ushered in a violent phase of
expansion, executed under the rubric "Manifest Destiny."'
62
Over the next several decades the Army prosecuted a sequence of wars to
perfect discovery by divesting Indians of their possessory interest'63 and
enabling the United States to claim trust title and exercise plenary power. Still
other wars were fought to suppress Indian unrest after violations of Indian
treaties.'64 After each genocidal campaign, a dwindled, harried, and hungry
161. BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND UNITED STATES'
INDIAN POLICY 73 (1982). See also VAN EVERY, supra note 113, at 260. By the late 1840s,
homesteaders and prospectors pressured policymakers to grant access to the coveted territorial
and material wealth of the American West - an area populated theretofore almost exclusively
by Indian nations. However, not all sectors of society supported ethnic cleansing; intelligentsia
and religious organizations led a vocal opposition:
We are, it appears, of the "Anglo-Saxon race," of a lineage of "land-stealers," a
progeny of plunderers! Oh, pious genealogy! How we "honor our father and
mother, that our days may be long in the land which the Lord our God hath given
us!" which land is to be all that, with carnage and devastation and enslavement we
can wrest from weak and wretched neighbors! The pagans who came as friends
among an unarmed people and fell to butchering them?
NAT'L INTELUGENCER, Jan. 15, 1848, at 1.
162. "Manifest Destiny," a term which first appeared in print in 1845, refers to the
nineteenth-century political philosophy holding that the United States was charged with a
divinely-inspired mission of extending its moral enlightenment, democratic principles, and
republican values to the furthest reaches of North America. See generally WEINBERG, supra
note 160. If fulfilment of this Manifest Destiny required the defeat, displacement, and murder
of Indian nations, the imprimatur of the Supreme Court and racial science supported the
inevitability of the expansion of the frontier and affirmed divine approbation of the mid- to late
nineteenth century Indian Wars. Id.
163. Theretofore, Indian claims based on lineal descendancy and exclusive occupancy earned
recognition, by treaty, statute, or agreement, of a limited possessory right to permanent
occupancy known as "recognized Indian title." See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
453, 543 (1823).
164. The Supremacy Clause establishes treaties as legal authority coequal to the Constitution
itself. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws... which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made... under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land[.]"). A violation of a treaty is therefore a violation of federal
law unless Congress subsequently and unambiguously legislates to abrogate the treaty. Edye
v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)(commonly known as "Head Money Cases") (citing
common-law rule supporting legislative modification of treaties); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (providing Congress may modify treaty provisions, or "supersede them
altogether[,]" by subsequent statute). Although an Indian treaty thus binds all branches of
government, Congress has plenary power to abrogate or otherwise limit it provided it does so
explicitly and "with perfect good faith toward Indians," which good faith is legally presumed.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)(establishing plenary power to abrogate or limit
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Indian nation in extremis sued for a peace that surrendered vast tracts of lands
and political freedom in exchange for dependence'
5 and "civilization."'16
During the first decade after the Civil War, the United States acquired nearly
one-fourth of the land within its modem contiguous boundaries 67 entirely free
of any legal obligation to pay more than token compensation. 6 1 Yet despite
terms of an Indian treaty); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977)
(upholding, under political question doctrine, plenary power to abrogate Indian treaties). Moral
restraint has been in as short supply as "perfect good faith." To cure breaches of land provisions
of Indian treaties occasioned by invasion, Congress passed abrogating statutes allowing the
United States to violate with impunity all of the more than 400 Indian treaties. Singer, supra
note 133, at 483-84. For a historical review of Congressional bad faith, see VINE DELORIA, JR.,
BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES (1974) [hereinafter DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL].
165. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL, supra note 164, at 382 ("The [U.S.] Army dogged tribes
across the plains, through the forests[,] in and out of desert canyons, and through the swamps
... until tribe after tribe realized they would have to sign a terrible treaty or face extinction[.]").
Treaty promises of annuities for peace were bitter bargains: defeated tribes were confined on
distant, strange lands, restricted from engaging in traditional subsistence practices, and forced
into dependency. Id.
166. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883) ("Congress... expected... the
semi-barbarous condition of the Indian tribes [to] give way to the highest civilization of our
race."0).
167. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, andRestitution: Indian Property
Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REv. 453,460 (1994) (noting expropriation ofone billion
acres of Indian land from 1865-1875) [hereinafter Newton, Compensation].
168. The Court refuses to confine plenary power within the Due Process and Just
Compensation Clauses, choosing abstention under the political question doctrine. See Lone
Wolf, 187 U.S. at 553. Although it held that takings of Indian property are subject to Fifth
Amendment restrictions, the Court adopted a formal distinction that permitted Congress near-
unlimited freedom in establishing compensation requirements. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). The Court restated what original Indian title means:
[T]he tribes who inhabited the [U.S.] held claim to such lands after the coming of
the white man, under what is... termed original Indian title or permission from
the whites to occupy. That... means mere possession not specifically recognized
as ownership by Congress. After conquest [Indians] were permitted to occupy
portions ofterritory ... This is not a property right but.., a right of occupancy
may be terminated ... by the sovereign ... without any legally enforceable
obligation to [pay] compensat[ion].
Id. Given the judicially-crafted distinction between "recognized Indian title" and "aboriginal
title," Congress may take even those lands undisputedly owned and exclusively occupied by a
tribe since time immemorial and extinguish Indian occupancy at will, without compensation,
and for any purpose, so long as those lands were not conveyed by an official act of Congress or
so long as the tribe did not enter into a treaty to claim them. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1998) (requiring explicit congressional designation, by
treaty or statute, to find recognized Indian title); CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 85, at
187-88 (stating Indians occupying aboriginal title lands are "mere tenants at the will of the




distribution of millions of cheap acres to settlers, 69 the national greed for
space, 7 ° fueled by an evolving inter-branch compact authorizing takings
of Indian land,' 7' dictated confiscation of the remainder of Indian country.
5. Sunset of Indian Sovereignty: End of the Treatymaking Era
In 1871 Congress exercised plenary power to strip away the last formal
vestiges of Indian juridical sovereignty by providing that "[n]o Indian
nation or tribe shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty."' No longer compelled as a matter of federal law to treat Indian
nations as foreign sovereigns or to regulate Indian affairs by treaty, the
government could now acquire Indian land without even the pretense of
consent, and Congress, unwilling to allow "(a)n idle and thriftless race of
savages.., to stand guard at the treasure vaults of the nation[,]" gave the
Army free rein to employ genocide 7 1 to crush the last obstacles to the
orderly march to the Pacific.
compensation at levels bearing no discernible nexus to market value. See Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U.S. 234 (1997) (subjecting plenary power only to limited Constitutional restraint that
Congress pay some compensation when extinguishing recognized title). In sum, Indian property
is beyond the Constitutional pale. See Newton, Compensation, supra note 167, at 457-58
(analogizing federal Indian law to Communist law in that neither afford meaningful protection
against takings).
169. See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862 ch. 75, 12 stat. 392 (granting 250 million acres of
Indian land to settlers at as little as $1/acre).
170. In part, U.S. land hunger is attributable to rapid post-Civil War technological
development that demanded raw materials and rendered land more important than labor to the
U.S political economy. Prince, supra note 55, at 251.
171. See Singer, supra note 133, at 483-84 (stating that, as all questions relating to Indian
affairs were now nonjusticiable political questions, "Congress and the President therefore
possessed absolute, unreviewable power over Indian nations").
172. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544,566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2000)).
173. Glenn T. Morris, International Law and Polities: TowardaRight to Self-Determination
for Indigenous Peoples, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA 55, 67 (M. Annette Jaimes ed.,
1992). Scores of tribes, their numbers reduced by war, disease, and starvation, were forced onto
land reservations in the 1860s and 1870s. The surviving three hundred members of the last
belligerents, the Chiricahua Apache, surrendered unconditionally in 1887 after the murder of
three thousand oftheir number. For a comprehensive history of the genocide of the Chiricahua
Apache, see generally LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 107.
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6. Allotment to Present: "Mighty Pulverizing Engine"'
By 1887 all two billion acres of the U.S. continental landmass had been
discovered, conquered, and expropriated save for the 138 million acres
apportioned to Indian reservations, which the General Allotment Act of 1887
(Allotment)" targeted for further dismemberment and colonization.
Allotment, an exercise of plenary power, subdivided large swaths of
communally-owned tribal lands into parcels for the private use of individual
Indian allottees under a twenty-five-year period of federal guardianship.'
Upon expiration of the trust period, the United States issued an unrestricted
fee patent to allottees who proved "competence," assumed U.S. citizenship,
and paid real estate taxes.' For most tribes, Allotment was devastating:
although tribal governments remained in situs on vestiges of reservations still
under trust protection, by encouraging Indian individuals to formally withdraw
from the tribe 7' in exchange for a per capita share of tribal land and by
meeting the failure of unemployed Indian allottees to pay property taxes with
foreclosure, reversion of title, and sale to white speculators at prices far below
market value,' Allotment abolished Indian reservations as autonomous and
174. See 15 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1914,
at 6674 (James D. Richardson ed., 1917) (calling Allotment a "mighty pulverizing engine
[designed] to break up the tribal mass").
175. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
176. Id. The original plan was to allot tribal heads of household 160 acres each and to make
surplus land available to non-Indians. See WILKINSON, supra note 153, at 19-20. However,
effects varied, and while some reservations, such as the Jicarilla Apache, remained unallotted,
see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1982), others, such as the Lake
Traverse Reservation of the Wahpeton and Sisseton Bands of the Sioux Tribe, were held to be
terminated once 85% of the reservation had been purchased by non-Indians, see DeCoteau v.
Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425,427-28 (1975).
177. See PEVAR, supra note 124, at 62 (noting that Allotment subjected individual Indian
landowners to the full panoply of territorial and state laws, including property taxation).
178. The concept that an Indian could not simultaneously be a tribal member and a U.S.
citizen persisted until Congress granted citizenship to "all non-citizen Indians born within the
territorial limits of the United States." See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000)). Prior to 1924, "Indian naturalization was conditioned on the
severing of tribal ties[.]" FEux COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 644 (1953).
179. JAMES J. LOPACH ET AL., TRIBAL GOVERNMENT TODAY 20 (1990). Subsequent to the
allotment of the lands of several tribes in what is now Oklahoma, in 1889 development
companies formed in Northern and Eastern cities for the purpose of settling the "unassigned
lands," and a oft-violent scramble erupted over recently depopulated Indian lands despite
supervision of the U.S. Army. STAN HOIG, THE OKLAHOMA LAND RUSH OF 1889 (1984).





Although several Indian tribes attempted to block Allotment, 18 the
Supreme Court ruled not only that Indian land was subject to the sovereign
right to take for public use upon payment of just compensation, 82 but that
takings of Indian land, described as a "legitimate form of 'investing for the
tribe" 8 3 that did not require either consent or notification, were precluded
from judicial review. 84 By 1934, Indian lands had been reduced by a further
ninety million acres, with almost twenty-six million lost through fraudulent
transfers, and of the two billion acres of formerly contiguous tribal land
holdings all that remained was a fragmented, forty-seven million acre mosaic
of reservation lands under trust, plots owned in fee simple by whites, and plots
held by Indian individuals no longer members of any tribe. 85 Moreover,
95,000 Indians were now landless.8 6 In sum, the synergy of discovery, the
on April 22, 1889- earned the epithet "sooners," and when local land offices could not resolve
disputes arising between sooners and "lawful" settlers, known as "boomers," over rights in
erstwhile Indian lands, the U.S. Supreme Court was ultimately called to resolve notthe question
of the legal legitimacy of Allotment but rather of the relative rights as between sooners and
boomers in the recently reoccupied lands. See Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490 (1893).
180. See PEVAR, supra note 124, at 5 (describing Allotment as divorce of individual Indians
from sources of tribal resistance to expropriation and a partitioning of the tribal estate).
181. Kiowa Chief Lone Wolf sued unsuccessfully to prevent allotment of 2.5 million acres
of tribal lands, guaranteed by treaty against allotment, without the signature of two-thirds of
adult males. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (providing that
compensation for takings of Indian land need not be paid where Congress acts as a trustee in the
"best interest" of Indian tribes despite violation of treaty); (abrogating Medicine Lodge Treaty,
15 Stat. 581, 589 (1867).
182. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (upholding legislation allotting
Indian land as constitutional despite violation of existing treaties and lack of tribal consent).
183. Atkinson, supra note 54, at 397.
184. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566(establishing that Congressional exercise of plenary power
in regulation of Indian affairs, even to the extent of abrogating treaty-based property rights, is
immune from judicial review under political question doctrine). A skein of subsequent cases
has reinforced, as a matter of domestic law, the sweeping breadth and depth of plenary power
to abridge Indian treaty-based property rights. See William J. Murphy, Jurisdiction -
Sovereign Immunity - Business Owned by Native American Nation Granted Sovereign
Immunity from Suit Arising from Its Private Off-Reservation Transaction, In re Greene, 980
F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994), 17 SUFFoLKTRANSNAT'LL.J. 599,
601 n. 16 (1994) (listing cases). Still, several Indian tribes continue, perhaps quixotically, to
assert legal claims arising from U.S. takings of recognized Indian title. See Susan Lope, Indian
Giver. The Illusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native American Land Claims, 23 S.W.U.L.
REV. 331 (1994) (evaluating such claims).
185. See Atkinson, supra note 54, at 398 (noting that due to Allotment many reservations
are checkerboards of federal and Indian land, with some even populated mainly by non-Indians).
186. Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place, 34 S.D. L. REv. 246,256,261 (1989).
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trust doctrine, and plenary power as manifested in Allotment perfected the
legal theft of Indian land.
87
Despite infrequent restitution and compensation for Indian land,'88 the
Constitution affords no protection to Indian tribes,' 9 and what remains of their
landbase continues under siege.'" In light of the progressive evolution of
187. More than half of the U.S. land mass was purchased at an average price of pennies per
acre, while another 300 million acres were taken without compensation and another 700 million
acres are claimed by the United States although it has taken no action to extinguish Indian title.
See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indian Land Claims Policy in the United States, 58 N.D. L. REV.
7,8-9(1982). Moreover, all of "Indian Country", a legal term-of-art meaning essentially lands
within the territorial limits of an Indian reservation, is now either trust land owned by the United
States or non-trust land permanently Indian-occupied but subject to Congressional plenary
power to restrict alienation and use. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining "Indian Country");
see also Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 234,243-44 (1998) (noting
that to qualify as "Indian Country" subject to federal jurisdiction, the trust doctrine, and limited
immunity from Statejurisdiction, Congress must explicitly designate lands in question, by treaty
or statute, either a "reservation," "dependent Indian community," or Indian allotment). In sum,
the United States owns superior title to all land within its borders, and efforts to reacquire Indian
land are vigorously opposed by all levels of government. See Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating
Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian
Gaming Act, 29 Agiz. ST. L.J. 25, 80 (1997) [hereinafter Tsosie, Negotiating]. From the Indian
viewpoint, non-Indians not only shamelessly "gorg[e] themselves on the spoils of old wars" but
remain unrepentant, as evinced by ongoing land seizures. Atkinson, supra note 54, at 381.
188. See, e.g., Maine Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1723 (2000)
(providing recognition and $81.5 million for purchase of 300,000 acres to Penobscot,
Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet); Florida Indian Claims Settlement Act 25 U.S.C. § 1744 (a)
(2000). While the United States has restored 540,000 acres since 1970, this represents .05%
of the two billion acres under Indian possession at First Contact. Newton, Compensation, supra
note 167, at 476-77.
189. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416-17 n.30 (1980) (reiterating that
nonconsensual transfers of Indian land to third parties are insulated from the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment when the United States acts as tribal guardian, rather than as sovereign).
190. See Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Native
American Indian Nations, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 745, 781 (1999) (noting recent
expropriations of Indian land), Newton, Compensation, supra note 167, at 473 (chronicling
post-World War 11 uncompensated expropriations of Indian land); Lope, supra note 184, at 331
(enumerating outstanding Indian land claims); Ward Churchill, The Earth Is Our Mother.
Struggles for American Indian Land and Liberation in the Contemporary United States, in
JAIMES, supra note 95, at 139, 147-48 (discussing ongoing Indian land struggles). Moreover,
tribal efforts to aggregate land parcels fractured by Allotment and other federal policies are kept
at bay only by the occasional intervention of the judicial branch. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1997) (holding a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25
U.S.C. § 2206 (2000), prohibiting the descent or devise of small fractional interests in
allotments and providing that such fractional interest would escheat back to tribes,




rights regimes it is surreal that the United States continues to wield:
[a]bsolute, unreviewable power to continue the conquest of Indian
nations that have not yet been forced to sign a treaty... [and to]
take land held under original Indian title as it pleases,.., without
any constitutionally mandated obligation to pay compensation for
the taking of land possessed by Indian nations for thousands of
years, and despite the fact that the members of such tribes are
United States citizens otherwise protected by the Constitution. 9'
C Ethnocide92
With its Manifest Destiny secured, the United States, heretofore oriented
toward the physical separation and extermination of indigenous people,
changed tacks to follow the prevailing political winds,193 and U.S. Indian
191. Singer, supra note 133, at 487. Reference to remedial federal legislation ofpurportedly
general applicability designed to enforce the legal equality of "all persons within thejurisdiction
of the United States[,]" particularly with respect to the "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of... property" and the "right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property" renders the legal burden placed upon Indian
property all the more unsupportable and indefensible. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-1982 (2000). Perhaps the only way to harmonize the statutes with the burdens upon
Indian property is to deny that Indians are persons within the meaning of the Constitution.
192. Ethnocide is defined as "any act which has the aim or effect of depriving [indigenous
people] of their ethnic characteristics or cultural identity [or] any form of forced assimilation
or integration, [such as the] imposition of foreign life-styles . . . ." Erica-Irene Daes,
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People, ESCOR, Part 2, 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.
2/1989/33 (1989). The WGIP synonymously uses the term "cultural genocide," defined as
denying an ethnic group "its right to enjoy, develop and disseminate its own culture and
language," to label actions that have the effect of destroying indigenous peoples as distinct
societies without requiring a showing of specific intent. See San Jose Declaration, supra note
62, at 90; see also, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
ESCOR, U.N. Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., 7, U.N. doc. EICN. 4/sub. 2/1994/56, 34 l.L.M. 541,
548, adopted Aug. 26, 1994 [hereinafter Draft Declaration] ("Indigenous peoples have the
collective and individual right not to be subjected to cultural genocide, including the prevention
of and redress for: (a) Any act which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity
as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the
aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;. . . (d) Any form of
assimilation or integration by other cultures or way of life imposed upon them by legislative,
administrative or other measures[.]").
193. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Progressive-Era Bureaucrats and the Unity of Twentieth-
Century Indian Policy, 15 AM. INDIAN Q. 1, 10 (1991) [hereinafter Barsh, Progressive-Era
Bureaucrats] (identifying liberal humanists and intellectuals as partly responsible for
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policy adopted a treble action agenda for implementation in conjunction with
private actors: liquidation of Indian culture,""5 eradication of tribal self-
government, ' and forced assimilation of"civilized" Indians, shorn of cultural
and social attachments, into the body politic.'97 These interrelated policies,
along with the specific laws, regulations, practices, and customs developed
throughout the late nineteenth and much of the twentith centuries to deny
Indians the right to maintain separate and autonomous polities and preserve
their culture from interference, painted Indian tribes as targets for a sinister
"genocide-at-law. "' Promising to free "backward" Indians from an
"outmoded past" and endow them with "civilization," "education," and
"prosperity"'" whether they desired these "blessings" or not,'w the BIA,2°'
transformation of late-nineteenth century Indian policy).
194. See ANAYA, supra note 37, at 26 (discussing formation, in latter half of nineteenth
century, of a government-Christian church conspiracy against Indian land and culture).
195. Culture can be defined as a "set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs
that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior which is transmitted
from one generation to the next and shapes interactions with others and the environment[.]"
Guy 0. Faure & Gunnar Sjostedt, Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction, in CULTURE AND
NEGOTIATION 1, 3 (Guy 0. Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1993). As such, "[e]ach culture..
.records... experiences in ways that provide meaning, guidance and codes of rectitude that
serve as compasses for the individual as he or she navigates the vicissitudes of life[.]" See W.
Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
25, 25 (1996). While culture is germane to the constitution of group identities, it is particularly
so for Indian tribes: a communal culture, constituted by language, law, music, dance, religion,
history, and world view, touches every facet of Indian life and serves as a template for
determining and patterning Indian behavior. See Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous
Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 703 (1993) ("[Indians]
without communal culture are not whole. They are, as one Indian leader derisively put it, just
people' and nothing more."). Indian culture, thus construed, can be analogized to tribal property
entitled to defense as such. See Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American
Cultural Property, 72 IND. L. REV. 723,725 n.7 (1997) ("[O]wnership of cultural property may
actually be a... right, not unlike a right to speak a certain language or practice a religion[.]").
For a discussion of Indian culture as a property right, see, e.g., Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Museum
Rights v. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal Interests in Native Cultural
Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437,441-51 (1986); see also Symposium, The
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 and State Repatriation
Related Legislation, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. I (1992).
196. The term "self-government" refers to the autonomous determination of the institutions,
structures, and processes ofpolitical organization, economic development, and legal regulation.
197. See Fenton, supra note 114, at 81 (analyzing 1871-1934 federal Indian policy as
acquisition of Indian land, destruction of Indian political leadership, and assimilation of
Indians).
198. See Strickland, supra note 100, at 718 (coining the term "genocide-at-law").
199. Barsh, Progressive-Era Bureaucrats, supra note 193, at 10.




along with religious missionaries, set about dissolving the "glue" of Indian
society. 2
1. Cultural Liquidation
a) "Kill the Indian to Save the Man'
Of all the processes engineered to strip away the Indian sense of self, world
view, and tribal identity, perhaps the most nefarious was Congressional
funding of religious schools geared toward eradication of Indian culture and
the substitution of Euro-American, Christian culture in its stead.2' Beginning
in the late nineteenth century, Indian children were taken, often without
parental or tribal consent, to boarding schools where their hair was cut, their
tribal clothing exchanged for Western garb, forced manual labor was required,
and harsh abuses of a physical and sexual nature were meted out for speaking
tribal languages or engaging in customary religious practices.2 5 During their
residence, Indian children were prohibited from visiting their relatives, who,
as a result, they often did not see for years.2" Removed Indian children, and
their descendants down through the generations, have typically lost the use of
their languages, been denied cultural knowledge and inclusion, and been
deprived of opportunities to take on tribal responsibilities.2 7
at-law, an understanding that compulsion would be as necessary to effect disenculturation as it
was to steal land explains the application of plenary power, rather than proselytism.
201. The BIA is the executive agency responsible for U.S. intergovernmental relations with
the tribes and for discharge of the trust responsibility.
202. See ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 24.
203. In 1892, Captain Richard Henry Pratt, founder of the Carlisle Industrial Indian School,
opined that "all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him and save
the man." Atkinson, supra note 54, at 392.
204. See Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the United States: Indoctrinationfor
Subordination to Colonialism, in JAMEs, supra note 95, at 380-81 (noting that boarding school
curricula stressed Anglo-American, while stifling Indian, languages, cultures, and religions).
205. See id. at 371 (stating that Indian children in boarding schools were subjected to
beatings, whippings, and sexual abuse well into the twentieth century); see also Tsosie, Sacred
Obligations, supra note 49, at 1663 (terming this forcible process whereby full Indian
participation in, and knowledge of, their culture was denied beginning at an early age by non-
Indians as "natal alienation"); ROBERT A. TRENNERT, JR., THE PHOENIX INDIAN SCHOOL:
FORCED ASSIMILATION IN ARIZONA, 1891-1935 (1988).
206. See Pommersheim, supra note 186, at 256-57 (noting that denial of visitation, along
with opportunities to visit reservations, advanced the process of assimilation).
207. See Pritchard, supra note 44, at 263 (discussing deprivation of cultural patrimony
occasioned by removal of indigenous children); see also Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with
Words: Native Americans' Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 905-08 (1999) (detailing effects of suppression of Indian languages).
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b) American Crusade: Eradication of Indian Religion
While Indian children were spirited off to forced conversions at distant
boarding schools, the United States, exercising its plenary power, posted
Christian missionaries to the reservations as Indian agents with orders to ban
tribal religions, initiate Christianization of tribal populations, and pacify
political and cultural discourse." 8 At the behest of the Indian agents,
Congress launched abroad-based assault upon Indian religion with laws2' that
weakened "marriage, family and clan relationships, the distribution of
property, and social and political organization."21 Courts of Indian Offenses
("CIO") enforced these stringent social control mechanisms. 2 ' In arguing
before Congress for the suppression of tribal dancing and feasting, the
Secretary of the Interior proclaimed that "[i]f it is the purpose of the [U.S.] to
civilize the Indians, they must be compelled to desist from.., savage rites
and heathenish customs."21 For most of the twentieth century, non-Indians
played "cultural game warden," ' 3 circumscribing the legal exercise of Indian
religion. 4 Despite passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
208. See DELORIA, CUSTER DIED, supra note 52, at 108.
209. By 1892 the BIA Commissioner had listed the following offenses as within the
jurisdiction of the CIO: "participating in dances or feasts, entering into plural . . . marriages,
acting as medicine men destroying property of other Indians, and engaging in immorality, [and]
intoxication.. .." Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy
Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1033-34 (1995) [hereinafter Newton, Memory and
Misrepresentation].
210. Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal
Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 191, 194 (1989); see also United States v. Clapox, 35 Fed.
575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (characterizing CIO courts as civilizing instrumentalities).
211. By 1900 CIO/CFR Courts had been created on the majority of reservations, extending
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. See Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation,
supra note 209, at 1034. Judges were chosen from the ranks of"assimilated" Indians who were
willing to cut their hair, wear western attire, and accept land allotments. See Andrea M.
Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical Legal Education,
6 CLINIcAL L. REV. 127, 139 n.28 (1999).
212. Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation, supra note 209, at 1033.
213. Rosen, supra note 82, at 253
214. Instances of the denial of the right to practice Indian religion are legion. For several
generations the BIA suppressed Indian religious practices, particularly the Sun Dance, as
promoting "superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idleness,... and shiftless indifference to family
welfare." COHEN, supra note 178, at 175 n.347 (citing BIA Commissioner in 1921
congressional testimony). Rigid proscriptions of all manifestations of Indian religion have been
vigorously enforced by all three branches of the federal government for more than a century.
See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policies in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN.
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(AIRFA) establishing the federal policy to "protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise...
traditional religions," 5 in practice Indian religions have proven too enigmatic
for non-Indian jurists to admit them within the meaning of "religion" as
enunciated in the Bill of Rights.2" For Indian claimants, who have not won
L. REV. 773,792 (1997); Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer of Hope: A Proposal to Keep the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 Intact, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (chronicling prohibition
of all forms of traditional Indian religious practice). In recent times denials have often involved
the right to gather or use ceremonial natural materials. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S.
734 (1986) (finding in legislative history and text of a federal criminal statute extending
protection to eagles clear evidence of Congressional intent to exercise plenary power and
abrogate right of the Yankton Sioux to quiet and undisturbed possession of their reservation,
to include reserved right to hunt eagles); Sharon O'Brien, The Medicine Line: A Border Dividing
Tribal Sovereignty, Economies and Families, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 315 (1984) (noting
international travel restrictions and domestic laws prohibiting importation of flora and fauna
prevent Indians from crossing national boundaries to gather or trade sacred items as they have
done since time immemorial); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988) (discussed infra note 218).
215. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978)
(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000)) [hereinafter AIRFA] (declaring as grounds for
protecting and preserving expression of Indian religions against infringement by state action that
"the religious practices of the American Indian... are an integral part of their culture, tradition
and heritage[.]").
216. Racism, paternalism, and romanticism conspire to prevent protection oflndian religious
freedom except when it is possible to cram Indian claims into the pigeonholes of the Bill of
Rights and the European-derived values and traditions supporting notions of what religion
should be - organized churches, formal institutions, a separation between the church and state,
and a hierarchical relationship between the deity and worshiper. See GETCHES, supra note 158,
at 764 (explaining inability of non-indigenous federal judges to translate Indian claims under
AIRFA into cognizable claims). According to Getches:
Indian religious life does not include the existence of a church, periodic
meetings, ritual, and identifiable dogma. Instead, there is a pervasive quality to
Indian religion which gives all aspects of Indian life and society a spiritual
significance . .. Judicial understanding and protection of Indian religion are
hindered by a general unfamiliarity with Indian spiritual life, and perhaps even
intolerance for religious beliefs and practices not succinctly defined by the ancient
writings or a central authority familiar to European-developed religious traditions.
Id.
Conflicts over land use requirements exacerbate judicial unwillingness to draw Indian religions
within the penumbra of the Constitution. As Deloria notes:
America is content with religious denominations which are capable of squeezing
their entire experience with land into a city block, into a pew, and into a pulpit,
leaving plenty of environmental "elbow room" for the business of the real world.
As long as our religions tow [sic] the line insofar as they expect land to be
sacrificed to our needs, we are happy ... But when a religion dares to turn the
tables and encourages humans to make medicine, prayers, and sacrifices in behalf
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a single case of religious freedom since AIRFA was signed in 1978217 and who
may not celebrate the sacraments of their faith without threat of prosecution
for violation of controlled-substance or species-protection legislation, the
American tradition of religious freedom has been a "cruel hoax."21 With
AIRFA ineffectual in the courts and Congress unwilling to strengthen
statutory protection," 9 a new millennium reveals only that Indians' freedom
of other living things, we feel violated, bullied by "an agenda," and even irritated
at such "primitive" ideas which hold "progress" hostage.
Vine Deloria, Jr., Is Religion Possible? An Evaluation of Present Efforts to Revive Traditional
Religions, 8 WICAZO SA REv. 38-39 (1992).
217. See Sharon O'Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act,
in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN REUGIOUS FREEDOM 27, 29-30 (Christopher Vecsey, ed.,
1995); see also New Mexico Navajo Ranchers' Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d
729 (D.C. 1988) (obligating United States to consider impact of actions on Indian religion but
not obligating consultation with affected tribes nor halt to proposed action threatening imminent
destruction of material foundations of a tribal religion).
218. Suagee, supra note 9, at 712. Not only did AIRFA provide little intellectual support
for the finding that Indian religions were "religions" with respect to the Constitution, but it was
passed as a resolution without concrete mandate other than a requirement that federal agencies
evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with Indian religious leaders and report
findings to Congress. Nader & Ou, supra note 158, at 22-23. Moreover, judicial interpretation
further guts constitutional protection of Indian religious practice: in 1988 the Court, finding no
independent cause of action arising under AIRFA, upheld U.S. logging and construction
activities on National Forest lands used for religious purposes by several tribes, even while
conceding it was undisputed that the activities could have "devastating effects on ... Indian
religious practices," on the theory that to find otherwise would be tantamount to permitting a
religious servitude on public lands. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439,452-53 (1988) ("Whatever ights the Indians may have to the use of the area... those
rights do not divest the Government of its rights to use what is, after all, its land.") In 1990 the
Court again left Indian religion subject to political whim when it refused to apply the
"compelling state interest" test developed under the First Amendment to a Oregon general
prohibition on the use of peyote applied, in the case at bar, to essential religious practice by
members of the Native American Church: a majority held it would be "courting anarchy" to
"open the prospects of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind" and that "leaving accommodation to the political process" is the
appropriate means to determine the state interest in regulating Indian religion. Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990).
219. After Indian NGOs and human rights groups formed the American Indian Religious
Freedom Coalition and drafted the "Native American Cultural Rights Act" to assure greater
protection of sacred sites, rights to make religious use of peyote, and rights to take endangered
species as needed for religious purposes, Congress specifically overruled Smith and created
additional substantive protections for Indian religion. See GETCHES, supra note 158, at 169.
However, the Court struck down the result, unable to identify a history of religious bigotry
necessary to support the legislation as a remedial or preventive measure under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), an attempt to define the substance of,
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to preserve their religious beliefs "amounts to nothing more than the right to
believe that their religion will be destroyed. '2 ° Even as Indians continue to
assert that denial of their religious freedom is a deprivation of the highest
magnitude,"' the preservation of teachings, values, objects, and places for
which they bear sacred inter generational responsibility is yet diminished by
federal law.m
2. Suppression of Indian Self-Government
The United States' Indian policy has long disabled autonomous
determination of the political organization, economic development, and legal
regulation of Indian tribes and people, principally by disintegrating tribal
institutions and supplanting them with Euro-American forms of governance.
From the dark ages of the Allotment Era 23 to the present, Indian legal
institutions have presented an attractive point-of-entry to agents of forced
"social evolution" '224 whose labors have wrought the domination and physical
assimilation of Indian tribes and people.
rather than enforce under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the protections of the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause, thereby intruding into the general authority of states to
exercise police powers). Protection of Indian cultural patrimony, an important constituent of
Indian religion, has fared no better despite specific legislative attention. See Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. § 3001-13 (2000)
(instructing federal agencies and museums receiving federal funds to identify the origin of
Indian cultural items for purpose of expeditious return). By conditioning repatriation on tribal
assertion of an extant religious tradition associated with the cultural patrimony in question, as
well as proof of tribal capacity to care for the property, NAGPRA primarily serves the financial
interests of counsel for institutions asserting costly defenses to repatriation. See Harding, supra
note 195 (identifying limitations of NAGPRA).
220. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 477 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. See ARNE SVENSSON, THE ETHMNCS IN AMERICA 36 (1960) ("We believe in the inherent
right of all people to retain spiritual and cultural values, and that the free exercise of these values
is necessary to the normal development of a people.") (citing Declaration of Indian Purpose of
Chicago Conference of the National Congress of American Indians (1960)).
222. The emerging international indigenous rights regime, though more aspirational than
federal Indian law with respect to encouragement of Indian religious diversity, does not, for
reasons endogenous to the dualist U.S. legal system, serve as a particularly potent source of law
in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/135 (1992)(establishing broad protection for minority religions); Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,
G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/36/55 (1981) (declaring rights to
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, association, and institution formation).
223. The period 1887-1934 is referred to as the "Allotment Era."
224. MOORE, supra note 57, at 63.
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a) Legal Imperialism
Although no Indian tribe had codified a body of written law as of 1776,
many tribes had "rules of conduct and attitudes of the mind concerning their
kinship system."2 5 Tribal legal systems conditioned members to adhere to a
sacred system of well-elaborated tribal values of order, harmony,
interdependence, and peace.226 Consequently, disputes within the tribe were
typically resolved not in formal institutions using adjudicative procedures, but
rather with the aid of respected elders who would guide disputants to a
restorative compromise. "[Tihough it appeared to the casual white observer
that anarchy reigned,"2 7  spiritual consensus produced a coherent
jurisprudence that served Indian tribes well despite the absence of the
"paraphernalia of European civilization.""' In contrast, the Anglo-European
model imported by discovering nations focused on individual rights, the
placement of the burden of proof on accusers, and the punishment and
removal of offenders from the community by imprisonment. 9 Despite
225. Ken Traisman, Native Law: Law and Order Among Eighteenth-Century Cherokee,
Great Plains, Central Prairie, and Woodland Indians, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 273, 274
(1981 )(quoting John Phillip Reid, The Cherokee Thought: An Apparatus of Primitive Law, 46
N.Y.U L. REV. 281, 290 (1971)).
226. Traisman, supra note 225, at 274.
227. WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCULTURATION
AND CONTROL 11 (1966).
228. WIUCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA, 40(1975) [hereinafter WASHBURN,
INDIAN IN AMERICA]. Prior to Euro-American arrival, a system of Indian dispute resolution
existed in which, despite the absence of coercive centralized authority, enforceable economic
sanctions, supported by the severe sanction of ostracism, could be imposed via procedures
similar to a blend of contemporary mediation and arbitration. See id. at 40-41. Remarkably,
however, the guilt or responsibility of the parties was almost never at issue: the sole basis for
contention was typically the amount of restitution to be paid and the sole method for resolving
the dispute was negotiated consensus. No member of the tribe would presume to impose a
solution and individuals were simply not conceived of as possessing adjudicatory powers. See
Nancy A, Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian Peacemaker Courts in Michigan,
76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 875, 878 (1999) (noting that because serious disputes threatened to
disrupt the life of the entire tribe, resolution of such controversies required either the
interposition of family members or the assistance of "peacemakers" endowed with moral
authority). In sum, underpinning the traditional Indian dispute resolution model was the notion
that indigenous communities were organic. These communities horizontally constituted
egalitarian entities bound to coexist with nature or perish. For the tribe to function, balance and
harmony had to govern intra-tribal relationships. Disputes invariably opened rifts in the tribe
and thus required healing, not only of the parties directly affected but of the entire tribe.
229. See Robert Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlii" - We are Now in Good Relations: Navajo
Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 120 (1996) (contrasting vertical European legal
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retention of nearly exclusive subject matter and personal jurisdiction to the
territorial limits of their reservations even as of the late nineteenth century,"0
Indian tribes, with no easily identifiable legal institutions, procedures, or
records, were beset by a constellation of religious proselytizers, "friends of the
Indian," and BIA agents23' who, concluding Indians were without law or
justice,232 imposed legal "civilization." '233
The 1883 case of Exparte Crow Dog,23 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
systems, built upon coercive and hierarchical institutions, with horizontal Indian legal systems,
predicated upon egalitarianism and kinship relations); see also Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the]
Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557,
594-5 (1999) (distinguishing traditional indigenous legal systems, which emphasize
"accountability, truth, restoration, forgiveness and integration of the offender back into the
community," with adversarial legal systems that stress procedural rights and punishment).
230. Individual federal statutes had provided for piecemeal federal prosecution of crimes
occurring on Indian land since the eighteenth century. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92,
3 Stat. 383 (extending federal jurisdiction to crimes committed on reservations by non-Indians)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §1152 (2000). Still, the legal regulation of reservation
transactions not involving non-Indians was left intact well into the late nineteenth century, save
for the removal of virtually all tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See, e.g., United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (permitting Colorado to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
crimes of non-Indians against other non-Indians occurring on the Ute Reservation as no
exception was made to territorial jurisdiction on Colorado's admission to Union).
231. See Harring, supra note 210, at 191, 229.
232. See Zion & Yazzie,supra note 37, at 56-57 (contrasting U.S. practice with longstanding
international practice of recognizing the validity and legitimacy of indigenous law); see also
Porter, supra note 37, at 266 (discrediting indigenous regime of property rights as unworthy of
respect enabled colonizers to legally ratify expropriation of Indian land and displace Indian
methods of dispute resolution without moral reprobation).
233. See Harring, supra note 210, at 224 (quoting Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz in
1879 report to Congress) ("If the Indians are to be advanced in civilized habits it is essential that
they be accustomed to the government of law[.]")
234. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Spotted Tail, an authoritarian Brule Sioux chief who had staked
his political fortunes on accommodation with U.S. authorities, was shot and killed on the
reservation by his political rival, Crow Dog. After a peacemaking ceremony, the family of
Spotted Tail agreed to accept a payment from Crow Dog of $600, eight horses, and one blanket
to resolve the dispute. See Harring, supra note 210, at 199. Despite the satisfaction of the
entire Brule tribe, the case presented federal authorities the pretext for extension of federal
criminal law to Indians. Id. at 200-01. Crow Dog was arrested, tried in the Territorial Court of
South Dakota, and sentenced to hang by an all-white jury. Id. at 204-12. However, the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, albeit with reference to Indian "savagery," finding that
the Brule had the sovereign right to resolve, free from U.S. interference, disputes wholly internal
to the tribe. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 571-72 (refusing to extend U.S. criminal law to acts
occurring on Indian reservations on the ground that to do so would "measure[] the red man's
revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality."). Nonetheless, for a white majority Crow
Dog was a "legal atrocity" inasmuch as an Indian killer had "escaped punishment." Harring,
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overturned, for lack ofjurisdiction, the federal conviction of an Indian charged
with the murder of another Indian, induced Congress to extend the complete
coercive power of federal criminal law to the reservations. Determined to
rectify the barbarous, "savage quality" of tribal law and mollify public fervor,
Congress applied "white man's morality" 235 with the Major Crimes Act of
1885236 to expressly establish concurrent federal jurisdiction over major
felonies committed by Indians on reservations regardless of the status of their
victims.237 Legal challenges to the Major Crimes Act failed to reestablish
tribal legal self-determination but provided the judiciary occasion to further
undergird the trust doctrine and plenary power."S
The paternalistic assault upon Indian legal sovereignty, joined on the
religious front with the adoption of the CIO/CFR courts, intensified during the
Great Depression with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
("IRA" or "Dawes Act"). 9 Although the IRA expressly recognized that
tribes might create their own courts24° and enact their own laws,24' thelegislation imposed BIA-drafted boilerplate constitutions242 that created
supra note 210, at 191, 194.
235. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571. As Rep. Cutcheon (D-Mich.) stated before the Indian
Affairs Committee in 1884:
[A]n Indian, when he commits a crime, should be recognized as a criminal, and
so treated under the laws of the land. I do not believe we shall ever succeed in
civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for the law, and show them
that they are not only responsible to the law but amenable to its penalties. It is an
infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there should be
anywhere within its boundaries a body ofpeople who can, with absolute impunity,
commit the crime of murder[.]
16 CoNG. REC. 934 (1885).
236. Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2000) and expanded to fourteen felonies from the original seven).
237. The Major Crimes Act subjects Indians charged with fourteen serious felonies to
exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction regardless of the place of the alleged offense or the
identity of the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding, in suit challenging
Major Crimes Act as an unconstitutional extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over murder
on an Indian reservation, that Congress has plenary power, immune from judicial review, to
exercise authority over Indians as it sees fit, for their own "well-being").
239. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461-79
(2000)).
240. Although the IRA appeared to encourage tribal legal self-determination, tribal courts
created under the IRA were merely revamped CIO/CFR Courts, with American substantive law
governing judicial process and imposing a regime of individual rights hostile to traditional
Indian legal systems. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
241. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(c) (2000).




strange new substantive and procedural obligations. Moreover, after the
passage of Public Law 280 in 1954,243 providing that specified states could
unilaterally accept concurrent jurisdiction over Indian territory within their
borders, the entire body of state civil and criminal law was extended to classes
of cases involving Indians.' Fearing that failure to create acceptable tribal
courts would result in states taking jurisdiction over all cases occurring on
reservations,245 and understanding that review of plenary power in the exercise
of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian affairs was an exercise in futility,2' the
tribes begrudgingly implemented constitutions and adversarial justice
systems.247
The penultimate blow fell in 1968 with the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA"), 248 which imposed many of the individualist strictures of the U.S.
Constitution - in particular the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
implemented, only standardized, authoritarian tribal constitutions that mirrored a BIA-
promulgated model providing for no separation of powers or branches and incorporating harsh
restrictions on freedom of action in trade, property, land, and political associations, were
ratified). Furthermore, constitutions imposed by the IRA subject tribal governments to majority
rule principles and grant the Secretary of the Interior or his delegate, the BIA Commissioner,
veto power over almost all important tribal decisions. See Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux
(Dakota) Cmty. v. Babbitt, 107 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding review and veto powers of
Secretary of the Interior over tribal actions).
243. Public Law 280 (Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000),28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)). Although it expressly
disclaimed any grant to the states of power to tax Indian lands held in federal trust or to abrogate
Indian reserved rights under treaties, Public Law 280 extended state civil and criminal
jurisdiction to Indian tribes in California, Nebraska, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake
Reservation), Oregon (except for the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin. Alaska was
added in 1958. See id. Perhapsjust as significantly in terms of the deevolution of authority and
responsibility, Public Law 280 also shifted responsibility for administration and funding trust-
based Indian entitlement programs to the states. Id.
244. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,219 (1959) (upholding application of state law
to Indians absent a governing federal statute without explicitly overturning Worcester holding
that state law cannot be applied due to its harmful effect on tribal sovereignty).
245. See, e.g., Costello, supra note 228, at 896 (stating that the Navajo Tribal Courts were
reestablished to prevent state court jurisdiction over the Navajo nation).
246. See Nader & Ou, supra note 158, at 19 n.26.
247. See COHEN, supra note 178, at 332-35 (detailing U.S. role in the development of tribal
courts).
248. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301- 1303 (2000)). ICRA limits tribal powers to define and punish
offenses and imposes substantive due process provisions of Article III and the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution upon tribal
governments. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
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- on tribal governments249 and smoothed the way for what Indian activists
branded "white-man's justice." ' Although the ICRA amended Public Law
280 to require tribal consent for the exercise of state civil and criminal
jurisdiction and left interpretation of the legislation to the tribes themselves,25" '
by the early 1970s the centuries-long federal assault on tribal legal systems
had displaced pre-Columbian methods of social control from tribal courts252
where an Anglo-American adversarial legal system had acquired tenure. BIA-
drafted codes permitted tribal court judges to apply tribal statutes, yet federal
and state laws were supreme,2" and federal judicial review steered tribal court
jurisprudence into lockstep conformity with the U.S. legal system.25'
249. Indian tribes were not subject to Constitutional restrictions prior to ICRA. See Talton
v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that Indian tribes, as they are not states within the
meaning of the U.S. Constitution, are not subject to its restrictions); see also Donald L. Burnett,
Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557
(1972).
250. Rights of Members of Indian Tribes, Hearing on H.R. 15419 Before the Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 127
(1968) (statement of John S. Boyden) See also Porter, supra note 37, at 271-72 (indicating
ICRA "significantly altered the focus... from the tribal community towards the individual[.]");
Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 449 (1992) (disputing claim propounded by sponsors
that ICRA would aid Indian tribes in establishing "meaningful self-determination"). ICRA was
foreign to sacred tribal traditions of fairness and justice, and its reference to "due process,"
"equal protection," "speedy trial," and "freedom of speech" were an unwelcome intrusion on
tribal sovereignty. See Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement
Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity and
Asymmetry, 18 QuINNWIAC L. REV. 1 5 (1998).
251. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1326 (2000). Congress specifically provided that
interpretation of the ICRA was to be left within the authority of the tribes and admonished that
its purpose was protection of individual rights as against the administration of tribal justice
without eroding the parameters of tribal sovereignty. Laurence, supra note 250, at 135-36.
Furthermore, ICRA did not provide a remedy in federal court for a tribal member contesting the
legality of his detention by a tribal court, except for a writ of habeas corpus. See 25 U.S.C. §
1303 (2000).
252. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 40 (1983) (terming U.S. courts "jurispathic" as they destroy law
generated by interpretative communities such as tribal courts, which are "jurisgenerative").
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (c)(2000) (requiring state courts exercisingjurisdiction in Indian
Country to apply tribal laws and customs only "if not inconsistent with any applicable civil
law").
254. Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation, supra note 209. One of the most powerful
instruments in enforcing control is the doctrine of comity. A long-standing practice of
American courts is the denial of comity to tribal court judgments on the ground that tribal
justices systems do not accord sufficient due process, such denial courts of the United States are




Individual reliance on foreign legal concepts and advocacy removed Indian
disputes from their natural contexts2ss  and compounded growing
acrimoniousness in reservation communities.2"6 With tribal governments
increasingly shackled by American legal hegemony, enforcement of
judgments became far more difficult,27 further damaging tribal harmony.
2 8
When a landmark 1978 case25 9 extended the United States' legal colonization
of Indian tribes still further by denying them jurisdiction over the acts of non-
Indians occurring on reservations,2' a new generation of critical legal
jurisprudence, influenced by the Civil Rights Movement, began to question
the foundations and institutions of federal Indian law.26
Although tribal proactivity and federal interposition hold state law partly
at bay,262 at present Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction solely over
in Anglo-Saxon society." Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding individual rights to due process violated by closing argument in Tribal Court
referencing history of white oppression and genocide against Indians). Although U.S. courts
are quick to disavow any interest in judicial paternalism in derogation of tribal self-government
or Indian "dignity," denial of recognition of tribal court judgments utterly neuters the legal
autonomy of Indian tribes, particularly with respect to their trans-border legal contacts. See id.
at 1141-43.
255. See Richard E. Miller& Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, andDisputes: Assessingthe
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 525, 526 (1980-8 1) (constructing notion of"natural
contexts" for particular types of disputes).
256. See Steven Haberfeld & Joan Townsend, Power and Dispute Resolution in Indian
Country, 10 MEDIATION Q. 405,409 (1993) (noting that by the 1970s Indian tribes were split
into contending camps of traditionalists, who opposed violating the sanctity of tribal lands
through extractive commercial development, and modernists, who supported exploiting
collective tribal resources for jobs, income, status, and power); see also Zuni Cruz, supra note
229, at 596 (describing how adversarial system employed by tribal courts, by placing high value
on protecting individuals from excesses of the collective, compounded tribal rifts to the
detriment of the traditional "mutually beneficial relationship between the individual and the
community').
257. See Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation, supra note 254, at 1003.
258. See Porter, supra note 37, at 277-81 (arguing that adoption of litigation as primary
means of resolving interpersonal conflict pushed tribal members to focus on vindication of
individual rights, thereby marginalizing relationships).
259. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
260. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (denying Indian tribes inherent
power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within
reservation).
261. See Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation, supra note 254, at 1003. "Federal Indian
law," as distinguished from "tribal law," is the body of U.S. statutes, doctrines, and caselaw that
governs relations with Indian tribes.
262. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (stating that the Indian
Commerce Clause divested states "of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian
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consenting tribal members on fragmented remnants of former tribal
holdings.263 Even this vestige of sovereignty is threatened by the plenary
power to extend all federal, and, by inaction, state laws to the reservations.2'
Rediscovery of tribal dispute resolution methods after a century of legal
imperialism, and their reintroduction in Indian Country as an assertion of legal
autonomy, are pressing concerns of Indian scholars and activists,265 yet
reacquisition of Indian law is inadequate by itself to offset the crushing force
of federal Indian law, a mechanism "genocidal in both its practice and
intent.
,266
tribes"); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219, 223 (1959) (ruling that to permit states to exercise
jurisdiction over Indians where "essential tribal relations" are involved would "infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves."). But see County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (allowing states to tax reservation
lands held in fee); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980) (allowing states to tax cigarette sales on reservations); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S.
713 (1983) (allowing state regulation of on-reservation liquor sales); Seminole Tribe., 517 U.S.
at 76 (Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity of a state from suits by tribes, regardless of whether congressional intent
to do so is clear). The contentious battle between tribes and states over the precise boundaries
of Indian legal autonomy, fought increasingly on the plain of taxation, continues. See Robert
A. Fairbanks, Native American Sovereignty and Treaty Rights: Are They Historical Illusions?.
20 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 141 (1995-96) (predicting future state attempts to tax Indian tribes).
263. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 ("[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation."). Although the Montana Court recognized tribal competence to regulate aspects
of the dealings of non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with or threaten the political
or physical well-being of the tribe, subsequent decisions eroded these inherent powers still
further. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) ("Montana thus described a
general rule that, absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority
over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation...."). Presently, the
presumption is that Indian sovereignty over Indian land is absent unless Congress explicitly
legislates otherwise. Id. at 451.
264. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (providing that states
may exercisejurisdiction over Indian tribes where federal law does not preempt exercise of such
power, the conduct of non-Indians is at issue, and tribal self-government will not be impeded).
Although the complex web ofjurisdictional issues exceeds the scope of this Article, the general
pattern is the transfer of legal sovereignty from Indian tribes to federal and state governments.
265. See William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to
Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in Indian
Dispute Resolution, 76 N. D. L. REv. 551 (2000) [hereinafter Bradford, Reclaiming].
266. Williams, Algebra of Federal Indian Law, supra note 158, at 363-65 (implicating
federal Indian law in displacement of indigenous peoples, dissolution of tribal institutions,






Although Indian tribes are separate sovereigns in retention of all rights and
powers not explicitly ceded to the United States by treaty. 7 or abrogated by
explicit legislative intent,2' U.S. Indian policy has been generally hostile to
the right of Indian tribes to self-govern as politically distinct communities.269
If the theme of the nineteenth century was eradication of Indians and the
seizure of their land, the motif of the twentieth century was the destruction by
law of tribal sovereignty. With the passage of the IRA,27 Indian tribes,
traditionally hyper democratic and consensus-driven institutions,27' were
267. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). As separate sovereigns
predating the U.S. Constitution, Indian tribes possess inherent, residual powers of sovereignty
not deriving from Congressional grants. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (Pet.) 1, 16
(1831). These inherent recognized powers include, inter alia, powers to establish a tribal
government, determine tribal membership (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978)), administer justice, exclude persons from the reservation (see Quechan Tribe v. Rowe,
531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976)), charter business organizations, exercise police power, invoke
sovereign immunity (Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49 (1978)), levy taxes (see Confederated
Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. at 152-55), and regulate domestic relations (see Fisher v. Dist. Court,
424 U.S. 382 (1976). Still, although tribes retain many of the trappings of sovereign nations,
the exercise of inherent tribal powers may be abrogated or restricted by the operation of a treaty
or law of the United States or, in limited circumstances, by state laws. See Atkinson, supra note
54, at 427.
268. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). Several federal statutes have restricted
the political rights of Indian tribes to self-govern. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 545, 30
Stat. 571 (Curtis Act) (terminating territorial sovereignty of Indian Nations and depriving tribal
governments of functions). In recent years, the legal doctrine that the powers lawfully vested
in an Indian tribe are not delegated powers, but rather inherent concomitants of a limited
sovereignty never extinguished by the United States, has been under threat. See Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,219 (1999)(Rehnquist, C.J.) (dissenting)
(suggesting that rights reserved by Indian tribes under treaties may be "temporary and
precarious" if not explicitly guaranteed in perpetuity by the plain language of the texts) (quoting
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).
269. U.S. hostility to indigenous political forms found expression in official policy
statements supporting Allotment. See ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 94 (quoting BIA
Commissioner) ("[E])xisting forms of Indian government which [are] menacing the peace...
and irritating their white neighbors, should be replaced by a regularly organized Territorial form
of government[.]")
270. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576,48 stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-
491 (2000)).
271. See generally LARRY W. BURT, TRIBALISM IN CRisis (1982); see also BURNETTE &
KOSTER, supra note 154, at 15 (describing tribal governments prior to 1934 as council
democracies advised by elders that operated on principles of consensus and voluntary
compliance with decisions).
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reconstituted in the image of non-Indian society.. and subjected to the veto
power of the Secretary of the Interior." 3 Subsequent legislative and judicial
action has stripped artificially reconstructed Indian tribes of most of their
inherent sovereignty over their form, property, and powers.274 Relations with
post-IRA Indian tribes, rather than proceed as if between mutual sovereigns,
are conducted largely through a welter of executive agencies.275 As a result,
the terms and conditions of Indian existence are frequently dictated from
Washington, rather than debated on the reservations. 276 Federal agencies to
which Congress delegates power smother tribes under a blanket of regulation
and programming2 7 that, although it provides the means of subsistence,
272. See GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THENEWDEALAND AMERICAN INDIANTRIBALISM 29 (1980)
(terming post-IRA Indian tribes "artificial units of Indian political and social life").
273. See BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra note 154, at 183 (noting that BIA-adopted
constitutions grant the Secretary of the Interior veto power over most tribal actions and
decisions). For an opposing view, see AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 22-23 (Nicholas J.
Spaeth et al. eds., 1993) (suggesting the IRA replaced federal with tribal governance).
274. See LEGTERS & LYDEN, supra note 64, at 6-7 (noting that as a consequence of the
legislative and judicial diminution of their sovereignty, Indian tribes are now often junior
partner in the hierarchy of federal, state, local, and tribal governments).
275. See Thomas Biolsi, "Indian Self-Government" as a Technique of Domination, 15 AM.
INDIAN Q. 23 (199 1) (describing U.S. policy of"indirect rule" through nexus of federal agencies
and reorganized tribal structures). Indirect rule imposes fiscal, cultural, and social costs:
increased tribal bureaucratization associated with governance from afar consumes nearly half
of tribal budgets, far more than that allocated to economic development. WELLS, supra note
152, at 17-18.
276. See Clyde Warrior, We Are Not Free, in JOSEPHY, supra note 63, at 84 ("We are not
allowed to make those basic human choices and decisions about our personal life and about the
destiny of our communities... Our choices are made for us... by federal administrators,
bureaucrats, and their'yes men,' euphemistically called tribal governments."); see also Atkinson,
supra note 54, at 393 (describing exclusion of Indian organizations and individuals from agency
planning); ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 148-49 (noting that rather than foster time-honored and
socioculturally appropriate education, cultural expression, and economic development, federal
Indian agencies force tribal leaders to lobby for federal funding for social programs developed
without significant Indian participation).
277. Under the trust doctrine, the United States funds and participates in the management
of a welter of complex statutory programs, involving education, health, social services,
economic development, and resource management, on Indian reservations. See, e.g., Economic
Opportunity Program, Native American Program Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991 -92d (2000); Education
Program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 25 U.S.C. §2001 (2000); Job Training Partnership Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1792b (repealed, Aug. 7,1998); Indian Manpower Program, Pub. L. No. 93-
0203, 87 Stat. 239, (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§2301-02 (2000); Native American Languages Act,
Pub. L. No. 1 01-477, 104 Stat. 1154 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2902-06)(2000); Indian
Health Care Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-83 (2000). Although Indian participation in the
development and administration of these and other programs shapes them to fit tribal needs and




suppresses traditional modes of social control and value allocation, and the
Secretary of the Interior looms large over every aspect of tribal life."
Driven in part by the Civil Rights Movement, a "dawning recognition that
[Indians] must be freed from federal dominance.., and that Indian[s] must
have more control over ... their lives and institutions" '279 spurs calls to end
the fundamental asymmetry of U.S.-Indian relations. Nevertheless, several
decades after official introduction of the federal policy of "Indian Self-
Determination, many Indian tribes remain politically subordinate to and,
consequently, economically dependent upon the United States28" ' Whether
Congress.
278. ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 247 (noting veto power of Secretary of Interior over tribal
decisions).
279. SAR A. LEvrrAN, INDIAN GIVING: FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS IX
(1975).
280. The legal history of "Indian Self-Determination" shall be rendered in brief. In 1970
Congress delegated authority to the Secretaries of the Interior and Health, Education, and
Welfare to enter contracts with Indian tribes in which federal Indian programs would continue
to be funded by the United States but responsibility for planning and administration would be
assumed by tribal governments. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975 (ISDEA), 25 U.S.C. §§450-57 (2000). Support for Indian Self-Determination took on a
bipartisan tint in the early 1980s. See President Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, PUB.
PAPERS OF RONALD REAGAN 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) ("Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian
Tribes on a government-to-government basis"). Congress in turn authorized development of
enhanced self-governance plans under the rubric of a "New Federalism" advanced by the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act Amendments of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000) (allowing tribes to assume administration
of some BIA programs). Nevertheless, federal Indian agencies remained mired in entrenched
patterns of costly, ineffective and unresponsive provision of services. PEVAR, supra note 124,
at 32 (noting investigations implicating BIA as primary deterrent to development of Indian self-
government in areas of employment, housing, and health care). Throughout the 1980s Indian
Self-Determination simply decentralized the fiduciary relationship, and by the start of the 1990s
both major political parties, eager to decrease the financial drain of Indian welfare programs,
cut aid while pressing Indian tribes to enter the world of private enterprise. See VINE DELORIA
& CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 7 (1983). To wit, the Regan
and Bush Administrations recommended that federal agencies initiate extensive leasing and
exploitation of tribal resources and develop programs to lure non-Indian businesses to
reservations by offering tax advantages, regulatory relief, preferential contracting, and technical
assistance. WELLS, supra note 152, at 9, 347. Although the Clinton Administration urged
federal Indian agencies to adopt the Reagan principle of mutual sovereignty, many Indian tribes
remain, paradoxically, under pupilage. See 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (1994) (instructing each agency
to operate "within a government-to-government relationship" with Indian tribes); WELLS, supra
note 152, at 9-10 (elaborating on paradox wherein continued federal funding is necessary to
implement Indian Self-Determination). In short, politics, economics, and law impede Indian
self-government.
281. Empirical evidence suggests that, for Indian tribes, political domination produces
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political subordination of Indian tribes is the translation of the majoritarian
principle of democracy into action 2 2 or a statist demonstration, by
induction, of the inferiority of competing governance structures and
philosophies, 283 Indian Self-Determination, absent an ideological revolution
spanning from the treetops of the international human rights regime28 to the
economic dependence. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 54. Nonetheless, economics and
politics exert reciprocal influence, and economic dependence precludes the free exercise of
Indian sovereignty. See John C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving
Concept of Sovereignty, 39 BuFF. L. REv. 495,499 (1991) ("Indian economic development may
be less about creating wealth than it is about creating the conditions for political power[.]").
282. See ELY, supra note 73, at 135-79 (noting that democratic majorities violate the duty
of "equal concern and respect" for the interests of discrete and insular minority groups).
283. See MOORE, supra note 57, at 280-81 ("The... treatment [of the Indian] by the state
symbolically conveys a message of state power and intentions to larger audiences[.]").
284. Decolonization whetted interest in the customary international legal principle of self-
determination - the concept that institutions should be substantially and continuously guided
by the will of the governed. See U.N. Charter, supra note 3, arts. 1(2), 55, 56, 73 (calling for
"friendly relations among nations based on ...self-determination of peoples[.]"); 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess. (adopted Dec. 14, 1960), Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A14684
(1961) (calling for elimination of "alien subjugation"); 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess. (adopted Dec. 21, 1965), Supp. No. 14,
at II, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 (1966) (calling upon states to
eliminate colonialism); ICESCR, supra note 3, pt. I, art. 1(1) ("All peoples have the right [t]o
... freely determine their political status [and] ... development."); 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations(Friendly Relations Declaration), G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. (adopted Oct. 24, 1970), Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, U.N.
Doc. A/8208 1970 (charging states with duty to respect self-determination), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 1292 (1970); Convention No. 169, supra note 37, art. 6(1 )-(2) (requiring states to consult
with indigenous peoples as to the formation and endowment of indigenous institutions and
programs); Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 36th Sess., Agenda Item 1I, at 74, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.1983/21/Add.8, paras. 58-81 (1983) ("Self-determination must be recognized as
the basic precondition for the enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their fundamental rights");
Draft Declaration, supra note 192, pt. I art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right [to] freely
determine their political status and... development."); Western Sahara Case, I.C.J., Advisory
Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 33 (incorporating UNGA resolutions to "[firee association ... [and]
voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and
democratic processes.").
Issues of indigenous sovereignty, statehood, and membership in international organizations
have also found expression in the CIL of self-determination. States inhabited by indigenous
peoples may have the legal obligation to recognize them as independent states where they




roots of federal Indian law, will remain a chimera.
the capacity to enter into international relations. See Makauwa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map
ofAfrica: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113,1125 (1995) (noting practice
"favors the requirement that an entity be treated as a state if it attains the qualifications of
statehood"); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject
of International Law?, 7 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 33, 75 (1994) [hereinafter Barsh, Indigenous
Peoples in the 1990s] (suggesting obligations of Draft Declaration confer international legal
personality upon indigenous peoples). However, in practice the legal obligations owing from
states to peoples seeking self-determination are case-specific and fact-intensive: questions of
entitlement, the extent of the right, the process whereby the popular will is to be ascertained, and
remedies available for denial of the right provoke disagreement. See ANAYA, supra note 37, at
3 (describing conflict over definition of "peoples"); BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA FOR
PEACE, U.N. Doc. S2411 1, para. 11 (1992) ("if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group
claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation"); HAROLD S. JOHNSON, SELF-
DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 71-98 (1967) (discussing difficulties in
determining who is allowed to express self-determination). Despite inherent tension with state
sovereignty, however, self-determination can be actualized through forms of autonomous
association short of political independence. See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra, at 121,
principle V (refusing to authorize or encourage "any action which would dismember or impair
. . . [State] territorial integrity[.]"); Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, ACHPR/RPT/
8th/Rev. 1, Annex VI, Comm. 75/92, at 9 (1994-95) ("[S]elf-determination may be exercised
[as] independence, self-government, local government, federalism, confederalism, [or]
unitarism[.]"); FERNANDO R. TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-56 (1998)
(contrastingjustifications for indigenous rights to self-determine with liberal critiques); ANAYA,
supra note 37, at 83-84 (noting redress of historical violations of self-determination does not
require reversion to status quo ante or formation of new states). Still, states have tended to cast
the question, particularly for indigenous peoples whose claims to prior sovereignty are
embarrassing, as an "all-or-nothing" issue. MORTON H. HALPERIN & DAVID J. SCHEFFER, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 60 (1992) (noting state fears that self-
determination translates into secessionism); Suagee, supra note 9, at 674 (noting spectrum of
official government policies regarding indigenous self-determination ranges from the
paternalistic to the formally assimilative to the "genocidal use of military force"). Although
secession may be appropriate where violations of indigenous rights are permanent features of
governance, the crowning glory of the indigenous rights regime - the Draft Declaration - is
meant to strengthen protection of self-determination without posing such a threat. See id. at 692
("Most indigenous peoples do not seek recognition as independent states, but rather seek to
establish [autonomy] within their traditional territories."). Nonetheless, states, jealous of
sovereign prerogatives, have prevented that instrument - currently under discussion by
UNHRC - from reaching the General Assembly for a vote. Eica I. Daes, Dilemmas Posed by
the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Autonomous Assembly of
Indigenous Peoples, in 2 INDIGENOUS AFF. 52 (1995) (discussing contentious drafting process).
While the idea that they should enjoy the right to self-determine through institutions reflective
of their culture is gaining theoretical force, many indigenous peoples remain trapped in webs
of politico-economic dependence. See Mireya Maritza Pena Guzman, The Emerging System of
International Protection oflndigenous Peoples'Rights, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 251,256 (1996)
(examining indigenous self-determination globally).
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c) Ethnodevelopmental Suppression
Despite significant endowment with resources natural and human,"5 many
Indian tribes28 6 remain ensnared in a web of economic dependence
8 7
deliberately fashioned by the United States over centuries288 from the strands of
institutionalized domination," 9  geographic dislocation, gross
undercapitalization,29 and various legal disabilities. Although the non-legal
285. The irony of Indian poverty is rendered all the more acute by reference to the abundant,
sustainable resources in Indian Country. Timber, hydroelectric sources, grazing land, minerals,
oil and gas, and wildlife abound. However, few tribes own the mineral resources on their
reservations, and the United States, as trustee, controls leasing and production of these assets.
See, e.g., Prince, supra note 55, at 23942 (noting that federal management of the $27 billion
of mineral assets on the Crow Reservation currently yields a return of only .01 percent to the
tribe).
286. The conditions of each reservation are as distinct as are the more than five hundred
tribes; several "report a sense of pride and accomplishment" in recent development of
autonomous programs which include "law enforcement, education, organic farming, sustainable-
resource logging, recycling plants, construction, environmental repair industries, language and
culture academies, arts and crafts workshops, casinos, buffalo ranches, resorts, solar and wind
energy production, computer assembly, tribal courts, veterans affairs offices, housing, road
improvement, sanitation, etc." Atkinson, supra note 54, at 430.
287. See Daniel Boxberger, Individualism or Tribalism? The "Dialectic" of Indian Policy,
15 AM. INDIAN Q. 29, 29 (1991) (noting "complex factors that have shaped tribal institutions
... [as] dependent, internal colonies"); see also ROBERT H. WHITE, TRIBAL ASSETS: THE
REBIRTH OF NATIVE AMERICA 7 (1990) ("Less than 10 percent of (Indian] communities have.
. any control over their economic fate[.]"). In addition to dependence upon the United States
for social services, many tribes rely upon low-wage federal and state jobs and the export of
nonrenewable natural resources for subsistence. WELLS, supra note 152, at 361-71.
288. A federal policy of promoting Indian economic dependence as a technique of reducing
the costs of direct political domination traces to the earliest foundations of the United States
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Carroll (Apr. 15, 1791), in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS,
supra note 96, at 976-77. ("The most economical as well as most humane conduct towards
[Indians] is to bribe them into peace, and to retain them in peace by eternal bribes." ). Id.
Although time has witnessed a progression to more subtle forms of dependence, a system of
annuities and transfer payments has held Indian tribes captive to the beneficence of the United
States for their economic viability and, in some cases, their physical existence, for generations.
See CADWALADER& DELORIA, supra note 85, at 136. For an examination ofdependency theory
as applied to Indian economies, see, e.g., ROBERT D. WALLERI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL EQUAuTY: A TEST OF DEPENDENCY THEORY (1976) (suggesting, by analogy,
that the U.S. deliberately under develops Indian reservations through resource extraction and
welfare payments); WELLS, supra note 152, at 377-78 (accusing federal agencies of "internal
colonization").
289. See Mohawk, supra note 281, at 496-97 (suggesting Indian economic development is
hostage to BIA interference with organization of independent political communities).
290. See Robert Williams, Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol27/iss1/1
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obstacles to Indian economic independence, the first and foremost goal of tribal
governments,29' are very real, the constraints imposed by federal Indian law are
even more formidable.
The United States holds trust title to Indian lands and resources,292 and Indian
property owners cannot sell, lease, or borrow against their property without the
express approval of the Secretary of the Interior.293 As the very question of
Secretarial approval introduces political uncertainty,294  trust-
Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Acts of1982,22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 335,
343-52 (1985) (relating remoteness of reservations from centers of commerce and education to
difficulty in accessing markets, capital, and managerial expertise).
291. See WITE, supra note 287, at 273. Still, tribal governments do not always speak with
a single voice as to the appropriate developmental path: there is a broad intra and intertribal
diversity of opinion as to the objectives, pace, and direction of Indian economic development.
Federal approaches advanced in recent years by the Task Force on Indian Economic
Development stress external investment, regulatoryrelief, preferential contracting, and technical
assistance to support the development of postmodem reservation industries. See Prince, supra
note 55, at 256; see also Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture
Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REv. 711, 724-35 (1996) (discussing "modernist"
approach to Indian economic development). However, "traditionalist" Indian tribes cherish
fidelity to a non-materialist and collectivist political economy that eschews acquisitiveness in
favor of a group commitment to culture; such tribes elect traditional indigenous modes of
production such as hunting, fishing, and trading through kinship groups. See Suagee, supra
note 9, at 709-10 (noting that rather than maximize material wealth, traditional indigenous
economic development strives to "preserve and transmit language[,.. .] religion and culture;
to preserve sacred places; to record and retain oral history;... and to... maintain the integrity
of communities[.]"); LOPACH ET AL., supra note 179, at 117 (expressing traditionalist view that
the modernist development approach imports economic, political, and cultural values hostile to
Indian culture and, thereby, to Indian self-government). Schismatic disputes between
traditionalists and modernists have rocked a number of tribes and damaged their relations with
non-Indian parties, with gaming and industrial dumping but two among many catalysts. See
WELLS, supra note 152, at 341; Tom Gorman, Tribe Seeks to Store Nuclear Waste,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jun. 2, 2002, at A3 (noting seizure by State of Utah of road leading into
Goshute reservation to prevent tribe from importing radioactive waste under terms of a lucrative
contract). Still, a pan-Indian near-consensus favors independent Indian allocation, free from
non-Indian mediation, of the cultural values informing Indian economic life. ANDERSON, supra
note 54, at 246. Time will tell whether Indian sovereignty, prosperity, and culture can coexist.
292. The United States defines the trust responsibility as the obligation to assert plenary
power "to ensure the survival and welfare of Indian[s]" by "provid(ing] those services required
to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and self-government, and "to raise the[ir]
standard of living.. .to a level comparable to the non-Indian society." WELLS, supra note 152,
at 19.
293. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 393, 396, 415, 483 (2000) (providing that an Indian individual or
tribe who wishes to sell, convey, lease, or mortgage property in Indian Country for a period
greater than one year must first secure the permission of the Secretary of the Interior).
294. Justifications for congressional refusal to consign the trust doctrine to the ashcan of
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based land-tenure constraints diminish the relative output-values of land-
intensive enterprises such as agriculture, ranching, and resource development.295
Moreover, federal management of Indian resources grants the government
paternalistic control over Indian economic destiny.' Although the United
States is under a moral obligation to husband Indian resources, diligently
advance Indian land claims against the states, secure adequate funding for Indian
social services, 97 and enhance the economic well-being of Indian people,29
history focus on the claim that the trust is necessary to protect Indians from exposure to market
forces and the improvident disposal of their property. See PERRY, supra note 102, at 16.
However, it is questionable at best whether the increasingly sophisticated tribes of the twenty-
first century are any longer in need of the "protection" afforded by an inept trustee such as the
United States has demonstrated itself to be. Critical examinations of BIA management
decisions, as well as recent case law, support the argument that the trust doctrine operates as
legal dressing for the assertion of federal politico-economic power for the benefit of non-Indian
constituencies, such as industries that compete against, or rely upon raw materials derived from,
Indian interests. See WELLS, supra note 152, at 379 (identifying trust doctrine as facilitating
corporate exploitation of Indian lands and resources); see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp.
2d 1, 7-11 (D.D.C. 1999) aff'd sub sub nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.D.C. 2001)
(finding as a matter of fact that the purpose of the trust doctrine was to "deprive [Indians] of
their native lands and rid the nation of their tribal identity" in order to avail non-Indians of tribal
lands and resources). Within this understanding of the trust, agency decisions regarding Indian
property are inherently governed by political considerations, rather than fiduciary concerns.
295. See ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 134 (illustrating process whereby the trust imposes
opportunity costs, bureaucracy, and dependence rather than permits self-determination).
296. Royalties earned from leases of rights on Indian lands are paid not to Indian individuals
or tribes but are deposited by the BIA, in theory, into trust accounts. See 25 U.S.C. § 415(a)-
(d)(2000). However, a 1996 federal audit discovered that the BIA could not account for $2.4
billion in Indian monies ostensibly safeguarded in federal trust funds. See Atkinson, supra note
54, at 427. Indian beneficiaries seeking remedies for breach of trust must confront the fact that
federal authority over Indian resources held in trust is legally limited only by the requirement
of "good faith." See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (holding that
United States, as trustee, may alter the form of trust assets as long as it attempts, in good faith,
to provide property of equivalent value).
297. Although the trust imposes a moral obligation upon the United States to provide
funding for Indian social services, the process whereby such funds are made available is a
paradigm of inefficiency and paternalism: only a fraction of what Congress allots to the BIA
reaches Indian tribes, and monies are specifically earmarked for programs selected by the BIA
despite tribal determinations that funds are better allocated elsewhere. WELLS, supra note 152,
at 20-21. Nevertheless, the United States has created a series of Indian benefit programs that
purport to uphold its obligations under the trust responsibility. See National Historic
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470(a) (2000) (providing particular protection to properties with
cultural and religious importance to Indian tribes); National Museum of the American Indian
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 80(q)-(q)(1 5) (2000) (creating museum exclusively for preservation and study
of history and artifacts of Indians); Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act,




federal agencies have withheld basic subsistence,2' mismanaged tribal
resources, 300 and violated the animating principles of the trust with near-
impunity: only in very recent years has the trust doctrine charged the United
States with judicially enforceable obligations apart from those incorporated in
specific treaties, statutes, or executive orders.30' Although the protective
dimensions of the trust doctrine have broadened,302 aggrieved Indian
drug abuse); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (2000) (according
Indian languages statutory protection); Workforce Investment Act of 1998, 20 U.S.C. § 2911
(2000) (supporting Indian employment); AIRFA, supra note 215 (pledging to protect and
preserve Indian religions); Native American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991-2992
(2000) (creating financial and cultural benefit programs); Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Program Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4577(cX4)
(2000) (giving preference to grant applications aimed at combating Indian alcoholism); Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000) (protecting
Indian burial sites and remains).
298. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
299. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 280, at 181 (charging both major political parties with
default on financial obligations arising under trust doctrine).
300. See S. REP. No. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 105-29, 140 (1989) (documenting century
of theft of Indian oil and gas). In the most recent breach of Indian trust case, a federal court,
finding the United States in breach of a common-law fiduciary obligation due to its "long and
sorry history" of gross mismanagement of over $500 million in 300,000 individual Indian
Money Accounts, retained continuing jurisdiction to enforce an accounting but stopped short
of ordering further remedies unauthorized by statute. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7
(D.D.C. 1999), aff'd sub. nom. Cobell v. Norton, No. CIV.A.96-1285 (RCL), 2002 WL
1480903 (D.D.C.). Although the Secretary of the Interior concedes the issue of gross federal
mismanagement and resulting disarray, the means proposed as the most cost-effective to make
an accounting - statistical sampling - would cost Indian claimants more than $70 million:
whether relief will ever be afforded is uncertain, although the Court maintains jurisdiction and
defendants' are currently required to file reports as to trust reform activities. Id. See also
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribe of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Norton, 211 F. Supp. 2d
157 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding case-at bar presented same questions of law and fact as in Cobell,
a "related" case, and refusing to refer case-at-bar, and other related tribal cases, to Calendar
Committee).
301. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no
general obligation under trust doctrine entitling tribes to rights broader than those created by
statute). Moreover, tribes must exhaust administrative remedies for claims of breach of trust to
be justiciable. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677-78 (9th Cir.
1988).
302. The full range of obligations owed under common law principles of fiduciary duty is
broad. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170-72 (1959)(listing, inter alia, duties to
exercise diligence and prudence, avoid conflict of interest, deal fairly, and assume liability for
loss). A few limit federal management of the Indian trust. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States,
261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (construing statute in light of trust doctrine to protect Indian right of
occupancy); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)(judging U.S.
conduct with respect to Indians "by the most exacting fiduciary standards"); Joint Tribal Council
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beneficiaries still lack effective legal recourse for its breach. 3
Plenary power, as well as judicial review of its exercise," further stifles
Indian economic development by enabling Congress to terminate federal
benefits3 5 andrestrict ° or even abrogate Indian rights reserved under treaties 7
of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (enforcing fiduciary
obligations to Indians). For a discussion of judicial efforts to expand enforcement, see Reid
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1213 (1975).
303. See COHEN, supra note 178, at 169 (noting full body of common-law duties and rights
"does not exist between the [U.S.] and the Indians"); Cobell, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 7-11 (holding
federal courts are limited by separation of powers considerations in reviewing executive
management of Indian resources and, where not authorized by statute, cannot function as "a
grievance committee"). As of 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court has never granted relief for a
breach of duty arising under the trust doctrine as defined generally at common law: relief for a
putative breach is available only in those limited circumstances where the United States acts in
the narrow and specific role of(quasi)private, rather than public, trustee. See Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (holding when the United States acts generally under the trust
doctrine it "cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary"); Loudner v. United
States, 108 F.3d 896, 901-02 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding allegations of federal mismanagement
state compensable claim whenever United States assumes "elaborate control" over Indian assets
even absent authorizing statute creating trust relationship).
304. Two centuries after Worcester the Supreme Court continues to permit the exercise of
plenary power "where . . . broad discretionary powers were vital to the solution of the
immensely difficult 'Indian problem."' Williams, Algebra of Federal Indian Law, supra note
158, at 261. Recently, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that will illuminate
the future direction of the trust doctrine in terms of its domestic enforceability. See United
States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, No. 01-1067 (Dec. 2,2002); United States v. Navajo
Nation, No. 01-1375 (Dec. 2, 2002).
305. L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenium, 96
CoLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1996).
306. Congressional plenary power to regulate Indian treaty rights for conservation purposes
is beyond the scope of the present analysis, as are corresponding state powers. See Puyallup
Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (upholding federal conservation
statute regulating Indian treaty rights); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (finding tribal reserved rights to hunt and fish can
coexist with State management plan).
307. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text (elaborating doctrines ofreserved rights
and Congressional plenary power and their intersection in federal Indian law). The legal
standard for abrogation of Indian treaties remains "plain and unambiguous" Congressional
intent. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,247-48 (1985); see also Lac
du Flambeau Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 759 F. Supp 1339 (1991) (same);
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. at 740 (establishing that "Congress actually [has to have]
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on
the other, and chose[n] to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty."). Absent such clear
and unambiguous intent, federal courts have read reserved rights to require imposition of




Domestic lobbying to induce Congress to allow non-Indian economic interests
access to Indian resources °" threatens tribes with divestiture of sustenance,
culture, religion, and income.3" Furthermore, although Indians, as prior
sovereigns, reserved rights in treaties to, inter alia, use water,1 ° hunt and fish,
and engage in traditional modes of production and worship on customary lands
and waters,3t' recent federal jurisprudence suggests that Indian reserved rights
are "temporary and precarious"3"2 privileges subject to revocation even in the
absence of explicit Congressional intent to abrogate them.313 The synergy of the
lands and waters, insulate tribes from state licensing fees, and protect against discriminatory
state regulations. See Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit
and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L.
REV. 407, 500 (1998) (enunciating negative and affirmative duties of United States and states
to protect Indian reserved rights).
308. Recent critics of Indian reserved rights have attacked the foundations of the reservation
system itself, not merely as "some sort of Rube Goldberg device for the control of Indian
people" but as an inefficient, ineffective system. Several call for the dissolution of reservations
and the redistribution of reservation-based resources. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 57, at 274.
309. Indian reserved rights to fish, hunt, use water, and possess land have been frequent
subjects of violent treaty abrogation campaigns. See, e.g., Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y
v. Slater, No. 98-36053, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3525 (Mar. 4, 1999) (affirming decision of
District Court in refusing to grant preliminary injunction to prevent Coast Guard from
implementing rule establishing protective zone around Makah Indian tribe exercising reserved
right to whale); John Enders, Oregon Farmers Rejoice at Water's Release, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 30,2002, at A2 (reporting conflict between Klamath Indian religious rights to take fish and
farmers' interest in use of dammed water in Oregon). For a discussion of the cultural and
religious importance of hunting and fishing rights to Indian tribes, as well as a sketch of the"
dimensions and intensity of the conflict over Indian reserved rights and their intersection with
and opposition to non-Indian economic interests, see Shelley D. Turner, The NativeAmerican's
Right to Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System,
the Effect of European Contact and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M.
L. REv. 377 (1989).
310. Political and legal machinations of the so-called "iron triangle" - interlocking
directorates of the Bureau of Reclamation, state officials, and corporate interests - have denied
Indians the beneficial use of water rights and permitted appropriation by non-Indian interests.
See LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 23 (1991).
For a discussion of this contested Indian right, see Taiawagi Helton, Indian Reserved Water
Rights in the Dual-System State of Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L J. 979 (1998).
311. Analysis of access to resources on lands ceded by treaty tracks closely with reserved
rights in land not ceded, with explicit congressional intent the standard for abrogation. See
Oregon Dep't of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985) (termination of
usufructuary rights requires express statutory language and cannot be inferred).
312. See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504,515 (1886)(holding Indian usufructuary rights
are "temporary and precarious" privileges that do not survive admission of the state in which
those rights are exercised into the Union).
313. Recent case law suggests that, while the standard for abrogation remains clear
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICANINDIANLA WREVIEW
trust doctrine, plenary power, andjudicial review ofindian treaties in derogation
of Indian rights are felt most acutely when tribes employ development methods
that promote Indian culture, spirituality, and identity." 4  As Indian
"ethnodevelopment ' 5 threatens the regulatory jurisdiction, market power, and
legal sovereignty of the states" 6 and the United States,3"7 federal Indian law has
expression of congressional intent, legal protection of Indian reserved rights is backsliding. See,
e.g., Western Shoshone Nat'l Council v. Molini, 951 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding ICC
finding that Shoshone reserved rights to hunt and fish were extinguished "by gradual
encroachment by whites"); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 994 (1 0th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221 (1996) (treaty rights reserved "during the pleasure of the President"
abrogated by equal-footing admission of Wyoming into the Union on ground that "Race Horse
is alive and well") (citing Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 504); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 562 U.S. 172,224-25 (1999) (finding Indian reserved rights, where they can
be construed to operate in derogation of state sovereignty, are mere privileges subject to state
regulation) (citation omitted).
314. Indian culture is a meta-value informing and legitimizing Indian politico-economic
organization. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES 246 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992).
Preferences, institutions, and strategies are determined by Indian culture, and observers identify
BIA failure to craft development plans that enjoy a cultural "goodness of fit" as a primary
determinant of relative Indian deprivation. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 55, at 19 (positing
cultural fit as condition precedent to sustainable Indian development).
315. See Guzman, supra note 284, at 257 (defining "ethnodevelopment" as autonomous
economic activity comporting with religious and cultural requirements of equatability,
sustainability, and, intergenerational responsibility). An accrediting body of CIL recognizes the
right to ethnodevelopment. See Convention No. 169, supra note 37, art. 7 (recognizing right
of indigenous people to control and participate in development process "as it affects their lives,
beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being"); United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 47th sess.,
Principle 10 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/REV. 1 reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (emphasizing
duty to protect ethnodevelopmental rights of indigenous peoples); Draft Declaration, supra note
192, art. 26 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use... the lands,
air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources which they have
traditionally owned or... used."). For Indian tribes, hunting, fishing, and other methods of
ethnodevelopment are religious duties that reinforce stewardship.
316. Indian gaming, though but one of the economic modalities that generate competition
and conflict with the states, is perhaps the most visible. See Mezey, supra note 291, at 736
(noting that states may soon enter the gaming market as competitors with tribes).
317. Profound polarization of belief systems and underdeveloped historical understandings
conspire to deprive Indian tribes of ethnodevelopmental rights, as a recent case illustrates. In
1855 the Makah reserved the right to hunt gray whales as they had for millennia in traditional
waters off the coast of Washington State. See Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Makah Tribe of Indians, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939. By the 1920s, non-Indian whalers had
hunted gray whales to near-extinction, and the Makah, motivated by a deep religious connection
to gray whales, voluntarily ceased whaling. When by 1993 gray whales were no longer
endangered as a matter of U.S. law, the Makah asked the United States to espouse their petition




been carefully crafted to check its expression.
3. Forced Assimilation
Early U.S.-Indian treaties did not contemplate incorporation of Indians as
United States citizens, and later treaties incorporated only those individuals who
had been objectively "detribalized." ' Against the force of a clear general
preference for a primary affiliation with tribal institutions,3"9 federal Indian
policy, for more than a century, has subsumed individual Indians within the
broader body politic, thereby facilitating seizure of tribal lands and resources,
elimination of contending governmental entities,320 and eradication of a critical
mass of practitioners of alien cultures and religions "stand(ing) in the way of
progress." 2' The first such assimilative measure, Allotment, divested many
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 stat. 1716 161
U.N.T.S. 72 (prohibiting whaling listed species without a permit). Although the United States
assisted the Makah in receiving a quota to whale under international law, the 9th Circuit
interpreted procedural provisions of U.S. environmental legislation narrowly so as to divest their
substantive right to whale. See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting
U.S. executive action in support of Makah petition prior to completion of Environmental
Assessment as violation of timing requirements of NEPA); William Bradford, "Save the
Whales" v. Save the Makah: Finding Negotiated Solutions to Ethnodevelopmental Disputes in
the New International Economic Order, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 155 (2000) (discussing case).
318. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous
Peoples, 15 HARv. BLACKLETTER J. 107, 108-09 (1999) (discussing mechanisms whereby
Indians became citizens prior to 1924, including acceptance of individual share of communal
land holdings and assumption of "characteristics and mannerisms of a civilized person").
319. See SVENSSON, supra note 221, at I (noting Indian ambivalence to participation in U.S.
polity and general preference for tribal affiliation over exclusive identification as U.S. citizens;
see also Rosen, supra note 82, at 246 ("Many [Indian tribes] want true self-governance to the
exclusion of any other polity; many do not want citizenship imposed upon them[.]").
320. See Herz, supra note 195, at 691-92 (stating indigenous groups "undermine political
and social stability by creating an orthodoxy in competition with ... the dominant culture" that
"undermines the state's claim to territorial sovereignty as well as its status as the representative
of all citizens[.]"). The solution to the problem of competing governance regimes is, for many
states, the assimilation of indigenous peoples, whether through force or co-optation. Id.
321. LOPACH ET AL, supra note 179, at 20; see also DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 280, at
24 ("American Indian[s]... have experienced cultural imperialism not merely as an unspoken
[social] phenomenon . . . but through government policies that promoted their forcible
assimilation[.]"); RUSSELL. BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY viii (1980) (chronicling "a history of attempts to subvert [tribal]
consciousness and replace it with the naked, alienated individualism[.]"). As with many other
dimensions of U.S. Indian policy, many assimilationists attach benign purposes to their
proposals; "friends of the Indian" suggest assimilation is promotive of racial and ethnic
harmony. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1992); J.
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Indians of their lands and created great physical and social distance between
them and their tribes.322 The imposition of U.S. citizenship in 19243" added
legal momentum to forced assimilation by foisting an awkward dual allegiance




Although assimilationist pressure abated during the Depression and World
War I, with the onset of the Cold War and mounting fears of enemies within,2
the preservation of distinct political communities within U.S. boundaries became
too offensive for many non-Indians to tolerate. 2 House Concurrent Resolution
108, known colloquially as Termination, exercised plenary power to "make the
Indians... subject to the same laws and... responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the [U.S., and] to end their status as wards[.]327 Termination,
under the direction of the former head of the War Relocation Authority,328 ended
Harvie Wilkinson, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural
America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1995). This "benign Indian assimilationism" flies in the face
of culturally deprived, economically dependent urban Indians, who, as a consequence of their
inability to participate meaningfully in either traditional tribal or majoritarian societies, suffer
physical and mental ills. See WELLS, supra note 152, at 61 (correlating increased incidence of
Indian social pathology with assimilationist policies that divided kinship groups and divested
Indians of culture); LAURENCE FRENCH, THE WINDS OF INJUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT xvi (1994) (discussing challenges facing assimilated urban Indians).
322. See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
323. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (Indian Citizenship Act) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000) (granting citizenship to all non-citizen Indians born within the
territorial limits of the United States)).
324. See Joseph William Singer, The Stranger Who Resides With You: Ironies of Asian-
American andAmerican Indian Legal History, 40 B.C. L. REV. 171, 174 (1998). Although the
Indian Citizenship Act ("ICA") provided that "citizenship shall not in any manner impair or
otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property[,]" in practice Indian
citizenship continued to be perceived by some in practice as less than fully compatible with U.S.
citizenship, as it had, as a matter of law, prior to the ICA. See e.g., United States v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278, 291 (1909)(holding, in evaluating a 1906 amendment to the Allotment Act
deferring grants of citizenship to Indians for a 25-year period, that "Congress, in granting full
rights of citizenship to Indians, believed that it had been hasty."). Id.
325. LEGTERS & LYDEN, supra note 64, at 7.
326. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 280, at I l1.
327. H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953) (enacted), repealed by 25 U.S.C. § 2502
(2000).
328. Perhaps uncoincidentally, the BIA Commissioner responsible for executing
Termination, Dillon Meyer, served as Head of the War Relocation Authority, the agency to




the U.S. trust relationship with over 100 selected tribes,329 curtailing federal
benefits and services, forcing dissolution of tribal governments, and distributing
former tribal lands and assets on a per capita basis.33° By legislatively
disappearing Indian tribes,33' Termination stripped Indian people not only of
primary sources of political allegiance and economic sustenance but of sacred
sites and other fonts of cultural renewal. Assimilationist pressure mounted, and
FRENCH, supra note 321, at 60; see also Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
329. H.R. CON. REs. 108, 83rd Cong.(1953) (authorizing administrative and Congressional
action to terminate tribes in California, Florida, New York, and Texas; the Flathead of Montana;
the Klamath of Oregon; the Menominee of Wisconsin; the Potowatamie of Kansas and
Nebraska; and the Chippewa of North Dakota); Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The
Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151 (1977) (identifying 109
terminated tribes). Although the process whereby tribes were selected for Termination is a
question beyond the scope of this Article, scholars note positive correlations with tribal wealth
and political activism. CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 85, at 119.
330. H.R. CON. RES. 108, (1953).
331. Termination has been partially reversed: thirty-one previously terminated tribes have
been reinstated to federally-recognized status. See, e.g., Menominee Restoration Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 903-903 (2000); Oklahoma Indians
Restoration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-281, 92 Stat. 246 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 861-861(c)
(2000)); Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restoration Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-227,94 Stat. 317
(codified at 25 U.S.C. 761-768 (2000)). However, many tribes remain terminated or
unreconstituted and therefore unrecognized, a status which precludes availment ofthe protective
aspects of the trust doctrine as well as the legal entitlements that accrue as a result of
recognition, such as, e.g., eligibility to game. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (differentiating between recognized and
unrecognized tribes for purposes of inclusion within protections ofthe trust doctrine); Mashpee
Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979)
(holding an Indian tribe may lose its tribal status by ceasing to function as a distinct, identifiable
entity); 62 Fed. Reg. 55270 (1997) (listing, as required under 25. U.S.C.A. §479a-1, tribes
recognized as eligible for federal services). Federal recognition can arise under a treaty, statute,
executive or administrative order, or a course of dealings. Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d at 370;
see also 25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (2002) (requiring, for purposes of recognition, a "continuous tribal
existence and ... autonomous entit[y] throughout history until the present."). However,
because the question of recognition is political and not subject to judicial review, terminated
tribes, as well as those disbanded by other federal policies, have few options whereby to reclaim
rights attached to tribalism. See Miami Nation of Indians Inc.ofInd. v. United States Dept. of
Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The second branch of the [political question]
doctrine ... is not engaged by a dispute over whether to recognize an Indian tribe. But the first
branch... which asks whether the answers would be ones a federal court could give without
ceasing to be a court.., is engaged" by dispute over recognition) (citing Cherokee Nation of
Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that review of grants or
denials of recognition are limited to questions of whether Department of the Interior followed
its own regulations and adhered to requirements of Due Process Clause).
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in 1954 Public Law 280,332 by according states extensivejurisdiction over Indian
tribes and individuals, granted non-Indian institutions of social control the legal
authority to adjudge and condemn Indian domestic relations and employment
practices.333
b) Relocation
Predicated upon the misapprehension that the emerging "Indian problem
334
was rooted in segregation and parochialism rather than a cascade of assimilative
legislation, Public Law 959, dubbed "Relocation, '" 33' directed federal agencies
to create "Indians who were Indian in appearance but not in culture036 and sap
remaining tribal political strength. At a time when reservations were
increasingly unable to provide material necessities,337 Relocation, by portraying
"contented Indian[s] working at good jobs and sitting beside televisions and
332. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§1162 (2000), 25 U.S.C. §§1321-1322 (2000), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
333. Subsequent to Public Law 280, State Departments of Health seized Indian children and
placed them with non-Indian parents at rates disproportionate to other races, relying on the
culturally-bound theory that traditional Indian parenting, reliant on extended kinship groups for
monitoring and nurturing children, was tantamount to neglect. BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra
note 154, at 133; see also Pritchard, supra note 44, at 259 (noting long history of forced
division of aboriginal families). Although legislation has heightened protection of Indian
familial and tribal rights, the right of Indian children to be raised as Indians by Indian parents
remains a focal point in the struggle to remedy the assimilative effects of Public Law 280. See
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 95-608,92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1901-1963 (2000)); see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
32-37 (1989) (interpreting Indian Child Welfare Act). Similarly, adult urban Indians experience
considerably more contact with criminal justice systems than they did prior to the passage of
Public Law 280. See JOSEPHY, supra note 63, at 75 (linking Indian maladjustment with federal
Indian law and policy and stressing that "for the sake of our psychic stability as well as our
physical well-being we must be free men and exercise free choices"); see also ERIC K.
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS
AMERICA 94-95 (1999) (linking cultural imperialism of federal Indian policies such as Public
Law 280 with psychological trauma and social dysfunction, including substance abuse,
incarceration, and domestic violence). By denying self-determination and pervading collective
self-esteem, federal law served yet again as a determinant of Indian pathology.
334. The "Indian problem," viewed from the mid-twentieth century dominant perspective,
consisted of(l) continuing tribal sovereignty on tribal land within U.S. borders, and (2) social
and material maladjustment experienced by Indians forced from reservations by Allotment and
Termination.
335. Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-959, 70 Stat. 986 (Relocation Act).
336. PEVAR, supra note 124, at 32.
337. See JOSEPHY, supra note 63, at 72 (noting that by the 1950s many reservations could




refrigerators [in Northern cities,]"33 induced an exodus to magnet urban areas
where a generation of the Indian best and brightes3 39 were dumped into
substandard housing' ° and menial employment 4' and subsumed in the
American melting pot.3 2
By 1970 reservation populations had dwindled so far that a final solution to
the "Indian problem" appeared to be at hand,343 and yet the "stubborn [Indian]
refusal to.. . become simply another American citizen" 3" has sustained Indian
tribalism against a malign tide of assimilationism unto the present day.3"5
Although Indian individuals currently possess both tribal and federal citizenship,
federal Indian law treats Indian tribes as subordinate governments,3 and thus
meaningful "dual citizenship" - predicated upon the assumption that tribal and
federal governments exercise separate, if overlapping, spheres of authority in
"good faith" '347 - is a legal fiction. For many Indians, this forced "split
identification of citizenship" was a genocidal act destructive of tribal political
338. Russel L. Barsh, Are We Stuck in the Slime of History?, 15 AM. INDIAN Q. 59 (1991).
339. BURT, supra note 271, at 78 (identifying educated Indians with leadership skills as
targets of Relocation). More than 35,000 Indians were relocated after signing an agreement that
they would never return to the reservations to establish residence. Atkinson, supra note 54, at
409.
340. See BURNETTE & KOSTER, supra note 154, at 172 (noting institutionalized housing
discrimination against urban Indians).
341. FRENCH, supra note 321, at 66.
342. Off-reservation Indians who do not enroll as tribal members are not only ineligible for
reservation-based federal services: they are, for reasons of physical and social distance, unable
to participate in the languages, lifestyles, and communities constituting Indian identity. WELLS,
supra note 152, at 5-6.
343. See BROOKS, supra note. 1, at 277 ("It is high time to stop treating the Indians as
second-class citizens. Indians ought to be... assimilated into our population.") (quoting Sen.
Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D.-Wash.), sponsor of ANCSA, supra note 38, at the time of its
passage).
344. JENNINGS C. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 399 (Vine Deloria, ed.,
197 1). "While the years have shown ... assimilation of other groups, only the red man has stood
firm, resisting all efforts to merge him with the groups that surround him." Id.
345. Relocation continues as federal policy, albeit outside the legislative orbit of Public. Law
959. See CADWALADER & DELORIA, supra note 85, at 121-22 (describing exercises of plenary
power to relocate Indians within reservations to facilitate mineral extraction and corporate
development).
346. See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship
Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy,
25 U. TOL L. REV. 617, 632 (1994) (elaborating theory of "compact federalism" incorporation
of Indian nations within the federal system in a constitutional relationship "roughly
approximating [that] between the states and the federal government[.]").
347. Id. at 632.
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identities,348 and few believe that tribal and national political participation can
coexist when Indian self-determination is construed to threaten U.S. territorial
integrity.
349
D. Summary: The Claim for Indian Redress
More than two centuries of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide, implemented
by the brutal instrument of federal Indian law,35 have depopulated and seized
Indian land and eliminated rival polities within the colonial state constructed
thereon. The historical review of U.S.-lndian relations has revised a mythical
account in order to prepare the intellectual terrain for contemporary remediation.
Although the role of the United States in the deliberate destruction of Indian
populations, property rights, and cultural patrimonies is for most Americans a
hidden history, it presents an archetype for the contemporary exposition,
analysis, and redress of a gross human injustice. However, even if re-
envisioning history instructs the non-Indian majority in its moral and legal
obligations to redress Indian claims,35' unless two fundamental, transformative
principles guide and inform redress, it is foreordained to fail.
First, because a set of institutionalized legal impediments352 runs through the
domestic order and trammels Indian rights, it falls to a process of legal reform
to make the nation safe for the peaceful coexistence of basic value-differences
348. See Porter, supra note 318, at 166-68 (arguing that forcing Indians to accept U.S.
citizenship, along with ongoing practices of forced relocation and assimilation, qualify as
genocidal acts within the meaning of the Genocide Convention).
349. AMERJcAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 99 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985)
[hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY].
350. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Jefferson, The Norman Yoke, andAmerican Indian Lands,
29 ARIz. L. REv. 165, 167 (1987) (describing federal Indian Law as "a brute reflection of the
interests of a conquering nation").
351. This is not an unrealistic proposition if one accepts that Indian claims are grounded in
the same "aspirational principles of the American people: ... self-governance, justice and
fairness, civil rights and civil remedies, compensation for takings, similar treatment for those
similarly situated, and avoidance of conflicting interests." Friedman, supra note 84, at 526
(citing DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776)).
352. Taken together, the doctrines of discovery and conquest, as judicially incorporated in
domestic law, as well as the trust doctrine, plenary power, and judicial subversion of reserved
rights, constitute a matrix of legal disability that refers Indian rights to property, culture,
religion, development, and self-government to interpretation and suppression by an often hostile
non-Indian majority. Further, although it incorporates principles that are not "relentlessly
hurtful" and provides internal resources with which to mount criticisms against it, federal Indian
law is a contradictory maze, and the United States does not live up to its aspirations as to the
best interpretation thereof. Letter, Joseph Singer, Professor, Harvard Law School, to William




between people as well as between peoples.53 Necessary reforms will include
legislation3 ' to strengthen protection of Indian religious, cultural, and property
rights;355 create specific remedial programs;. 6 tighten judicial canons of
construction to resolve ambiguities and construe treaty terms in favor of tribal
reserved rights; and incorporate those principles of conventional and customary
international law protective of the rights of indigenous peoples. 57 A
Constitutional amendment may be necessary to renounce plenary power.. 8 and
353. The rights claimed by Indians as constituents of their cosmology- rights to property,
religion, culture, and ethnodevelopment - are third-generation, collective entitlements.
FREHuICH, supra note 9, at 44. By the late 1960s indigenous groups worldwide were struggling
to secure these collective rights, yet extant international human rights laws were concerned
mainly with individuals, and many states resisted the notion that rights might attach to groups.
See Robert N. Clinton, The Rights ofIndigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 ARIZ.
L. REV. 739, 744 (1990) (identifying state resistance to indigenous rights in 1970s and 1980s);
Yanamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 509-10 (indicating that declarations of
indigenous rights norms have long been devoid of functional utility in the courts of states that
violate such norms). Until the 1980s, the UN placed little leverage upon states; however, in
1982 the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations ("WGIP"), created by ECOSOC to
enhance protection of indigenous peoples, launched a bolder generation of legal architecture
upon rights to maintain and develop ethnic identity, improve social and economic conditions,
security in traditional economic activities, and cultural and religious independence. See Report
of the Working Group of Indigenous Populations, Fifth Session, at 3-7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1987). After the ILO further elaborated indigenous rights in Convention No.
169, WGIP began to extend these obligations to nonratifying states. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples
in the 1990s, supra note 284, at 75. Several principles of the resulting Draft Declaration have
been recognized by states as legally binding. See, e.g., Statement by Mr. Robert Tickner,
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, on behalf of the Government of
Australia, U.N. WGIP, 10th Sess., at 2, 10-13 (July 28, 1992)(reporting measures to "address
... aboriginal disadvantage and aspirations in relation to land, housing, law andjustice, cultural
heritage, education, employment, health,... [and] economic development") (referring to Draft
Declaration). However, with indigenous groups as well as states pressuring to modify its terms,
the Draft Declaration is in jeopardy. Karen Bravo, Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and
the Demands of Economic Development: Lessons from the United States and Australia, 30
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 529, 534 (1997); see also Daes, supra note 284 (critiquing Draft
Declaration). The Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues, a subsidiary organ established by
ECOSOC on July 31, 2000, to give indigenous peoples a "unique voice" within the UN system
and a primary goal of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004),
may become the sole bulwark against state sovereignty and majoritarianism when it holds its
initial conference in May 2002. Press Release 5932, ECOSOC, UN Establishes Permanent
Forum for Indigenous Issues (Jul. 31, 2000)(on file with author).
354. See infra notes 752-53 and accompanying text.
355. Id.
356. See infra note 754 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 192, 232; see infra notes 592, 754 and accompanying text.
358. See infra note 757 and accompanying text.
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restore Indian tribes to a position superior to states in the federalist hierarchy.
Proposed reforms will "portend changes in power and well-being for specific
persons or groups" '359 and may compromise the universalist approach to
conceiving of, promoting, and protecting rights." °  Redress thus invites
contestation over its form, pace, and scope.36" '
Consequently, the second principle, a corollary to the first, is that the non-
Indian majority must assist in the infusion of "Indian Self-Determination" with
genuine meaning. 62 The United States and Indian tribes are not only
359. Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 95 (1990) (hereinafter Delgado, When a Story]. As non-Indians possess the bulk of
political power and legal reform is largely a democratic process, the fundamental question is,
How much power over Indian people and governments are non-Indian people prepared to cede?
360. See Rupa Gupta, Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental Community
Accommodating Claims Through a Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1741, 1766
(1999) (noting even liberal states have been unable to resolve tension between majoritarianism
and group rights of discrete and insular minorities); see also W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy,
Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 YALE L.J. 401, 413-15 (noting that addition of
indigenous rights to the equation complicates the intellectual and governance task of
determining when, how, and to what extent minority groups claiming rights to self-determine
may "discharge themselves from the reach of general community norms" without compromising
the liberal project of promoting universal human rights).
361. Critics excoriate the call for legal reform as a "result-oriented modification of
established legal doctrine" that would "deconstruc[t] ... neutral principles" to exempt minorities
"from the ordinary application of the laws." Jeffrey J. Pyle, Race, Equality and the Rule of Law:
Critical Race Theory's Attack on the Promises of Liberalism, 40 B.C.L. REV. 787, 804 (1999).
Talismanic fixation on a facially neutral legal order stymies reform on behalf of indigenous
groups worldwide. See, e.g., New PresidentSubmitsBillin Indian Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
6, 2000, at Al 6 (outlining etiology of legislative stalemate in Mexico over Indian rights bill);
see also infra notes 455-456 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between liberal and
critical jurisprudence).
362. An Indian tribe with a population, territorial base, government, and the capacity to enter
into international relations could in theory declare independence and gain international
recognition. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1 987)("Under
international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population,
under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in,
formal relations with such other entities."); Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties
of States, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 8811, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (art. 3), T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 117
U.N.T.S. 3 (art. 9) (as amended by the Protocol of Amendment in 1967,21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S.
No. 6487 (art. 12) (same). Some ardent advocates suggest that only full tribal sovereignty as
independent nation-states can overcome the disabilities imposed by federal Indian law and
policy. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A
Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the
Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REv. 439,445-49 (1988); Paul H. Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The
Law and Economics of Native American Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REv. 263,338-39 (1999) ("[U.S.]




intertwined geographically and historically, they are interdependent. Indian
autonomy and prosperity on the one hand, and U.S. legitimacy and global
leadership on the other, are inseverable, with each a necessary condition for the
full realization of the other.363 Enhancement of the positive externalities of
reciprocal transactions will serve both Indian and non-Indian peoples. If U.S.-
Indian relationships advance on the basis of a recognition of, and respect for,
mutual sovereignties, with differences and disputes attended notby coercion and
domination but by negotiation and harmonization, a new era of domestic peace
with justice, more worthy of emulation and export than earlier periods of
American history, will follow.
The next section defines and contrasts the theories, procedures, assumptions,
and remedies that distinguish reparations and reconciliation, the dominant
contending modes of redress available to group victims of human injustice;
bring each mode to bear upon the Indian claim; and evaluate the relative utilities
and disutilities of each.
III. Reparations v. Reconciliation
A. Reparations
1. Current Contestation over a Traditional Remedy
Reparations3" is grounded in the common law of torts365 and in the
cannot be a little bit sovereign, and entities like Indian tribes are entitled to little legal respect
because they are not recognized as states."). However, most tribes desire not statehood but
rather an intermediate status that would allow them to "challenge... intrusions across the full
spectrum of locations at which... injury is felt." Herz, supra note 195, at 698. Issue-area
autonomy, combined with representation in international organizations, departs sufficiently from
the current statist international and domestic legal regime to satisfy most tribes. Suagee, supra
note 9, at 692. Still, cultural barriers impede discovery of middle ground, and much cooperation
will be necessary to define and implement Indian Self-Determination.
363. The concept of interdependence between nations is well-developed in international
relations theory. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE
(1989) (defining "interdependence" as a condition where the reciprocal effects of transactions
across political boundaries constrain choices). Similarly, it is a cardinal tenet of liberal political
theory that institutionalization of democratic principles enhances social stability and economic
development. See, e.g., BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 284, at 46-47 (linking economic
development with democracy). If the economic development of "domestic dependent nations"
is tied to U.S. leadership of the global political economy, so also is the moral legitimacy of the
United States linked to its respect and promotion of the human rights of Indians.
364. See supra note 45 (defining reparations as employed in domestic and international law).
365. Neither constitutional (First, Fourth through Seventh, or Thirteenth through Fifteenth
Amendments) nor statutory (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1985 (2000)) sources of law provide a remedy
for their violation, and thus it is in tort in which a claim for reparations ultimately sounds. See
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international law principle3" that when an intentional wrong cannot be undone,
justice requires compensation of victims for injuries and punishment of the
wrongdoer.367 Although reparations for aggrieved minority groups368 can soothe
damaged psyches and relegitimize nations,369 reparations claims confirm the
hoary remedial foundations of tort law,37 in demanding damages37' and
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing reparations claim
alleging violations of constitutional and statutory sources as noncognizable); Jeremy Levitt,
Black African Reparations: Making a Claim for Enslavement and Systematic De Jure
Segregation and Racial Discrimination Under American and International Law, 25 S.U. L.
REv. 1,28 n. 11 (1997) (rejecting all but tort as cognizable source of law for reparations claim).
366. State responsibility for acts or omissions breaching obligations and causing injury is
a fundamental organizing principle of international law. See Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J.
(Merits), (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13) (holding that violation of a rule of international law
gives rise to a state obligation to provide remedies); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 7 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) para. 25 (1989) ("'every violation of an international obligation which results in
harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation'); International Law Commission, Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, 11 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 59-60 (1975) (codifying principle of
state responsibility for repair of torfious acts or omissions of governments, organs, or agents);
Theo Van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, andRehabilitation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. GAOR 4th
Comm., 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, para. 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8
(1993) (stating remedies must "wipe out" all consequences of illegal act or omission). Remedies
include restitution (reestablishment of status quo ante), compensation (loss of earnings, medical
expenses, pain and suffering), rehabilitation (medical, psychological, legal assistance), and
satisfaction (public disclosure, apology, punishment, and measures in deterrence). See generally
2 F.V. GARcIA-AMADOR, CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1984).
367. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 26,33-37 (5th ed. 1984)
(positing compensation and retribution as tort law objectives); Richard Abel, Pounds of Cure,
Ounces of Prevention, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1003 (1985) (listing compensation, deterrence, and
moral judgment as reparative functions); Tuneen E. Chisholm, Sweep Around Your Own Front
Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L.
REv. 677, 721 (1999) (propounding deterrent value of reparations).
368. Rights to justice inhere in the entity suffering harm; thus, aggrieved minority groups
qua groups are bearers of the right to reparations. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note
12, at 519.
369. For reparationists, U.S. legitimacy hinges upon the bestowal ofreparations to aggrieved
minority groups. ROBINSON, THE DEBT, supra note 39, at 208 (contending that without
reparations, "America can have no future as one people.").
370. Legislatures have proven friendlier to reparations claimants than courts, in part because
the legislative approach is an equitable proceeding unencumbered by legal doctrines. See
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896) (Congress, under its Article 1, §8
powers, may legislate concerning any claim arising from an equitable obligation not cognizable
in a court of law); Ozer, supra note 17, at 487 (suggesting Article 1, § 8 power to pay
reparations is augmented by powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Jacobs v. Barr, 959
F.2d 313, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 831 (1992) (holding, even under strict




concessions372 from perpetrators, 3" so as to return victim-claimants to the status
quo ante.
2. Opposition to, and Limitations of, Reparative Justice
Despite deep roots in the law of remedies, however, and notwithstanding
the existence of precedents to which advocates can point,374 reparations for
the claims of aggrieved U.S. minority groups is, for a slew of reasons
doctrinal, political, and practical, "one of the most perplexing, challenging,
States harmed a recipient racial group). Despite this distinction, the approaches are parallel
tracks fraught with different hazards: where legislative remedies are not forthcoming, judicial
avenues remain open, if only in theory; conversely, exhaustion of judicial remedies is a
condition precedent to legislative reparations. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 255, n.69
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Further, because both approaches posit historical injury as predicate to
compensation without reconciling perpetrators and victims, conflation aids the contrast with
reconciliation.
371. Cash is the central remedy in reparations theory. Harold S. Peckron, Reparation
Payments-An Exclusion Revisited, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 705, 707 (2000). Tax incentives, loans,
and other indirect compensatory schemes occupy a lesser place. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 12, at 519. Value consequences of forced labor, the present value of
expropriated property, and opportunity costs of racism fall within the compensatory ambit.
Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, supra note 42, at 608. Damage calculation is difficult, yet
reparationists assert a U.S. obligation to transfer that share of national wealth with which
victims would be endowed had they not been harmed. MUNFORD, supra note 39, at 425-29; see
also Richard F. America, Unjust Enrichment and Restitution: Defining and Measuring Current
Benefits From Past Wrongs -Estimation and Policy Implications, 5 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTs.
413, 422-23 (1988) (proposing racialized wealth redistribution).
372. Reparations theory assumes that (1) state-structured wealth inequalities associate with
race; (2) racial inequalities in wealth produce racial inequalities in political access; (3)
elimination of racism will not undo these inequalities; and (4) state legitimacy and security is
a function of the degree to which racial equality is achieved. Allen, supra note 44, at 12; see
also Matsuda, supra note 51, at 391 (stating "violence" may result when uncompensated groups
reject official process as illegitimate). To overcome tenacious racial hierarchy and secure
structural economic reform, reparationists demand that redistricting and affirmative action
accompany compensation. Id.
373. Although some include private entities within the wrongdoer class, reparationists
typically cast the government - agent for the "dominant social group" - as "perpetrator," and
the aggrieved minority group as "victim," in allocating moral and legal responsibility. See
Allen, supra note 44, at 7-8, 14 (identifying state as agent of injustice and obligor); Verdun, If
the Shoe Fits, supra note 42, at 636-38 ("Society," through its "governments, laws, courts, and
... institutions.., allowed the injury to take place[.]"); id. (analogizing dominant social group
to a trustee holding the corpus of a trust and aggrieved minority group as beneficiary entitled
to disgorgement of assets).
374. See supra note 28 (describing Japanese American reparations); see also supra notes 17-
26.
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and emotion- producing" issues in domestic law.375 Given the magnitude of
the claims presented, the scope of remediation necessary to effect full
redress, and the redistributive effects, critics hasten to raise a series of
interrelated doctrinal, politico-philosophical, and practical objections.
a) Legal obstacles
Numerous doctrinal objections, framed as dismissal motions or
affirmative defenses, serve as roadblocks to justiciability or remediation of
reparations claims. The standard set includes the doctrines of standing,
proximate causation, time-bar, laches, res judicata, exhaustion of remedies,
ex post facto application of the laws, sovereign immunity, and political
question.
(1) Standing
Remedies law typically assumes the paradigm of a single plaintiff "A"
seeking damages from a single defendant "B" for a palpable injury B is
alleged to have recently inflicted upon A.376 In tort actions, courts have been
375. ROBERT S. LEcKY & H. ELLWOT WRIGHTT, BLACK MANIFESTO: RELIGION, RACISM, AND
REPARATIONS 1 (1969). Even if reparations is firmly rooted in the law of liberal Western states,
no universal normative standard exists to resolve conflicts of values and differing conceptions
ofjustice. Whereas many reparationists contend that aggrieved minority groups cannot expect
existing remedies to reach every aspect of their claims, opponents deride reparations as a
betrayal of core principles of liberalism Matsuda, supra note 51, at 324. Proponents tend to
spring from the ranks of aggrieved minority groups, whereas their adversaries affiliate with a
largely white societal majority, and the two camps maintain diametrically opposed belief
systems. Verdun, Affirmative Action, supra note 38, at 609-10 (contrasting the "dominant
perspective" of the group that exercises "economic, political, and ideological control over
society" and the "consciousness ... spawned from generations of survival as an oppressed
people in a hostile environment[.]"). Still, if the application of reparations to remedy the claims
of aggrieved minority groups in the United States remains fraught with controversy and
vituperation, recent scholarship has secured one of the primary goals of reparation theorists -
the development offresh, enriched, and interdisciplinary colloquium on the complex and painful
subject ofrace relations. See Magee, supra note 38, at 866 (noting neglect by the legal academy
of reparations for aggrieved minority groups); Westley, supra note 17, at 437 (stating
reparations claims can "reinvigorate (interdisciplinary] discussions" about race); Levmore, supra
note 44, at 1689 (suggesting that reparations provides a "fresh start for race relations and the
law.").
376. The federal doctrine ofstanding encompasses the constitutional requirement of a "case
or controversy" as well as prudential principles of judicial self-restraint. The constitutional
foundation of the standing doctrine appears to permit adjudication of all federal questions while
precluding justiciability only of requests for advisory opinions. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2




unwilling to permit parties other than the actual alleged individual victim
standing to demand, from the actual alleged wrongdoer, compensation for
injuries.377 Reparations, in contrast, rejects the requirement of this
immediate horizontal nexus between individual disputants in favor of a
relaxed linkage that allows plaintiff class "A" (members of a victim group)
to bring an action against defendant class "B" (descendants of a perpetrator
group), consistent with the remedial theory that group responsibility and
entitlement are appropriate when group characteristics are of primary
relevance to the mechanism and nature of the injury alleged.37 For racial
reparationists, the experience of racism379 indivisibly welds members of the
"Controversies[,]" thereby excluding advisory opinions). However, the prudential foundation
of the standing doctrine operates to exclude many cases or controversies otherwise within the
Article III grant of power to the federal courts but too costly in judicial resources. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Standing, a potent bar to otherwise justiciable cases and
controversies, requires a plaintiff to plead that he himself has suffered a recent injury "fairly
traceable" to the challenged action which can be redressed by the judicial relief sought. Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984). Absent a federal statute conferring standing or a special
relationship to the plaintiff, federal courts reject assertions of violations of the rights of third
parties. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding a direct and immediate personal
injury alleged to be the direct result of the challenged action - i.e., a "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy" - best assures the "concrete adverseness which sharpens"
presentation of the issues); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding
individual citizens have undifferentiated interest and thus lack standing to challenge regulation);
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (restricting associational
standing to cases where members themselves have standing, interest asserted is germane to
associational purpose, and "neither the claim.., nor the relief requested requires" membership
participation).
377. See Magee, supra note 38, at 906-07 (noting that traditional remedies jurisprudence
ignores group-based theories of redress despite evidence of group injury and group
responsibility for that injury). Courts relax stringent standing requirements in class-action
litigation, an important exception. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Still, the judicial avenue to
redress, with its standing requirements, is obstructed to aggrieved minority groups, and demands
for legislative reparations though they have fared better, are requests for political, rather than
legal, redress. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903
(permitting compensation of heirs of Japanese American internees who died prior to
disbursement without requirement of legal standing); NANA SAI, GERMAN REPARATiONS: A
HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 172-74 (1980) (noting compensation of children of Jewish
Holocaust victims despite absence of direct injury).
378. Chisholm, supra note 367, at 712-13.
379. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art.
1(1), 5 I.L.M. 352,353 (1966) [hereinafter Racism Convention] (defining racial discrimination
as any "distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise . . . of human rights[.]"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTONARY 1170 (2nd ed. 1982) (defining "racism" as "any program... of... discrimination
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victim group into a coherent legal entity,8 ° just as the collective enjoyment
of the benefits of past wrongs inflicted by society at large solidifies the
perpetrator group as a collective defendant, even if some individual
members currently decry racism and its legacy.
38'
Although reparationists concede that the categories of perpetrator and
victim group are potentially overinclusive in that they impose obligations
upon individuals who have not personally perpetrated any harmful acts3 2
while compensating individuals whose injury status relative to the victim
group is attenuated,3 3 reparations theory maintains that because racism is
animated by assumptions made about groups, and because the dominant
racial group unjustly reaps the benefits of the harm inflicted upon the
subordinated group,3' whether individual members of the dominant group
.. . that claims to find racial differences in character [or] intelligence [and] asserts the
superiority of one race over... others").
380. Westley, supra note 17, at 448.
381. Matsuda, supra note 51, at 378-80.
382. Because they are paid through general revenues, legislative reparations impose financial
obligations on all taxpayers, including individuals yet-unborn at the time of the injury, critics
of the government policies that caused the injury, immigrants who arrived subsequent to the
injury, and members of the injured group themselves. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 365, at 36
(detailing categories of "innocent" groups in Japanese Civil Liberties Act). This question of
redistributive fairness does not trouble reparationists, who note the common obligations of
citizenship, privilege the duty of state officials to afford justice over the desire of citizens to
avoid the onus of specific government expenditures, and stress the practical inability to collect
reparations solely from supporters of the past injustice. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS 297 (1977) (noting that because reparations cannot be levied solely upon "active
supporters of the [injustice,] ... the costs are distributed ... among all the citizens, often over
a period of time extending to generations that had nothing to do with the [injustice]").
383. Critics of reparations build on standing questions by decrying inclusion of minority
group members who do not experience relative material disadvantage in the victim group.
Westley, supra note 17, at 471. Reparationists counter that to means-test reparations is to
substitute class for race as the basis for remediation, obscure the intangible insults of state-
sanctioned racism, and dismiss the group-centric nature of the entitlement. Id. In response to
those who challenge inclusion of individuals of mixed racial background as victim group
members, reparationists counter that the judicial and legislative branches can draw upon
experience with "fluid recovery mechanisms," used in class-action litigation, to determine
membership in the victim group in cases concerning racial reparations. See Chisholm, supra
note 367, at 721-22 (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981)) (holding that a
market system can be "used to fund a project" to benefit likely members of a class even where
membership is uncertain).
384. See Verdun, Affirmative Action, supra note 38 (contending that, even if most white
Americans did not participate in the particular acts of injustice, they continue, as members of
the dominant social group, to reap most of the benefits of those acts). Critics of reparations,




wish this to be so, racial groups are "morally relevant unit[s] and
appropriate subject[s] for compensation.""38
For opponents, proceeding from what reparationists label the "dominant
perspective" of Anglo-American jurisprudence, the inability of aggrieved
minority groups to identify specific individual victims of any discriminatory
acts or omissions of specific individual wrongdoers frustrates the requisite
horizontal connection between plaintiff and defendant and renders suits
demanding reparations "absurd, frivolous, or unworthy of serious
consideration.""3 6 Critics attribute racial hierarchy to tough "luck" '387 while
dismissing notions of collective harm and responsibility and asserting that
reparationists invoke racial groups - human entities ontologically
independent of individuals - simply to find a current victim for "ancient
wrongs."3  Anti-reparationists further insist that punishment of vast
categories of individuals who lack responsibility for, or control over, the
acts of long-dead individuals3 9 would charge them with guilt by
association.39 Moreover, foes decry an undeserved "windfall" to
responsibility for past injustice simply because they elected to join the social experiment called
the United States. Reparationists counter that immigrants cannot select the actions and
commitments of others when accepting citizenship, a restriction differentiable from participation
in a market economy.
385. Brew, supra note 28, at 196.
386. Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, supra note 42, at 624.
387. See Wheeler, supra note 44, at 301-02 ("People's differing circumstances are matters
of luck rather than the fault of some subset of their contemporaries[.]"); see also Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar, supra note 12, at 571 (suggesting that reparations foes force aggrieved
minority groups to prove overt past acts of discrimination due to their inability to recognize the
more pervasive and invidious forms of present "social and institutional injustice" producing
racial subordination).
388. Wheeler, supra note 44, at 301-02.
389. Under the doctrine of vicarious responsibility, legal obligations for the behavior of
others extend only to individuals under the control of the person assuming the obligation.
KEETON ET AL, supra note 367, §§ 69-70, at 499-509. Critics of reparations thus reject the
notion that minority groups should have standing to sue the state on a theory of vicarious
responsibility for the past actions of parties over which it lacked control. Chisholm, supra note
367, at 710.
390. Chisholm, supra note 367, at 711-12 (describing the dominant perspective, which posits
that, with respect to African-American reparations, as all slaves and all slaveholders are now
dead the notion that the "current generations of whites should pay for the sins of earlier
generations of whites" violates the principle that only those parties that caused the harm should
pay compensation.). Id. Anti-reparationists note that the wrongdoer class in the Civil Liberties
Act of 1988 included people not born in 1941, people who strenuously objected to internment,
and people who immigrated to the United States after internment was terminated. Verdun, If
the Shoe Fits, supra note 42 at 652-54.
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descendants of those long-dead individuals harmed in fact.39'
Unsurprisingly, standing, the doctrine imposing stringent criteria for
evaluating the range of legal entities capable of inflicting and suffering
injury, is a weapon wielded by reparations opponents. 92
(2) Causation
For a wrongful act to give rise to a basis for compensation of an injury,
the tort law doctrine of causation imposes the requirement of a nexus
between the act and the injury, as well as between the wrongful act and the
wrongdoer. Legal causation - a doctrine related to standing - strictly
limits the legal duty of parties and permits compensation only of those
injuries identifiable as having been committed by a party as a matter of law
and reasonably foreseeable as giving rise to the harm of an injured party.
393
391. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996).
392. In Cato, several plaintiffs sued the United States in forma pauperis for damages and an
apology arising out of the enslavement of and subsequent discrimination against African
Americans ("$100,000,000 for forced, ancestral indoctrination into a foreign society; kidnaping
of ancestors from Africa; forced labor; breakup of families; removal of traditional values;
deprivations of freedom; and imposition of oppression, intimidation, miseducation and lack of
information about various aspects of their indigenous character."). Cato v. United States, 70
F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1994). When the District Court dismissed for failure to state a
legal claim, the plaintiffs, on appeal, attempted to restate the complaint on more narrow civil
rights and tort grounds but were precluded by threshold procedural obstacles, including, inter
alia, a lack of standing. Id. Still, reparations plaintiffs possess standing to allege denial of equal
protection, provided they allege they are being denied equal treatment solely as a result of the
challenged classification. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984); Jacobs v. Barr,
959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 831 (1992) (holding the claim for
declaratory relief of German Americans interned during WWII alleging the Civil Liberties Act
of 1988 discriminated on the basis of national origin in violation of the Fifth Amendment
satisfied standing requirements). By the same token, critics of legislative reparations would
likely lack standing to challenge a reparations bill on taxpayer grounds, although standing might
be proper with respect to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (rejecting federal taxpayer standing to
challenge validity of statutes governing the CIA).
393. The doctrine of causation shields parties against legal liability for harms not closely
related to wrongful acts of which they are authors. Because the consequences of an act could
theoretically be defined to extend forward into eternity, and the causes back to the origin or
time, the question of causation in tort law is typically bifurcated into (1) actual and (2) legal,
or proximate, cause, with legal cause requiring proof of specific acts or omissions in breach of
aduty to the injured party that cause specific injuries reasonably foreseeable at the time the acts
or omissions were undertaken. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)
(establishing modem doctrine of legal causation). Determination of foreseeability typicallyrests
on the question of whether a reasonable person contemplating the consequence of a particular




Furthermore, even when an act is the proximate cause of a foreseeable
injury, liability does not necessarily attach where the injured party
contributed to the injury or an intervening or confounding act can be linked
causally thereto.3
The requirements of legal causation have not traditionally been satisfied
solely by membership in aggrieved racial groups absent proof that
commission of specific injurious acts by specific tortfeasors legally caused
specific compensable injuries.9 Critics, who do not accept a causative
relationship between present manifestations of racially structured economic
inequality'" and past acts of racial injustice, contend that to permit
relaxation of the doctrine of causation would be unjust and illogical.397
Reparationists insist that to deny that racial disparities in economic status
and political power are fairly traceable to past acts of injustice authored or
approved by the state is a political determination shielding the perpetrator
group against liability, rather than a result necessitated by the requirements
of a breach of a duty to the injured party, the test for legal causation is satisfied; fairness
considerations dictate rejection of claims where injury and harm are not so closely connected.
1d.
394. See Aviam Soifer, Redress, Progress, and the Benchmark Problem, 40 B.C. L. REV.
525, 527 (1998) [hereinafter Soifer, Redress, Progress] (noting that with the passage of time
events can intervene and obscure the chain of causation and that the "world is full of
contingencies, and we cannot ignore multivariate causation"); see also Levitt, supra note 365,
at 22 (conceding that "in the case of reparations the vertical gap of time" between the alleged
act and the alleged injury admits the possibility of intervening and multivariate causation);
Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 12, at 571 (identifying attempts to deflect liability
by identifying a "scapegoat" from another time or place as an intervening cause).
395. With the Japanese Civil Liberties Act, the relatively brief period between internment
and redress made connection of the wrongful act with the injury relatively easy, although
linkage of the wrongdoer- the U.S. government- with all taxpayers was more difficult. See
supra note 28.
396. See Chisholm, supra note 367, at 687-88 (noting that contemporary pathologies such
as poverty, unemployment, and despair do not clearly relate back to past acts of injustice).
397. For foes, the argument for reparations is essentially predicated upon the "foiled hopes
and frustrated dreams" of racial minorities rather than upon the demonstration of a causal
connection between a wrongful act and an injury warranting relief. Verdun, If the Shoe Fits,
supra note 42, at 643. Opponents argue that even if past acts of injustice were committed,
intervening causes, many attributable to racial minorities themselves, abound. See id. at 620
(suggesting that reparations critics assume that present racial inequities reflect the true inherent
abilities or disabilities of minorities). Thus, imposition of liability on a reparations theory
would lead to blameless individuals compensating injuries of which their actions are not the
proximate cause. Id. Reparationists counter with the suggestion that causation-based challenges
arise from the "different perceptual world" that white Americans inhabit, preventing recognition
of the self-evident relationship between persistent racial animus and past injustices. Id.
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of law or justice.398 For many mainstream jurists, gross human injustices
justify bridging wide gulfs of time and space to join act and injury and
impose proximate causal connection.3 Still, establishing the causal linkage
remains, as a matter of law, an obstacle for reparations claims.
(3) Time-Bar
To serve the interests of procedural due process and substantive fairness,
the doctrine of time-bar, as codified in state and federal statutes of
limitations,' establishes an outer temporal limit between the accrual of
injurious acts and the adjudication of claims lest defendants be precluded,
by waning memories, lost documents, or deceased witnesses, from
marshaling evidence in their defense.4°' Reparationists posit that statutes of
limitations need not be construed to terminate the legal right of aggrieved
minority groups to seek judicial relief because the injury of which such
groups complain is the continuing stigma of racism and social deprivation;
as such, their "wounds are fresh" and their claims are timely."°2 So long as
a victim group suffering a stigmatized position caused or promoted by the
harmful act can be identified, reparationists contend that litigation of a claim
for relief from this harm offends neither the principle of procedural fairness
nor any reasonable temporal limit.' 3 Nonetheless, defenses based on
398. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 367, § 41 (noting that legal limitation on scope of tort
liability arising under doctrine of causation, though it may bear a relationship to the nature and
degree of connection in fact between the acts and injuries of which a plaintiff complains, is
inherently associated with policy or administrative convenience rather than any self-evident
requirements of justice); see also Matsuda, supra note 51, at 382 ("Even mainstream jurists.
recognize that the proximate cause questions is essentially political.").
399. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (imposing market
share liability despite lack of proof linking particular drug manufacturer to an injury).
400. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,395 (1946) (strictly enforcing statute
of limitations where legislature "explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right").
401. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965) ("statutes of limitations
are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants.., by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared"); id. ("the right to be free of stale claims in time comes
to prevail over the right to prosecute them."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1963) (explaining that time-bar and laches promote efficiency and certainty by ensuring claims
are fresh and reasonably connected in time and space to a demonstrable act).
402. Ozer, supra note 17, at 494; see also Singer, supra note 133, at 529 (noting that critics
of reparations, though they recognized and condemn the "original sins" of slavery and conquest,
consign these sins to the past "with the pretense that we have gotten beyond them").
403. See Matsuda, supra note 51, at 381-82 (contending that, although it "allow[s] people




statutes of limitation have a successful history in reparations litigation.'
(4) Laches
Many of the acts of which reparationists complain accrued decades, even
centuries, ago. Laches, the equitable analog of the time-bar doctrine 5 -
provides a defense where rights long-neglected, or "slept upon," are sought
to be enforced. Although reparationists insist that laches ought not be
available to a government defendant that, under color of its own laws,
prevented a class from suing it,4°" opponents argue that the doctrine
promotes procedural fairness 7 and judicial economy." 8
(5) Res Judicata
The common-law doctrine of resjudicata prohibits judicial decision of a
"sins of the past [from] ... burden[ing] the innocent generations ... into etemity[,]" the time-
bar doctrine should not preclude claims that are not truly "sins of the past").
404. See Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part,
782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F.2d 779 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988) (time-barring class action lawsuit on a
constitutional takings claimbased on internment of Japanese Americans due to running of a six-
year state statute of limitations); see also Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108 (time-barring, by applicable
statute of limitation, suit for slavery and subsequent discrimination).
405. See DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES 43 (1973).
406. Reparationists suggest that equitable principles permit groups operating under legal
disability to bring their claims once disabilities are removed, regardless of the running of an
applicable statute of limitations. See Matsuda, supra note 51, at 382; see also Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (recognizing judicial power to read equitable tolling
principles "into every federal statute of limitation"). However, application of the doctrine of
federal equitable tolling is disfavored unless a plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant engaged
in a conduct designed to conceal evidence of its alleged wrongdoing, that the plaintiff was not
on actual or constructive notice of that evidence, and that the plaintiff did not "sleep on his
rights." J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245,
1255 (1st Cir. 1996). Although reparations claims have evaded prior litigation due to legal
disabilities arising directly from the injuries suffered - lack of legal personality and an unjust
legal order - reparationists have difficulty establishing that the United States fraudulently
concealed evidence of its very public, though unjust, acts. Levitt, supra note 365, at 23-24.
Consequently, equitable principles do not require courts to treat reparations claims as timely
after applicable statutes of limitations have run.
407. See Dobbs, supra note 405 at 43 (noting that passage of time incrementally severs
perceived connection between a tortfeasor and its responsibility for a much earlier wrong).
408. See Bumett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("Courts ought to be
relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.").
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matter subsequent to prior determination in another forum." 9 Res judicata
precludes adjudication of claims that were or could have been advanced in
an earlier proceeding."" A judgment for a plaintiff serves as the "full
measure of relief to be accorded" between the parties and precludes pursuit
of further relief on that claim in a separate action, whereas a judgment in
favor of a defendant extinguishes the claim and acts as a bar to further
litigation.4" Furthermore, res judicata precludes relitigation of issues
adjudicated, and essential to ajudgment, in an earlier litigation between the
same parties."" Underlying policies include conservation of judicial
resources, finality in the resolution of disputes, and the fairness interest in
preventing a plaintiff unsuccessful in a prior action from perpetually
relitigating his claim until he achieves his desired result."" Reparations foes
can point to historical mechanisms engineered to redress group claims to
establish that these and related legal issues have, or should have, been
advanced and determined in and by those mechanisms and are thus
precluded and/or barred as res judicata.
(6) Exhaustion of Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion requires that remedies under existing laws,
where available, effective, and adequate, must be exhausted before resorting
tojudicial fora or arguing for extension of existing law.4"4 International law
similarly requires that available domestic remedies be exhausted prior to
recourse to international tribunals." 5 Foes contend that if aggrieved groups
409. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997) (establishing
that an order is res judicata where it is a final judgment disposing of the controversy).
410. See Kylerv. Montezuma County, No. 99-1052,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1145 (10thCir.
Jan. 28, 2000) (restating doctrine of res judicata and its preclusion of claims where ajudgment
is rendered).
411. Kaspar Wire Works v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 536 (1978).
412. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTETAL,FEDERALPRACTICEAND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
AND RELATED MATTERS § 4402, at 8-11 (1981).
413. See De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11 th Cir. 1998) (where a claim is
precluded as resjudicata, a plaintiffs current suit for the same claim is an "attempt to make an
end run around the prior... adjudication").
414. Ohio v. United States Envti. Prot. Agency, 997 F.2d 1520, 1528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(discussing factors courts consider in applying exhaustion doctrine); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000)
(establishing requirement of exhaustion of remedies under Administrative Procedures Act).
415. A general principle of international law provides that a local remedy with no prospect
of success is neither adequate nor effective. Kunzi-Brenzikofer and Others v. Denmark, App.
No. 12097/86, 53 Eur. Cm. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 210,217. Claimants for reparations against the
United States in an available international tribunal who can demonstrate the lack of a domestic




suffer discrimination they have recourse to administrative agencies that
enforce antidiscrimination laws and available remedies to exhaust prior to
initiating reparations claims."
t 6
(7) Ex Post Facto
The United States Constitution, along with the constitutive documents of
almost every other legal system, incorporates hostility to retroactive
legislation, " as does federal jurisprudence interpreting the common-law
doctrine proscribing ex post facto application of the laws."' Simply put,
most of the more heinous acts of which reparationists complain - slavery,
land theft, genocide, and ethnocide - were legal under international law,
U.S. law, and the laws of the various states at the time of their
commission.4"9 As such, the doctrine prohibiting ex post facto application
to justiciability may thus be released from the obligation to exhaust remedies. Id. However, a
remedy is to be presumed available and effective unless attempts to exercise it would clearly be
a "senseless formality" (such as where a domestic forum does not afford due process or denies
access to remedies) or it is clearly incapable of producing the result for which it was designed.
Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment of January 20, 1989, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (Ser.C) No.
5 (1989), paras. 65-69. Still, a remedy is adequate provided only that it is "suitable to address
an infringement of a legal right," and "the mere fact that a domestic remedy does not produce
a result favorable to the [plaintiff] does not in and of itself demonstrate the inexistence or
exhaustion of all domestic remedies." Id. at 70. Exceptions to the exhaustion requirements
tolerated by general principles of international law are few and narrow. In interpreting Article
46 of the American Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter ACHR](Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1, O.A.A. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I1, 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (English
1979)), the Inter-American Court held that after a defendant has made a showing of
nonexhausted local remedies the plaintiffmust prove that remedies are ineffective, unobtainable,
unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile. Velazquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-
American Ct. H.R. (Ser.C) No. 1 (1987) at paras. 86-96. U.S. law tracks closely with
international law in waiving exhaustion requirements only in the strictest ofcircumstances. See
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that "exhaustion of
remedies in a foreign forum is generally not required when foreign remedies are unobtainable,
ineffective, inadequate, or obviously futile").
416. See Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, supra note 42, at 629.
417. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
418. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly;
settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle
that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that
existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.
419. For official acts of genocide or conquest subsequent to the judgment at Nuremberg and
the drafting of the UN Charter, analysis of the international legal obligations of states and
individuals is much more complex, as claims arising from these acts may well be maintained
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of the laws would preclude a reparations suit, at least where the acts in
question pre-date adoption of the positive laws making such acts illegal.
(8) Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, a descendant of the English
common-law principle that "the King can do no wrong," shields the
sovereign from suit on the ground that "there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."42 ° Sovereign
immunity thus precludes suit against the United States in an action to which
the federal government is named as a party unless a waiver is unequivocally
expressed.42' Even under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), which
gives federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States
for money damages,"' tort claims are barred unless the plaintiff brings a
claim within two years of the accrual of the harm, , and the FTCA does not
waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts.424  Although several
commentators suggest that the doctrine be abridged by legislation orjudicial
decision, 425 and although contemporary public opinion shuns many of the
retroactively, without constitutional or other domestic impediment, as far back as 1939-1945,
when certain norms ofjus cogens, including the rights to be free from conquest and genocide,
became nonderogable. Levitt, supra note 365, at 40 n. 179; see also infra note 526 (discussing
retroactive application of laws in context of norms ofjus cogens).
420. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
421. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). Under the Larson-Dugan
exception, analysis as to the issue of sovereign immunity would theoretically be different with
respect to individual defendants sued in official capacity. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,689 (1949) (raising "scope ofauthority" exception to immunity
of individual government agents); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609,621-23 (1963) (same). Still,
the immunity from suit for damages accorded to public officials of all three branches of
government who act within the scope of their authority is nearly absolute. Jones v. Clinton, 72
F.3d 1354, 1356-66(8th Cir. 1996). Injunctive relief is also presumptively barred by sovereign
immunity. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1311-12 (11 th Cir. 2001).
Moreover, any individual defendants that might be named in suits alleging historical injustices
are likely long deceased, and it is substantially unlikely that relevant State laws would waive
State immunity to permit actions for damages to be brought against States.
422. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
423. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
424. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000). However, some commentators suggest that violation of
a norm ofjus cogens constitutes an implied waiver of immunity. See Levitt, supra note 365,
at 26.
425. See Barbara L. Tang, The Japanese Internment and Reparations: Creating a Judicial
or Statutory Cause ofAction Against the Federal Governmentfor Constitutional Violations, 21
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 979, 1027-28 (1988) (urging Supreme Court to amend common law of




official acts it shelters from legal exposure,"" sovereign immunity bars
reparations suits in domestic courts.427
(9) Political Question
Mindful of the principle of separation of powers, courts have long
abstained from the adjudication of cases or controversies more properly left
to determination by the political branches of government.428 Even where a
dispute may constitutionally be subject to the judicial power under the
requirements of Article HI of the U.S. Constitution, courts both state and
federal have long declined to address the merits of inherently "political
questions" out of a respect for and deference to the coequal power of the
legislature and the executive.429 With the seminal case of Baker v. Carr,4
30
the Supreme Court definitively expounded the characteristics of a political
question that, upon their identification in suits before courts of the United
States, necessitate judicial abstention: (1) a "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment" of an issue to a "coordinate political
department[,]" (2) the "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards[,]" (3) the "impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion[,]" (4) the
426. Levmore, supra note 44, at 1698. Domestic courts that address the moral dimensions
of the acts ofwhich reparations plaintiffs complain invariably condemn such acts while refusing
to find a legally cognizable basis to permit adjudication of such claims in the face of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995)
("Discrimination and bigotry of any type is intolerable... This Court, however, is unable to
identify any legally cognizable basis upon which plaintiffs' claims may proceed against the
United States[,]" an immune sovereign defendant.).
427. See id. at 1107 (dismissing reparations suit under FTCA for slavery-related damages
accruing in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on ground the FTCA permits only claims
brought against the United States accruing after January 1, 1945 and brought within two years
of accrual); Trice v. United States, No. C94-1474 BAC, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1994);
United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987) (barring, on ground of sovereign immunity, claims
arising under First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendments).
428. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.)
("Questions, in their nature political. . . can never be made in this court.").
429. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939) (determining existence of
political question by evaluating the "appropriateness under our system of government of
attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory
criteria for a judicial determination."); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
("[E]ven though a dispute may constitutionally be subject to the judicial power, if a political
question is present, a federal court should decline to reach the merits."); Comm. of U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
430. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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"impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government[,]"
(5) an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made[,]" and (6) the "potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments."43' Accordingly,
courts scrupulously abstain from, and dismiss, foreign relations cases,
particularly where such cases implicate one or more of the Baker
characteristics. 32 Although international disputes may be "not as separable
from politics as are domestic legal disputes, ' 4" reparations claims,
particularly those that trench in matters of foreign policy or international
relations, are likely to trigger the political question doctrine to the detriment
of even the most sympathetic plaintiffs.41
431. Id. at 217.
432. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,302 (1918) ("[T]he conduct of the
foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and the
legislative - the 'political' - departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.");
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
[Tihe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political
departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in
the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry
ld.; Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (allocation of powers of war and foreign
relations is, from both textual and structural standpoints, something the judiciary, a body neither
equipped nor empowered for the task, cannot undertake); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp.
1506, 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (broad challenge to executive conduct of foreign policy is
nonjusticiable political question).
433. Andrew M. Scoble, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in
Federal Court, 74 CAL. L. REv. 127, 182 (1986).
434. See, e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that
a claim seeking recovery against a German company and U.S. subsidiaries for damages resulting
from plaintiffs forced labor in construction of military airbase in Nazi Germany presented a
non-justiciable political question in light of creation, under German law, of claims mechanism
the United States pledged, via executive agreement, to fully support as a bar to judicial
resolution of such a claim); Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 284 (D.N.J.
1999) (claims of World War II slave laborers present non-justiciable political questions);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,485 (D.N.J. 1999) (political question doctrine
bars redress for slave labor claim); In re Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939,
944 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (same). For a discussion of the political question doctrine and related




(10) Inability to Render Fair Damage Assessment
Reparations foes suggest the practical impossibility of a fair damage
assessment arising from the unprecedented scope of the harms alleged and
the potential number of claimants. Implicit in this doctrinal objection is the
claim that reparations breaches the obligation to avoid bankrupting the
government while inflating actual injuries suffered. 35 Advocates scoff at
the notion that reparations threatens the fiscal health of the nation and
counter that imposing requirements of scientific precision in elaborating the
individual value of the harms, along with membership in the remedial class,
would establish more stringent standards than those applicable in other
class-action litigation. In other words, because exactitude in the assessment
of damages is less important than other social goals of the law, "better rough
justice than no justice at all."43 For reparationists, the common-law cypres
doctrine437 establishes a permissible degree of misallocation of damages to
afford compensatory justice even where establishment of class membership
and/or the mechanism and scope of individual injuries is problematic.43
in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000).
435. Reparations have been judicially barred by the doctrine on at least one occasion. See
Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. Colo. 1968), affld, 430 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir.
1970) (denying reparations to Mexican-Americans promised by the United States in 1848 Treaty
of Hidalgo ending Mexican-American War on ground of impossibility of calculating fair
damage assessment).
436. Matsuda, supra note 51, at 386; see also id. (noting irony that racial minorities labor
to disassociate from negative group stereotypes only to discover that reparations foes are all too
eager to require proof of minority group membership and particularized damages).
437. "Cy pres que possible" is a trust doctrine allowing courts to accept a measure of
inexactitude in affording relief provided the policy of the law is served. See Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435, 439 (1970) (defining the application of the doctrine to effect racial justice).
438. Some domestic reparationists suggest that racial disparities in median per capita income
serve as the basis for calculating and compensating the present economic effects of past racial
discrimination. See, e.g., MUNFORD, supra note 39, at 430-34 (defining this figure as the
Economic Exploitation Index). The precise amount of capital required to compensate this
element of racial harm could be calculated as the product of the number of members in the
group and the gap in median income between white Americans and the compensated group.
BROOKS, supra note 1, at 372. This product would be recalculated each year until the debt was
paid. Others argue for the direct redistribution of such funds as are necessary to accord each
racial group resources commensurate with its proportional share of the population. See Pyle,
supra note 361, at 818. International courts have employed prudent estimates, rather than rigid
criteria, in calculating remedies. See Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 15 (1994) (employing, in the case of a matriarchal and communal victim class for which
it was difficult to establish membership due to lack of birth records and marriages and difficult
to determine levels of compensation where the national currency was unstable, the principle
restitutio in integrum to create a trust fund with sufficient present-value to provide
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b) Political Resistance
Reparations sparks a series of perhaps unresolvable439 debates over the
nature of and remedy for minority disenfranchisement, the adequacy of
existing civil rights legislation and liberal legal aspirations, the
constitutionality of group entitlements, the ideal racial distribution of
economic and social power, and the appropriate means to resolve conflicts
between attainment of racial justice and preservation of social peace. Such
debates underscore the fact that the demand for reparations is not
exclusively a plea for a legal judgment but rather an argument for a formal
acknowledgment of historic wrongs, a recognition of continuing injury, and
a commitment to redress. In short, reparations is a political, as much as a
legal, plea.
(1) Nature of and Remedy for Minority Disenfranchisement
For reparationists,"* the continuing disenfranchisement of racial
minorities is rooted in a hierarchical system preserved by a perpetrator
group, which denigrates its racial "inferiors""' and systematically excludes
them from political, economic, and social opportunities." 2 If modern forms
indemnification over life of all potential class members) (citing ACHR, supra note 415, at art.
63(1) (providing that a remedy in financial compensation be available for a breach of right
under ACHR and granting the Court broad authority to order compensation); Velasquez
Rodriguez Case (Compensatory Damages), 7 Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 25 (1989)
("[Elvery violation of an international obligation . . . creates a duty to make adequate
reparation[.]"). Still, no international tribunal has yet permitted a tribe to serve as the unit of
remediation for the state breach of a tribal right, although scholars have urged courts to extend
the Customary International Law ("CIL") of remedies. See, e.g., CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA,
THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS, SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 16 (1988).
439. Heritage and life experience shape the analytical prism through which reparations is
viewed, polarizing reparationists and anti-reparationists. See Verdun, If the Shoe Fits supra
note 42, at 646 ("[w]hat is obviously right to the opponent of reparations is clearly wrong..
[to the reparationist].").
440. Supporters of reparations include, inter alia, members of Congress, professionals,
captains of industry, members of the academy, and legal practitioners. Verdun, If the Shoe Fits
supra note 42, at 607.
441. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,400-01 (1978) (Marshall, J.)
("A whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream
of America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin
color he never even made it into the pot.").
442. See BRIAN BuRKITT, RADICAL POLmCAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ALTERNATIVE ECONOMICs 3 (1984) ("Differential power and advantage create individual and




of racism"3 have become more subtle and procedural, ' this "new racism"
is just as causally related to original unremediated injustices, and just as
immutable as its older, more overt variant: simply put, the United States is
not "anywhere close to eradicating racial discrimination[.]""' 5 Thus, until
the perpetrator group obliterates all traces of racism from public and private
life, race-conscious remedies, including affirmative action' and
reparations," 7 will remain essential palliative measures, and the ongoing
obstinacy of the perpetrator group suggests unconscious indifference"' to
opportunity. They prove resistant to change because the privileged possess both the motivation
and the resources to maintain... and transmit [their position] to their offspring."); WLUAM
Juuus WILSON,T'HE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBUC
PoucY (1987) (elaborating theory of a racially-ordered permanent underclass).
443. See supra note 379 (defining racism).
444. Westley, supra note 17, at 448.
445. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
446. Broadly defined, "affirmative action" refers to public and private programs designed to
remedy proportional under-representation of members of certain racial or ethnic groups in
educational or employment venues through measures that consider group membership in
selection of participants in those venues. Affirmative action programs include the active search
for, and recruitment of, members of particular groups, as well as the evaluation of group identity
in the favor of the applicant in admissions and hiring decisions. For a more detailed discussion
of affirmative action, see generally Brest & Oshige, supra note 5 1, at 856. Reparationists are
not of a single mind. Some, enamored of affirmative action in the belief that it infuses minority
groups with wealth and political power while creating positive role models and altering
perceptions of group inferiority, fear payment of reparations would terminate affirmative action
programs on the theory that the remedies are mutually exclusive. MUNFORD, supra note 39, at
423. Others hail affirmative action as a complement to reparations in its capacity to advance
institutional integration and attitudinal transformation. See, e.g., Magee, supra note 38, at 881
("persistent race consciousness among people of different races... will continue to necessitate
race-conscious policies within multicultural settings" even after an award of reparations). Still
others are supportive in theory and critical in practice, suggesting that affirmative action serves
less to transform the collective economic position of minority groups than to coopt and
neutralize the cultural leadership of minority elites through closer, but more tightly manipulated,
association with white society. Chisholm, supra note 367, at 703-04; see also TAKAKI, supra
note 47, at 103 (contending that affirmative action forces minorities to trade elements of their
culture for full participation in social activities); Magee, supra note 38, at 880 (noting the
"warm glow of condescension that permeates affirmative action," a "demeaning form of racial
tutelage"). For those chary of the limited remedial reach of affirmative action and mindful of
the resentments it arouses, reparations is preferable. Id. at 880.
447. Some reparationists embrace race-conscious modification of legal doctrines and exempt
certain issues and parties from the normal operation of the laws via hate speech legislation,
affirmative action, and race-conscious sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Affirmative
Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 844 (1997) (proposing that blacks
should never receive capital punishment for killing whites).
448. For many. reparationists, racism is understandable only as part of a collective
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racial justice claims at best and racial antipathy at worst.
Some critics of reparations" 9 challenge the bleak assumption that racism
is singularly dispositive of the life chances of minorities and unremediable
by social intercourse.5 ° Others suggest alternative explanations for racial
disparities in employment, healthcare, housing, education, and wealth
accumulation: for some, the socioeconomic indicia of minority disadvantage
relative to whites is ascribable to genetic intellectual inferiority,45" while for
still others, racial inequality, though not inherent in the nonwhite condition,
can be ameliorated only by incremental policies of racial self-reliance - in
essence, minorities must lift themselves up "by their own bootstraps" '452 and
eschew external relief. To the extent that compensation in any form is owed
to the victims of racial discrimination, anti-reparationists look to standard
tort and civil rights remedies and insist that individuals, rather than groups,
advance and prove their claims." 3
unconscious that reproduces racial hierarchy even in the absence of conscious discrimination.
RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA
AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 14-19 (1996); see also CHARLES LAWRENCE, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, in KEY WRITINGS, at
235, 237 ("[W]e are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.");
Magee, supra note 38, at 913 (racism "is grounded in the subconscious persistence of white
supremacy as a normative principle in ... judicial and legislative institutions"); RAYMOND S.
FRANKLIN & SOLOMON RESNIK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM 3 (1973) ("(T)he various
forms of oppression within every sphere of social relations.. . together make up a whole
interacting and developing process which operate(s) so normally and naturally and [is] so much
a part of the existing institutions of the society that the individuals involved are barely conscious
of their operation.").
449. Criticism of reparations is widespread and sharp. See Magee, supra note 38, at 913 (
"As perhaps the most extreme expression of official responsibility for the continuing disparity
of experience between [minorities] and whites, [reparations] are particularly susceptible to the
disrespect and inattention of mainstream academics and politicians.").
450. See Pyle, supra note 361, at 795 (contending that reparationists "substitute subjective,
personal and even fictitious'narratives'as evidence of the permanence and prevalence of racism"
and deem challenges to such narratives evidentiary of the challenger's racism).
451. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MuRRAY, THE BELL CURVE 312 (1994)
(noting comparatively low achievement of racial minority groups on standardized intelligence
examinations). Others deny racial inferiority but promote the notion that past acts of racial
injustice benefitted, rather than harmed, minorities. See David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why
Reparations for Slavery are a Bad Ideafor Black People-and Racist Too, DAILY CALIFORNIAN,
Feb. 28, 2001 (claiming descendants of African slaves benefitted from slavery through coming
to live in the United States and contending that because the"benefits" override the harms no
injury or unjust enrichment requires repair).
452. See BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY (1900) (elaborating racial self-help
method of redress).




(2) Sufficiency of Existing Civil Rights Legislation and Broader
Liberal Legal Aspirations
Although self-help may complement reparations in dismantling
subordination to and dependence upon whites, reparationists insist that self-
help alone would delay racial equality without redressing unjust
expropriations and denials of equal opportunity.454 Moreover, the current
approach to remediation proffered by mainstream theorists - integration
and equal protection of the laws - is inherently unsuited to eradicating
long-entrenched racial hierarchies.4"5 For reparationists, many of whom
subscribe to the tenets of Critical Race Theory,("CRT")456 the "rights theory
454. See Newburger, supra note 33, at 23 (suggesting that reparations is "so far from being
achievable that it is a dangerous distraction from the concrete business of fixing our schools,
defending civil rights protections, closing the opportunity gaps, and repairing the criminal
justice system[,]" issues upon which "great black minds ought to be focused"). However, some
are convinced that only reparations - not contemporary civil rights legislation - can reach the
past acts of racial injustice that structurally deny minorities opportunities to compete as
economic and political equals. See LECKY & WRIGHT, supra note 375, at 63 ("[The U.S.] was
parceled out before minorities became legal persons, and the facts of... history preclude [them]
from acquiring a stake and access to the levers of political power."); Westley, supra note 17, at
444 ("Where the implementation of racist policies has a substantial and continuing impact on
the ability of a social group to achieve equality... reparations is ajust remedy.").
455. See Magee, supra note 38, at 913-14 (contending that, while integration remains
important, more "expansive" equitable approaches are required to address "institutionalized
white supremacy").
456. Critical Race Theory (CRT) is an offshoot of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
movement, which suggests that, because the liberal law is manipulable in legitimation of
existing maldistributions of wealth and power, it is necessary to "begi[n] all over again the fight
over the terms of social life" by listening to the voices of socially disadvantaged groups.
Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561, 583 (1983);
Matsuda, supra note 51, at 324 ("[Tjhose who have experienced discrimination speak with a
special voice to which we should listen" in order to "defin[e] the elements ofjustice."); Delgado,
When a Story, supra note 359, at 95 ("some members of marginalized groups.., are able to tell
stories different from the ones legal scholars usually hear" and these "voices" must be heard to
chart legal transformation). By deconstructing social hierarchy, CLS jurisprudence aims to
transform the liberal order away from individualism and towards justice for disenfranchised
groups. Matsuda, supra note 5 1, at 325. CRT extends the CLS critique in asserting that liberal
legal reasoning systematically subordinates racial minority groups because racism, the single
most pervasive and immutable social variable, creates a zero-sum conflict between powerful
whites and powerless minorities that cannot be mitigated by commonalities or socialization. See
Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE
POuTICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRTIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1998). CRT contends further
that a "person's position on the racial totem pole" is determinative of the degree of justice
afforded him in a legal order that, as it legitimates the unconstrained choices of racist white
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of remediation" of liberal jurisprudence,' which purports to explain away
the need for reparations once formal equality of rights are guaranteed by
law, has delivered neither non-discrimination nor civil or political
equality.458 Thus, liberal law, a body of doctrine that constructs race and
reproduces racial domination, is more problem than solution.
Reparations foes contend that existing civil rights laws459 already afford
minority individuals equal opportunity and equal protection.' If racism and
legislators and judges, must yield to achieve racial liberation. Derrick Bell, RacialRealism, 24
CONN. L. REv. 363, 364-68 (1992) (constructing theory of "racial realism").
457. Liberal jurisprudence accepts that individual interests expressed in a state of
interdependence will conflict but assumes that a nomological jurisprudence can be introduced
such that individual conflicts are resolved by rules and principles, rather than by the arbitrary
decisions of man. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPUCATION OF LAW 1-15 (1958). The paramount
principle - that "like cases be decided alike" the better to protect individual rights - guides
and adapts liberal civil process to the progressive satisfaction of conflicting wants. See Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARe. L. REv. 353, 366 (1978) (describing
adjudication as the process whereby "formal and institutional expression" is given to the
"influence of reasoned argument in human affairs"). However, the precise meaning of rules in
the liberal legal order is open to judicial subjectivity and choice, and doubts as to the validity
of the rank-ordering of individual wants, as well as contending and equally authoritative
principles and precedents applicable to specific disputes, introduce the potential for arbitrariness
and abridgement of rights. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 820 (1935). To resolve these threats to its theoretical
coherence, liberal jurisprudence depends upon ajudicial "Hercules" to search for and balance
the principles that best fit positive rules to the institutional details and shared philosophical
understandings of the political community. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARe. L.
REv. 1057, 1059, 1075, 1083 (1975). While the principles from which Hercules can draw-
including representative democracy, formal equality, guaranteed individual liberties, and
judicial review - are not self-enforcing, liberalism purports to offer all individuals not only the
most rational, coherent, and compelling theory of governance but the greatest opportunity to
"confront power-holders, such as legislators, judges or voters, with their failures to live up to
the promises of the 'American Creed'." Pyle, supra note 361, at 787, 811.
458. See Magee, supra note 38, at 906 (suggesting that biased individual decision makers
exploit prejudices and adjudicate cases arising under anti discrimination laws to the systematic
detriment of racial minorities). Because liberal law is essentially politics, and because U.S.
politics is essentially white supremacy, liberal law is structurally incapable of yielding racial
equality even if it formally rejects malign racial classifications and hierarchies.
459. See, e.g, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000g; 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000 e; Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § § 3601 -3631 (2000); 24 C.F.R. §
100, 103, 104 (2002).
460. Critics of reparations- a group that includes former President Clinton- are adamant
in their defense of the sufficiency of existing civil rights laws. See Chisholm, supra note 367,
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discrimination linger, a question upon which reasonable minds can differ,"
adequacy of enforcement, rather than legislative sufficiency, is implicated.
Moreover, critics decry the wholesale rejection of liberalism they perceive
to inhere in claims for reparations as an "unprincipled, divisive and...
unhelpful attack[.]J " 2 By "succumb[ing] completely to post-modernist
absurdity"463 and rejecting the entirety of the liberal legal order with their
"blame-game rhetoric," reparationists render reasoned discourse impossible
while "alienat[ing] potentially helpful whites."4"
(3) Constitutionality of Group Remedies
Reparationists insist that just as past harms and present discrimination
inure to the benefit of the dominant racial group, remedies must be accorded
to harmed racial groups qua groups. 5 Refusing to accept group
responsibility for ongoing racial inequities, critics reject the notion that
rights are definable with reference to the relative social position of racial
groups, affirming instead the liberal principle that individuals are the
legitimate bearers of rights.' For critics, group membership imputes no
Most of my African American friends and advisors don't believe that we should
get into what was essentially a press story about whether there should be an
apology for slavery in America. They think that that's what the 13th, 14th, and
15th amendment was [sic]; they think that that's what the civil rights legislation
was; and they think we need to be looking toward the future.
461. See Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745
(1989).
462. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERicAN LAw (1997) (criticizing reparationists for "abandoning
objectivity, reason, and truth[.]"). Reparationists do not take lightly the liberal criticism of
group-centric legal remedies; at least one scholar warns that a "'never forget' view of history,"
though it accords appropriate recognition to the role of racial hierarchy in the United States,
"can bolster the destructive side of identity politics by separating communities unnecessarily.
.. and thereby poison reconciliatory possibilities." Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22,
at 12.
463. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPuBuc, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40. Critics of
CRT are hostile to the notion that knowledge is socially constructed, contextually subjective,
and immune to objective evaluation, premises which, if true, would diminish the promise of
liberalism for groups subordinated in a racial hierarchy. See Richard Delgado, On Telling
Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REv. 665, 674 (1993); MARI
MATSUDA ET AL, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1997) ("Critical race theorists embrace subjectivity of perspective
and are avowedly political.").
464. Pyle, supra note 361, at 790.
465. Westley, supra note 17, at 448 (arguing group harms require group remedies).
466. The liberalism animating the U.S. Constitution does not easily incorporate such
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blame and confers no entitlement, and reparations is an illiberal attempt to
ascribe the sins of the fathers to their sons. Ironically, the U.S. political and
legal order embraced colorblindness" just as critics of group remedies for
past generations of racial harm assumed political and legal ascendancy."
concepts as group entitlements or wrongs:
[In the Western tradition[,] individuals voluntarily enter into a social compact in
which individual autonomy is exchanged for peace, security, and protection
provided by the sovereign... Rights are conceptualized as constraints on the
government in favor of the individual ... Good government is equated with
regulating the state and not strengthening group affiliations.
Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 277, 297 (1993).
467. See Magee, supra note 38, at 900 (distinguishing current "colorblind model of
constitutional construction" from older chain of racially "hyperconscious" precedents tracing
to Dred Scott).
468. Tension between the integrationism of the Civil Rights Movement and the liberal
aspiration to colorblindness has wracked affirmative action since the late 1960s. See Brest &
Oshige, supra note 51, at 861 ("The essential wrong that... most antisdiscrimination laws seek
to prevent is the unequal treatment of individuals based on group membership .. .[I]t is
precisely this tradition of liberal individualism that renders affirmative action . . .
constitutionally problematic."). While some critique the susceptibility to characterization as a
"handout," others, protesting "reverse discrimination," argue that affirmative action obscures
causation of, and responsibility for, racial inequities while externalizing social costs. See id. at
865-66 (suggesting that institutions not acknowledged as wrongdoers confer benefits upon
minority candidates, who need not show proof of individual injury, while imposing burdens on
individually blameless but still "dispreferred candidates - those who, but for... affirmative
action[,] would have gotten the position."); see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR
CHARACTER (1990) (elaborating critiques of affirmative action). In 1995, after decades of
wrangling, the Court sounded what proponents decried as the constitutional "death knell." See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (subjecting congressional race-
based legislation to same strict scrutiny standard applied to state and municipal actors and
providing that legislation for exclusive benefit of a racial group will ordinarily violate
Fourteenth Amendment). However, some racial preferences, narrowly tailored by the
government entity that itself discriminated, are yet permissible. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d
916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[reverse] discrimination [by the discriminating institution] is
sometimes permissible to rectify past discrimination[.]"); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch.,
233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a properly designed race-conscious program violates
neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor federal civil rights laws), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051
(2001). Nonetheless, State legislation is trumping affirmative action. See Coalition for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1491, 1519-20 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) (rejecting claim that constitutional amendment
eliminating affirmative action in public employment, education, or contracting denied equal
protection and conflicted with federal statutes); Smith, 233 F.3d at 1192 (decertifying class after
new State law prohibited affirmative action during pendency).
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(4) Resistance to Racial Redistribution of Economic and Social
Power
More than any other remedy, reparations transforms the material
condition of recipients. Moreover, it connotes culpability: 9 for a majority
that rejects group hierarchy, harm, and responsibility, reparations is a radical
redistribution of wealth, rather than a disgorgement and reallocation of an
unjust acquisition, that exacerbates unrest."" Reparations thus yields
resistance, 47 1 backlash,4 7 2 and "ethnic elbowing.4 73 As it would strip their
469. See LECKY & WRIGHT, supra note 375, at 57 (noting that reparations evoke painful,
guilt laden images such as the Holocaust). While payment of reparations by a government does
not imply that any particular individual citizen shares moral accountability for past acts of
injustice, distribution of the costs of the remedy can be equated with distribution of guilt for the
acts.
470. Some fear reparations will "bring forth rent-seeking" and wasteful litigation by racial
minorities. Levmore, supra note 44, at 1698-99. Others fear that violence looms large behind
every reparations claim. See, e.g., Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 497-98
(noting that President Johnson rescinded the Reconstruction policy of redistributing lands of
wealthy Southerners to former slaves when opposition threatened the peace). Reparationists
counter that remediation of racialized wealth inequities produced and maintained by the
discrimination to which reparations is addressed may well be a precondition to stable social
peace. Allen, supra note 44, at 5.
471. Politics is a numbers game, and because a white majority strongly disfavors reparations,
all but the most intrepid judges and legislators blanche at its mention. See, e.g., Bill Moss, State
Refuses Rosewood Blame, ST. PETERSBuRG Tns, Mar. 17, 1994, at 1 (1994 WL 4786463)
("The people who did the damage should pay for it, not today's taxpayers[.]"). Recently, the
State Legislature, finding Oklahoma was not an official wrongdoer, refused to compensate black
survivors of the Tulsa Race Riots and instead established a memorial and a scholarship fund.
Chuck Ervin, Divided Senate OKs Race Riot Bill, TULSA WORLD, May 24,2001 at 1 (2001 WL
6929550). In Duluth, Minnesota, after a local organization sculpted a memorial to draw
attention to the lynching of thiee black men accused of raping a white woman in 1920, local
officials discouraged further measures; as Mayor Doty noted,"Why would I want to tell the
world that something horrible happened in my city?" Craig Gustafson, Duluth Faces Up to
Ugly Chapter, BOSTON GLOBE, Jun. 16, 2001, at A3.
472. See Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 494 (noting that demands for
reparations trigger "regressive reactions," rooted in fear ofreduction in relative social advantage,
by the dominant social group).
473. "Ethnic elbowing" is a divide-and-conquer strategy that foments fierce competition
between nonwhite groups to keep all claims for redress of racial harms at bay. MUNFORD, supra
note 39, at 118 (describing use of Indian trackers to capture runaway slaves and Buffalo Soldiers
to combat Indian tribes); Delgado, Derrick Bell Lecture, supra note 48, at 291 ("while one
group is gaining ground, another is often losing it"); Matsuda, supra note 51, at 351 (noting
schismatic history of struggle against racism). Reparationists urge suppression of egocentrisms
in favor of a synergistic "united front." See id. at 397 (stressing that, even if some groups
remain uncompensated, "[e]ach separate commitment to... reparations... [hastens] the end
of... victimization"). Despite this admonition, reparations vaults a compensated group up the
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racial privileges along with their currency, reparations is opposed by all but
the most altruistic whites.474
(5) Magnitude of Damages
Opponents aver the practical impossibility, given the scope of the harms
alleged,47S the status of claimants, 7 and the passage of time, of determining
who should receive reparations and of establishing a measure of damages. 77
Although some assert that any debt owing from the dominant social group
has been at least partially discharged through wealth transfer programs such
as the Great Society, Social Security, public assistance, and affirmative
action,478 most concede that the amount demanded by aggrieved groups as-
ladder of racial hierarchy. Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, supra note 42, at 659. To wit: opponents
of the Civil Liberties Act offered amendments blocking reparations until Indian tribes were
compensated, as well as amendments blocking Indian reparations. See 134 CONG. REC. H6314
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (proposing no funds be appropriated for Japanese Americans until
American Indians were compensated)(statement of Rep. Davis); 134 CONG. REC. 54397 (daily
ed. Aug. 20, 1988) (rejecting claims by "any Indian tribe"). Uncompensated groups took
umbrage; some whites, noting that injuries absorbed by these groups dwarfed compensated
harms, denounced the Act. Brew, supra note 28, at 194 ("[blacks and Indians] have experienced
greater... discrimination than Japanese Americans").
474. See Magee, supra note 38, at 908 (elaborating interest-convergence theory of Derrick
Bell, who maintains that the rights of racial minorities are recognized by the dominant social
group only when recognition benefits a larger interest of the latter); Chris K. Iijima, Reparations
and the "Model Minority" Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to
Original Humiliation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385 (1998) (creating concept of "model
minority" that serves the interests of the dominant group and thus deserves reparations);
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 497 (referencing the interest convergence
theory of Derrick Bell).
475. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 9, 1969 ("There is neither wealth nor wisdom
enough in the world to compensate for all the wrongs done in history.").
476. See Minow, Not Only for Myself, supra note 32, at 679 (suggesting reparations can
"encourage unmanageable numbers of claims" and "invite trivial claims").
477. Paradoxically, the compensation ofbeneficiaries can nevertheless redound to the benefit
of those paying reparations, as the remedial method is susceptible to quantification and thus to
fixed andfinite limits: claims are ultimately extinguished. Meredith Lee Bryant, Combating
School Resegregation Through Housing: A Need for a Reconceptualization of American
Democracy and the Rights It Protects, 13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 127, 149-50 (1997).
478. While certain programs might be construed to offset a fraction of the compensation
owed, most reject the claim that relief programs, the benefits of which may have accrued
disproportionally to racial minorities, satisfy in any important measure the claim for reparations
and suggest instead that such programs are part of the problem rather than the solution. See
Pritchard, supra note 44, at 263 (estimating that wealth transfer programs account for no more
than one-fifth of the racial debt); see also STEPHEN E. FERACA, WHY DoN'T WE GivE THEM
GuNs? THE GREAT INDIAN MYTH 209 (1990) (arguing the "dole system," not genocidal war or
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yet uncompensated might total several trillion dollars,479 a sum that exceeds
the reserves in the federal treasury4 80 along with any conceivable boundaries
of political possibility."' Moreover, many foes, already troubled by the
redistributive effects of the remedy, find distasteful the notion that
compensation might be paid directly to individual members of racial groups
rather than invested in institutions, businesses, or communities."' Proposals
to offer per capita compensation on the order demanded by reparationists
would be born as political bogeymen, welcome nowhere and feared
everywhere.
While many reparationists prefer to abstain from discussing the
mechanisms4"3 and scope4 of compensation until a consensus in support of
the remedy can crystallize, others reject bifurcation of issues and dismiss
talk of fiscal crisis and paternalistic investment strategies with the following
legal assault on culture and sovereignty, stands as the greatest harm inflicted on Indians).
479. No sum can restore aggrieved minority groups to the position in which they would have
been but for past harms and the continuing effects of those harms: the magnitude of harms and
effects is so overwhelming that any compensation offered is bound to provoke fiscal concerns.
See 134 CoNG. REc. S4329 (daily ed. Apr. 20,1988) (suggesting a court might award "hundreds
of billions of dollars" in damages to Japanese Americans if Congress failed to pass the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988) (statement of Sen. Stevens); Susan Hansen, Slavery Reparations Bill
Moves Forward, BALT. MORN. SuN, Oct. 25, 1990, at 3A (noting that the House Judiciary
Committee considering the 1990 Conyers slavery reparations bill suggested that requested
compensation could total $4 trillion); MUNFORD, supra note 39, at 429 (stating claims are worth
"hundreds of billions if not trillions").
480. The payment of reparations to Japanese Americans is simply of no value as a historical
analogy whereby to predict the likely financial effects of reparations to other aggrieved racial
groups. Total compensation to eligible class members did not exceed $2 billion, an amount so
small as to be fiscally insignificant. The value of claims for reparations arising out of slavery
and federal Indian policies presents different questions entirely. See Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 12, at 515 (conceding that reparations to Japanese Americans, "were
a small blip on the radar of the [U.S.] economy" and that reparations to other groups would have
a much more profound effect).
481. See Bryant, supra note 477 at 151 ("[A]ny realistic attempt at putting a dollar figure on
past racial harms often yields an amount too large or otherwise politically unfeasible.").
482. Matsuda, supra note 51, at 387.
483. Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, supra note 42, at 657-58. When reparationists respond to
contentions that payment on a per capita basis to individuals untutored in financial management
skills would open the door to inefficiency and waste, they note that investment counseling
programs could accompany awards, which in turn could be structured as trusts or annuities.
Matsuda, supra note 51, at 387.
484. Reparation is an inherently symbolic act that expresses the "deep regret and...
continuing obligation" of the party making the award, and thus the exact dimensions of the
award are less important than the sincerity of the reparative gesture. Matsuda, supra note 5 1,
at 395.
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postulates: (1) the scope of the remedy must comport closely with the scope
of the harm; (2) just as tortfeasors do not determine the method of
compensation, it falls to the victims of racial injustice, rather than to the
government or the dominant social group, to determine the mode of
reparation; 485 and (3) the U.S. economy is robust enough, and the perpetrator
group numerous enough, to absorb, amortize, and discharge the entirety of
the debt. 86
(6) Illusion of Progress Without Transformation of Racial
Attitudes or Legal Structures
Although invocations of state power in alteration of the established
hierarchy are "intensely powerful ... political acts that challenge racial
assumptions underlying past and present social arrangements,"" 7 reparations
exposes its theoretical Achilles' heel in its inability to specify the conditions
under which the satisfaction of the claims of aggrieved racial groups
genuinely promotes progressive perfection of the social and legal order.8"
Although reparations enhances the possibility of institutional and attitudinal
restructuring, it mandates neither result, and wary exponents fear the remedy
may yield illusions of progress while stifling other remedies that might yield
more, and more meaningful, redress. 9
Specifically, reparationists and other critical legal scholars, contending
that the dominant social and racial group has captured the state, posit that
any statist remedy runs the risk of political tailoring so as to perpetuate
485. Proponents of reparations are insistent that beneficiaries reacquire a positive sense of
control over their lives; election of the method of redress comports with this understanding of
the emancipatory purpose of the remedy. See id. at 387-88 ("Whatever the form and
administration of an award, the choice does not... belong to the perpetrators."); see also LECKY
& WIUGHT, supra note 375, at 56 (contending that, unlike other civil rights remedies which vest
disposition of funds within the discretion and control of whites and thereby perpetuate minority
financial dependence, reparations is uniquely empowering).
486. Ifthe recent settlement of claims for indemnification of $500 billion in federal and state
payments to beneficiaries suffering from tobacco-related illnesses will not harm the future
prosperity of tobacco companies, payment of racial reparations should not prove deleterious to
U.S. financial health, particularly as funds will be reinvested in the domestic economy by
compensated groups. Allen, supra note 44, at 153.
487. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 479.
488. The ideal end-state of reparativejustice is the public confirmation "that the Constitution
works (if belatedly) and that the [U.S.] is far along on its march to racial justice for all." Id.
489. Advocates of racial redress highlight the significant expenditures of political and social
capital that reparations claimants have been obliged to expend in questioning whether
reparations ought to receive the lion's share of their attention to the detriment of other remedies.




dominant group interests rather 'than those of the proclaimed beneficiary
group.49° Indeed, in consideration for a "one-shot" payment in satisfaction
of past wrongs, the United States might claim a resjudicata opportunity and
dissociate from continuing obligations to enforce civil rights legislation49
or to labor toward a racially neutral and egalitarian "fourth-tier"
democracy. 4 2 Moreover, because financial compensation alone will not
yield racial equality in the absence of genuine contrition and ongoing
supervision, reparations threaten to reify the state as benign patron while
assuaging white guilt and displacing the onus for continued racism from the
dominant social group to the still-subordinated.493 Furthermore, reparations
"tokenism" co-opts the leadership of racial minorities by inducing their
consent, on behalf of current and future generations, to racial hierarchy,
albeit in slightly attenuated form, in exchange for few tangible benefits;
consequently," some thoughtful victim group members are inclined to reject
reparations[.]"4  Lastly, because reparations is a law-centric, adversarial
means of redress, it tends to prolong interracial conflict by casting racial.
490. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress
and Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 223, 232 (1992) (arguing that because
reparations is akin to other civil rights laws in that specific provisions require ongoing
interpretation by majoritarian civil and political institutions alerted to and exploitative of issues
of indeterminacy and contingency, the benefits promised are not immune from review and
diminution).
491. See Matsuda, supra note 5 1, at 395 (warning payment of reparations might commodify
harms and sever legal obligations to claimant groups by the doctrine of res judicata);
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 496 (cautioning that Japanese American
reparations may have "let the govemment off the hook so that it no longer needed to vigorously
oppose racism against Asian Americans.").
492. See Bryant, supra note 477, at 142-48 (elaborating theory of racial democracy
categorizing social evolution of states from "first-tier" democracy, in which racial minorities
lack legal rights, to the colorblind "second-tier," in which racial minorities enjoy only negative
rights to be free from denial of equal protection, the remedial "third-tier," in which racial
minorities possess the "positive right to reparation for present inequalities caused by the
negative denial of rights," and ultimately the "fourth-tier," in which race is "taken into account
as a positive factor in the ordering of our legal and social worlds" and "celebrated" by state and
non-state actors).
493. Payment of reparations to Japanese Americans may have effected socioattitudinal
transformation of white Americans less in the direction of greater racial tolerance and more
toward the conclusion that "now the system works" and that if racial minorities are still
struggling it is due to an inherent defect of character or intelligence. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 12, at 496. For reparationists, the feared response from whites to
continued racial hierarchy post-reparations is "We paid you, why are you still having problems?
It must be in your genes." Id.
494. See Matsuda, supra note 51, at 395-96 (suggesting "[o]ne generation could sell away
their claim at bargain-basement prices, to the detriment of future generations, ... to cash in[.]").
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groups in the roles of winners and losers in social combat and abnegating
engagement in the polyracial dialogue necessary to creative synergy, moral
instruction, and genuine remediation. 5
c) Indian Reparations
Tracking closely with the general theoretical form, the Indian claim for
reparations for genocide, land theft, and ethnocide might take the form of a
class action'" in federal district court49 with individual Indians suing the
U.S. government and its agencies and instrumentalities in tort 98 demanding
damages for ancestral wrongful deaths4' and destruction of tribal
integrity,5" and Indian tribes suing under a constitutional theory for
restitution and/or compensation of unlawful takings of lands.5"' In practice,
495. See Magee, supra note 38, at 875-76 (contrasting reparations with a "cultural equity"
method of racial redress that requires "acknowledgment of and respect for the cultural-
experiential difference between whites and nonwhites" and offers not merely financial
compensation but a "host of creative public and private policy initiatives," including enhanced
minority access to political participation and multicultural approaches to economic and social
policy).
496. Though their claims have been doctrinally precluded, aggrieved groups seeking
reparations have had little difficulty satisfying federal class requirements. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (enumerating federal class requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1995) In recent years,
plaintiffs alleging mass human rights violations in U.S. courts have not had difficulty
establishing the requisite elements for class certification, particularly in light of a policy
favoring the relaxation of the analysis where near-identical injuries were inflicted upon plaintiffs
because of their group membership and where it is impossible, or at least impractical, to bring
such cases individually. For a discussion of the relaxation of federal class certification
requirements in human rights litigation, see Margaret G. Perl, Not Just Another Mass Tort:
Using Class Actions to Redress International Human Rights Violations, 88 GEO. L.J. 773
(2000) (citing cases).
497. Assuming, arguendo, that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a cognizable federal
claim or that it sat in diversity jurisdiction, the district court would exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction to hear State law wrongful death claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (codifying
basis for federal exercise of supplementary jurisdiction over State law claims).
498. See supra note 367.
499. See supra notes 90-110 and accompanying text. Even employing the lowest estimate
of Indian victims - $5 million - and a paltry sum for each decedent-$ 100,000 - the
compensation demanded by claimants for ancestral wrongful death might approach haifa trillion
dollars. Id.
500. See Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. United States, 477 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding that
destruction of tribal physical integrity is theoretically actionable by affected individuals as an
ordinary tort claim provided the federal action complained of is an explicit violation of a treaty
or federal statute).




however, such a claim is almost certainly neither cognizable nor justiciable
in courts of the United States; moreover, for practical and aspirational
purposes, there is a more prudent and productive avenue Indian claimants
can take toward redress.
d) Legal Obstacles to Indian Reparations
(1) Sources of Law and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Although federal jurisdiction is limited to those claims "arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"5 °2 only those elements
of the Indian claim arising under treaties are certain to satisfy the
jurisdictional issue for purposes of litigation in federal courts. An absence
of law with which to advance judicial claims renders much of the gravamen
of any prospective Indian reparations claim noncognizable for a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failing to state a claim for which relief
can be granted," 3 and elements not arising under treaties would be dismissed
at the pleadings stage.5'
(a) Genocide
Relief is unavailable in U.S. courts for the element of genocide in the
Indian claim. The fundamental ordering principle of international law,
sovereignty, protects state prerogative to engage in any unprohibited
billion acres of the U.S. continental landmass. Although principles of equity proscribe the
wholesale evacuation of millions of non-Indians many years after the facts of settlement, the
enormity of the sum required to compensate takings of Indian land, even if set at a level far
inferior to market rates as would be likely, would preclude its payment. See Newton,
Compensation, supra note 167, at 460 (analyzing historical compensations of takings of Indian
land and finding, based on historical experience, that nothing close to fair market value is likely
to be accorded Indian claimants).
502. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
503. See supra note 365 (rejecting, as bases for reparations claim, constitutional and
statutory sources of law as failing to state cognizable claims and relying instead on common law
of tort). Still, although the Alien Tort Claims Act provides district courts subject matter
jurisdiction over torts in violation of the "law of nations," it neither defines the "law of nations"
nor provides a forum for U.S. citizens, a status borne by individual Indians since 1924. See
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Indian Citizenship Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1401(b) (2000) (conferring U.S. citizenship upon Indian individuals). Thus, a remedy for any
putative violation of the "law of nations" is similarly unavailable to Indian reparations claimants
in U.S. courts.
504. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) (providing for dismissal of claims over which the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal for failing
to state a claim for which relief can be granted).
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activity."' Although the practice of genocide attained categorical
proscription5" through crystallization as a violation of a norm of jus
cogens.°7 by the start of 1939,"' at the time of the Indian Wars - generally,
1850-1890 - no such peremptory norm denounced the killing, in whole or
in part, of Indians as Indians;5 9 on the contrary, Indian mass murder was
official U.S. policy. Although Indian claimants can easily prove the
statutory requirements of genocide even under a narrow judicial
interpretation,"'0 ethnic cleansing of Indian land as prelude to annexation, as
505. See Case Concerning the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B), No. 10.
506. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (defining genocide as killing or seriously
harming, either physically or mentally, members of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group
as such).
507. A norm ofjus cogens, or a peremptory norm, is recognized by the entire international
community one from which no derogation is permitted and which cannot be modified save by
a subsequent norm of this general character. Norms ofjus cogens limit state sovereignty and
immunity in that the general will of the international community takes precedence over the
individual will of states to order their internal relations. See Vienna Convention, supra note
126; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k; Reporter's
Note 6 (1987) (defining jus cogens as narrow subset of CIL norms, including prohibitions
against genocide, slavery, torture, and terrorism, that sit atop the international legal hierarchy,
preempting conflicting treaties and norms).
508. Although the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") was an ad hoc judicial body
confined as to subject matter, personaljurisdiction, territorialjurisdiction, and temporal domain,
its jurisprudence established under international law that (1) a state, through its officials, could
be held criminally liable for the treatment of its own citizens; (2) German crimes against its own
citizens were retroactive; and (3) no defenses where available even where the genocide occurred
entirely within the boundaries of one state. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
of 8 August 1945 (Nuremberg Charter), confirmed by G.A. Res. 3, U.N. Doc. A/50 (1946) and
G.A. Res. 95 (1), U.N. Doc A/236 (1946); see also Trial of the Major War Criminals
(Nuremberg Judgment) (Sept. 30, 1946), reprinted in LEON FRIEDMAN, TIE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 922-1026 (1972) (finding individual Nazis guilty of crimes against
humanity (now chargeable as genocide), war crimes, and crimes against peace from 1939-45
despite defense that positive law of treaties did not proscribe such acts by individuals at the time
of their commission); United States v. Alfried Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1950) (applying law
retroactively to reach conduct of individual accused of crimes against humanity). However,
because the United States does not directly incorporate international law, IMTjudgments are
emphatically not U.S. law.
509. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
510. Several courts have circumscribed the definition of the crime by requiring proof of
specific intent to commit a widespread, systematic pattern of genocidal acts; others have the
issue before them. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La.
1997); Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, (1995), 30 C.R.R. (3d) 26, 184 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (Can.); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia, Serbia & Montenegro), Application of the
[Vol. 27
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it predates codification of international and domestic legal proscriptions,"'
is a misdeed beyond the purview of contemporary legal remediationi'2
International law sources, including human rights treaties,51 3 and fora,
although of increasing importance to prosecutions of genocide and other
grave breaches, s14 are similarly inhospitable to Indian civil claims arising
Republic of Bosnia, (filed in ICJ Registry March 20, 1993) (alleging pattern of widespread,
systematic acts violative of the Genocide Convention); id. at Preliminary Objections, 11 July
1996 (finding jurisdiction based on article 9 while holding Convention is primarily designed to
reach individual conduct).
511. Federal law incorporates the Genocide Convention, criminalizing genocide. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 109 1-93, 3181 (2000) (punishing genocide with imprisonment and fines). However,
the proscription entered positive law in 1988, and for genocide occurring pre-1988 a remedy
is unavailable. Genocide Convention Implementation Proxmire Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091
(2000). Moreover, federal lawprovides no civil remedy. U.S. Reservations and Understandings
to the Genocide Convention, 28 I.L.M. 754, 782 (1989) (rejecting obligation to pass
implementing legislation). Although the Alien claims Tort Act ("ATCA") may confer subject
matter jurisdiction upon federal courts for suits complaining of acts in violation of the "law of
nations," it does not provide a forum for U.S. citizens, a legal status conferred upon Indians in
1924, and defenses apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA) (2000).
. 512. Although post-World War II treatment of Indians is colorable as a violation of several
norms ofjus cogens, such claims are conceptually distinct from genocide. See Hugo Princz v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1179 (D.C. 1994) (holding that a state violatesjus
cogens if it practices or condones, inter alia, genocide, slavery, murder, arbitrary detention, or
systematic racial discrimination) (citing REsTATEMENT (THRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 702 (1987)).
513. Many human rights instruments proscribe the conduct at issue in the Indian genocide
claim. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 3, at art. 3 (stating everyone has the right to life);
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
3, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (prohibiting murder); ACHR, supra note 415 at art. 13(2) (protecting
civilians from attack); ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 6 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life."). Still, although the United States signed several it has ratified few and, by entering
reservations, has not assumed many legal obligations created therein. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701(4),(6)(1987) (rejecting binding character of much of
UDHR); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of[ICCPR], 138 CONG.
REc. S478 1-01 (1991) (attaching reservations); U.S. Reservations and Understandings to the
Genocide Convention, supra note 511 (rejecting obligation to implement Convention).
Moreover, the United States has not acceded to additional protocols to permit individual
standing to claim violations. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to [ICCPR], 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 360, 383 (1967); U.S. Dep't of State, A List of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2002 (2002) (listing ratifications and
reservations)[hereinafter Treaties in Force].
514. Two UNjudicial bodies try individuals accused of, inter alia, genocide. See Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), S. C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess. 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. 5/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192;
Statute of the International Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602. One
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from genocide."' Redress for ancestral murder would thus be forced into
the framework of domestic wrongful death law and subjected to defenses.
(b) Land Theft
Plenary power and the political question doctrine preclude judicial
undoing of even the most fraudulent, duressive, or unconscionable treaties" 6
defendant has been convicted; others are at trial. See The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR
97-23-S (judgment and sentence) (Sept. 4, 1998) (convicting Rwandan Prime Minister of
genocide); Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Radislav Krstic, ICTFY, IT-98-33 (amended
indictment) (Oct. 27, 1999) (charging genocide in destruction of Srebrenica); Prosecutor of the
Tribunal v. Dusko Sikirica, ICTFY, IT-95-8 (amended indictment) (Aug. 30, 1999) (charging
genocide in operation of Keraterm). Neither is competent to adjudicate Indian claims, however,
and the International Criminal Court, while it will exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide,
is barred from retroactive application of law. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC), art. 24, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 1183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1016 (restricting jurisdiction of the
ICC to criminal conduct occurring after the entry into force of the Statute).
515. International law recognizes treaties as creating obligations owing between sovereigns.
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Individuals thus lack
standing to challenge violations of treaties "in the absence of a protest by the[ir] sovereign[.]"
United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, Hensel v. United States 461
U.S. 958 (1983). Thus, a treaty creates enforceable private rights only if the text so provides.
See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). The United States generally considers
treaties non-self-executing promises to enact domestic implementing legislation absent which
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear, and individuals lack standing to bring, claims
alleging violations of rights granted or safeguarded therein. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24,
30 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 311-14 (1829)), cert.
denied, 429 US. 835 (1976); see also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699,
719-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (terming both UN Charter and UDHR proclamations of aspirations that
do not waive requirement ofimplementing legislation and confer no subject matterjurisdiction);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 n. I (2d Cir. 1995) (holding, even if non-self executing
treaties are evidentiary ofjus cogens norms, no subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts exists
independent of an implementing statute); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.
Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 726 F.2d 774, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985) (non-self-executing treaties, absent implementing legislation, confer no individual
standing); Scoble, supra note 433, at 132 (indicating all U.S. human rights treaties are non-self-
executing). Because the Genocide Convention as implemented does not create a civil remedy
or confer standing, it is unavailable to plaintiffs seeking redress for genocide; identical
conclusions attach to complaints of crimes against humanity arising from violations of other
human rights instruments.
516. In 1855 Congress created the Court of Claims to award compensation for property
seized by the United States. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. Congress soon
precluded claims based on Indian treaties from its jurisdiction. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §9,
12 Stat. 765, 767. Indians remained without a forum until 1946, when, embarrassed by Nazi




and proscribe review of takings, as well as express and intentional violations
of treaty provisions. Indian real property is thus without the full protection
of Constitutional law,"1 7 and with both restitution and compensation within
the exclusive power of Congress, domestic law is a barren source for
framing Indian claims for land seizure. The question of whether such claims
are responsive to international sources of law in domestic courts is
considerably more complex,"'8 as the precise body of applicable law remains
created the Indian Claims Commission (" ICC"). Atkinson, supra note 54, at 399. The ICC
body provided a forum for adjudication of U.S. treaty violations and broad moral "claims based
upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity."
25 U.S.C. § (70-70(v)(3)(2000). The ICC was charged with assessing damages in accordance
with the specific factual history of the tribe, relative U.S. responsibility, and price per acre at
the time of expropriation. Id. Although the ICC found that 35% of the continental United
States - 750 million acres - is legally Indian land, it adopted procedural and evidentiary rules
favoring the United States, which defended each claim as an adversarial, rather than a remedial,
proceeding. Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 38, at 776-84. By not ensuring the
skill or integrity of the non-Indians providing legal representation, the ICC further stacked the
deck. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRILl, supra note 164, at 226. Moreover, the ICC read the "fair
and honorable dealings" clause out of its organic statute, the text of which prohibited in natura
restitution. Id. at 227. Ultimately, the ICC redressed less than one-third of land seizures, most
at rates far below a just level of compensation. See BURNETrE & KOSTER, supra note 154, at
121 (calculating median payment at $225 per Indian individual). Equation of money with
justice soon cast the ICC as another assimilative vehicle, and many defiant tribes "refused to
touch a cent [.1" Atkinson, supra note 54, at 400-03. With the legislative demise of the ICC
in 1978, Indian tribes lack a judicial forum for redress of treaty violations, and special
jurisdictional acts are required to close the jurisdictional hole in the organic statute and allow
adjudication in the Court of Claims. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000) (authorizing federal
jurisdiction over claims brought by federally recognized Indian tribes). Claims that Indian
treaties are voidable due to conditions surrounding their negotiation are nonjusticiable, a legal
result buttressed by the myth that acquisition of Indian lands was legitimate. See ALASDAR C.
MACINTYRE, AFTERVIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORALTHEORY 13-14 (1990) ("The property-owners
of the [U.S.] are not the legitimate heirs of Lockean individuals who performed .... acts of
original acquisition; they are the inheritors of those who... used violence to steal ... vast tracts
[.]"). For a discussion of the ICC, see HARVEY D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990).
517. Newton, Compensation, supra note 167, at 453,457-58 (noting that for all parties save
for its indigenous peoples, the United States accepts the constitutional obligation to remedy
takings of land in violation of law by restitution either in natura or in damages).
518. The very question of whether the collective rights, for the putative violation of which
Indian claimants seek relief, are indeed legal formulations that impose duties on states is
unresolved. A number of declarations and conventions purport to codify an obligation
incumbent upon states to afford indigenous peoples a forum for settlement of disputes and
remedies for redress. See, e.g., Draft Declaration, supra note 192, at art. 39 ("Indigenous
peoples have the right to have access to prompt decision through mutually acceptable and fair
procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States, as well as to effective
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actively contested.
Treaties of the United States are on a par with the U.S. Constitution itself
as the "supreme Law of the Land."5"9 However, although Indian treaties
were understood to be interstate treaties at the time of their conclusion, and
although a well-settled principle requires courts of the United States to
interpret U.S. law consistently with international law and provides that an
act of Congress or a Supreme Court decision ought never be construed or
rendered so as to violate international law "if any other possible construction
remains,"52 the introduction of plenary power established long ago that
Indian "treaties," if only as a matter of domestic law, are not interstate
agreements within the meaning of the Constitution. Consequently, the
United States does not recognize any obligations arising under Indian
treaties as arising under international law.52" ' Similarly, other sources of
conventional international law 2 are almost unequivocally unavailable to the
remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights[]"). Very few states,
however, have accepted the binding character of these declarations and conventions, and courts
of the United States have been particularly unreceptive to the incorporation of such obligations.
See Philip Alston, US. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 365, 372 (1990) (noting that U.S.
courts reject international legal sources purporting to impose obligations with regard to the
promotion or protection of group rights).
519. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
520. See Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains .... ").
521. International law does not recognize treaties between indigenous peoples and states as
creating any enforceable legal obligations, although a recent series of WGIP exhortative
declarations has called upon states to accord treaties with indigenous peoples the character of
interstate agreements. See, e.g., Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive
Agreements Between States and Indigenous Populations: First Progress Report submitted by
Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/32 (1992); Resolution
on Action Required Internationallyto Provide Effective Protection for Indigenous Peoples, Eur.
Parl. Doc. (PV 58) (2), para. 10, at 4 (1994) (calling upon states "in the strongest possible
terms" to honor treaties signed with indigenous peoples). Although for many indigenous rights
advocates the question of "whether or not treaties or agreements with indigenous peoples have
the same juridical status as interstate treaties is not in itself an issue of much practical
importance[,]" particularly if these agreements are accorded respect and mechanisms to ensure
their effectiveness, the "international character" ofthese agreements is largely unacknowledged
in U.S. courts. ANAYA, supra note 37, at 131.
522. Traditional sources of international law include
(i)(a.) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by states; (b.) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; (c.) the general principles of law recognized by civilized




redress of Indian land claims in courts of the United States..3 Although the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties524 categorically proscribes the
very sort of fraudulent, duressive, and bad-faith conduct appurtenant to the
drafting, implementation, and unilateral United States abrogation of Indian
treaties for the last two centuries,125 it does not reach the conduct of parties
prior to its entry into force.526 Moreover, it is not applicable to treaties
concluded "between States and other subjects of international law," '27 nor
is the United States a party, 28 and there is heated debate as to whether the
legal terrain mapped by the Vienna Convention is declaratory of customary
international law 29 or merely a step in the progressive development of
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
Statue of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 (1945).
523. Although humanitarian law yielded conventions purporting to renounce aggressive war,
1907 Hague Convention (II) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36
Stat. 2261, T.S. 538, and the use of force as a policy instrument, Treaty for the Renunciation of
War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact or Pact of Paris), Aug. 27,
1928, art. 1 46 Stat. 2343,94 L.N.T.S. 57, both texts post-date the Indian Wars, and thus neither
is a valid legal source upon which to base an Indian claim for land seizure in the course of
aggressive wars.
524. See Vienna Convention, supra note 126.
525. Id. at art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith."); id. at art. 49 ("If a State has been induced to conclude a
treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud as
invalidating its consent to be bound[.]"); id. at art. 52 ("A treaty is void if its conclusion has
been procured by the threat 'or use of force in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the [UN Charter.]").
526. Id. at art. 28 ("Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or
any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force... with respect to that
party."). Even in the post-Nuremberg era, sovereignty remains an imperfect trump card that
states employ to shield their historical, particularly pre-twentieth century, aggressive territorial
acquisitions. Although the IMT determined that all civilized nations had come to recognize the
CIL principle proscribing acquisition of land by force as of 1939, it did not apply this principle
retroactively. See Nuremberg Judgment, IMT, Cmd. 6964 at 65 (Oct. 1, 1946) [hereinafter
IMT], reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 -333 (1947); see also GEORG SHWARZENBERGER, 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1965) ("By 1939, the rules on belligerent occupation [that it does
not transfer sovereignty] had been recognized by all civilised nations.., as being declaratory
of the law and customs of war.").
527. Vienna Convention, supra note 126, at art. 3.
528. See United States, Treaties In Force, supra note 513 (listing treaties of which the U.S.
is a party).
529. Customary international law (CIL),just as its domestic analogue, common law, is more
difficult to identify and interpret than conventional sources. CIL evolves from the practice of
states, as reflected in official statements and acts, court decisions, and legislation, in a manner
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consistent with the subjective understanding that such practice is legally obligatory - the
requirement of opiniojuris sive necessitatis. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G.
v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (holding that a practice does not become CIL merely
because it is widely followed but rather because it is also deemed legally obligatory by many
states). State practice, particularly by major powers and directly affected states, is the most
concrete element of CIL. Michael Akenhurst, Custom As A Source of International Law, 47
BIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 18 (1977). To become binding, the practice must be consistent, settled, and
uniform, but need not be universal. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in
InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. IN'L L. 413,433 (1983). The key to understanding its formation
lies in the distinction between "custom" and "usage." I OPPENHEIM, supra note 83, Vol. I at 26.
"Custom" requires a clear and continuous habit of doing certain acts under the conviction that
they are obligatory. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 22 (June 18). "Usage" refers to a habit of doing certain acts without a conviction that
the conduct is required, whether as a matter of courtesy, habit, or policy. RESTATEMENT
(THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 25 (1987). To be considered CIL, a practice should reflect
wide acceptance among states involved in the relevant activity as obligatory. Id. In some
instances, a practice followed by a few states can create a rule of CIL absent conflicting practice;
by the same token, as international law is based on the consent principle, and because a practice
need not be universally accepted to become CIL, a state that has consistently rejected the
practice before it became CIL is not bound. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.),
1951 I.C.J. 116. Although the Supremacy Clause on its face appears to require incorporation
only of conventional sources- i.e., treaties signed by President and consented to by the Senate,
see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, judicial decisions and executive practices subsequent to the
framing of the Constitution suggest strongly that CIL is part of the "law of nations" and
therefore federal law, see, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 388, 422-23 (1815) (stating
that United States courts "are bound by the law of nations, which is part of the law of the
land."); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707 (1900) (holding that CIL is a source of
international law found in "the customs and usages of civilized nations as evidenced by jurists
and commentators" that binds U.S. courts unless explicitly contradicted by legislation or
executive order); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,425 (1964) (holding CIL
is federal law); II Op. Att'y Gen. 297,299-300 (1865) ("The framers of the Constitution knew
that a nation could not maintain an honorable place amongst the nations of the world that does
not regard ... the law of nations as part of the law of the land."). Despite these
pronouncements, delineation of the substantive boundaries of the "law of nations" is contested.
Human rights advocates insist that the expanding body of human rights norms and principles
articulated in declarations and working groups constitute a body of CIL directly enforceable in
U.S. courts. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 37, at 49. Critics of direct incorporation insist that
rights under CIL belong to sovereign nations and CIL does not by its judicial discovery create
a private remedy in U.S. courts; rather, as with treaties, domestic implementing legislation is
necessary to create not only a remedy but, a priori, subject matter jurisdiction and standing to
adjudicate alleged violations. Federal courts have been arid terrain for the direct incorporation
argument: even where the CIL principle at issue is "universal, definable, and obligatory," such
as prohibitions against genocide and torture, legislative, rather than judicial, incorporation
remains orthodox jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
779 n.4 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that absent a clear grant of a cause of action manifested by




general principles regarding formation and interpretation of interstate
treaties."' a
Furthermore, although the Draft Declaration defines ethnocide as
including "any action which has the aim or effect of depriving [indigenous
peoples] of their lands, territories or resources" '31 and provides that Indian
tribes have the right to "restitution of the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and
which have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free
and informed consent" or to "just and fair compensation" in the form of
"lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status,
3 2
U.S. courts533 do not recognize this or other CIL sources regarding
creating a forum in U.S. courts to adjudicate alleged violations of human rights); Scoble, supra
note 433, at 132 (noting that even where a substantive human right "possess(es) the requisite
degree of consensus, specificity of definition, and obligatory nature to be judicially
cognizable[,]" implementing legislation is required to confer jurisdiction and standing). In
short, recourse to CIL in domestic litigation of human rights claims is largely fruitless, as
obligations arising under CIL are as yet essentially moral and as such do not satisfy opiniojuris
- the essential subjective component of CIL. Thus, rather than bring claims of its alleged
violation before domestic tribunals, a claimant must "exhaust local remedies and then repair to
the executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy
or before an international tribunal." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 817.
530. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW introductory note (1987).
53 1. Draft Declaration, supra note 192, at art. 7(b).
532. Id. at art. 27.
533. Although the UN Human Rights Commission ("UNHRC") acknowledges the
importance of land to the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, and despite its competence
to question states regarding treatment of indigenous populations, it is a quasi-judicial organ: its
findings are not legally binding, and access is checked by consent principle and other attributes
of state prerogative. See AKEMARK, supra note 10, at 139-47 (discussing limitations of
UNHRC relative to investigation of state treatment of indigenous peoples); Newton, Courts of
the Conqueror, supra note 38, at 478 (noting that prudential barriers - i.e.., standing -
frustrate tribal attempts to bring land claims before UNHRC); Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra
note 49, at 1649 (noting failures of Lakota and Seneca to attain redress before UNHRC); San
Kronowitz, supra note 158, at 604-06 nn.516-30 (noting unsuccessful Hopi efforts to attain
redress for land claims before UNHRC). U.S. refusal to sign the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, the sole instrument that might confer standing upon Indian claimants in the UN system,
is the most significant impediment. Brian B.A. McAllister, The United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work ofthe World
Bank Among Human Rights, The Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMEP. L. REv. 689, 729 (1993) (noting "communications" from non state parties may
only be considered by UNHRC if the state party concerned has recognized UNHRC competence
by ratifying the optional Protocol). Although adjudication and redress of indigenous claims in
international fora with the power to bind states is a controversial subject, the framers of the
indigenous rights regime are committed to the development of sources of law, and forums in
which to apply that law, whereby and wherein protection of indigenous peoples and cultures can
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disposition of indigenous lands534 as creating legal obligations that bind the
political branches of government. 35 In sum, any remedies for Indian land
theft cannot issue from the judiciary: special legislation is necessary to
compensate takings of Indian land" 6 absent which restitution requires either
direct purchase or grant from the United States537
be accorded. Anaya, supra note 37, at 129-30; see also Levitt, supra note 365 (suggesting the
domestic analog of diversity jurisdiction might support litigation of indigenous claims against
states in international tribunals); see also Stuart Ford, OSCE National Minority Rights in the
United States: The Limits of Conflict Prevention, 23 SUFFOLKTRANSNATVLL. REV. 1, 1,43, 48-
50 (1999) (suggesting formation of international organization with competence over protection
of indigenous rights and powers to investigate and adjudicate claims against states). Still,
domestic legal systems and institutions remain authors oflaw and arbiters of claims, and the fate
of international judicial bodies with competence to take meaningful action with respect to
breaches of indigenous rights instruments is linked to the fate of those instruments within the
established canon of public international law: interposition of an "international civil society"
between international law and indigenous peoples that modifies domestic and international laws
and processes may prove the best hope for indigenous rights advocates. See Paul H. Brietzke,
Insurgents in the "New" International Law, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 55-56 (1994) (discussing
international civil social "insurgency").
534. See, e.g., IMT, supra note 526, at 65 (holding that a CIL principle proscribed
acquisition of territory by force as of 1939); UDHR, supra note 3, at art. 17(2) ("No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property."); ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 1(2) ("In no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."); Racism Convention, supra note 379, art.
5(d)(v) (guaranteeing, without discrimination based on race, the right to own property
individually and collectively); ACHR, supra note 415, art. 21(2) ("No one shall be deprived of
his property except upon payment ofjust compensation[.J"); Convention No. 169, supra note
37, 6th preambular para. (providing enhanced protection of indigenous lands and resources);
Quito Declaration On the Enforcement and Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, at pt. II, § A (July 24, 1998), reprinted in 2 YALE
HuM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 215, 218-19 (1998) ("The obligations of the State [include] ...
noninterference.., in the use of the resources of each ... group[.]")
535. See supra note 528 (discussing CIL incorporation in U.S. legal system); see also Beanal
v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362, 373-74 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing, without
prejudice, claim for "cultural genocide" brought by indigenous Indonesian tribe against U.S.
corporations under ATCA and TVPA for failing to state a claim for which relief could be
granted). Although the United States purports to share with Indian tribes the "fundamental goal
of preserving indigenous history, language, and tradition," it contends that this objective can
"best be achieved byprotecting the right of individuals to take the necessary steps by themselves
and in community with others[.J" Suagee, supra note 9, at 509 (quoting U.S. delegation
statement at 1997 Session of WGIP at UNHRC) (emphasis added). Although the United States
admits certain legal obligations to Indians, rather than recognize the Draft Declaration as
constitutive of international law the United States encourages textual redrafting to "harmonize
[it] with existing international law." Id.
536. See supra note 191.
537. Carter D. Frantz, Getting Back What Was Theirs? The Reparations Mechanisms for





Just as genocide and land theft are not actionable due to an absence of
justiciable law, an Indian claim for ethnocide would fail to state a claim for
which relief can be granted in courts of the United States. Although
nineteenth century Christian messianism538 would, if committed at present,
violate a host of human rights instruments protective of cultural, linguistic,
and religious expression539 and particularly defensive of the rights of
children' and their tribal affiliations, 4' this body of "soft law" consists
538. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (detailing forcible removal of Indian
children from parents, punishment for religious and linguistic expression, and criminalization
of Indian religion and culture).
539. See UDHR, supra note 3, art. 18 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion"); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 18(2) ("No one shall be subject to
coercion which would impair his freedom to have ... a religion or belief of his choice.");
Racism Convention, supra note 379, at art. 5(d)(vii) (obligating states parties to observe,
without discrimination, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion); ICCPR, supra note 3,
at art. 18(l) ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.");
ACHR, supra note 415, at art. 12 (3)("Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may be
subject only to the limitations... necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals,
or the rights or freedoms of others."); Convention No. 169, supra note 37, at 5th preambular
para. (recognizing "aspirations of peoples to ... maintain and develop their identities, languages
and religions, within... States in which they live."); Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 2
("Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities.., have the right
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own
language.., without interference or... discrimination."); Draft Declaration, supra note 192,
art. 7 ("Indigenous peoples have the.., right not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural
genocide, including the prevention of and redress for: (a) Any act which has the aim or the effect
of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic
characteristics or identities"); id. art. 32 (guaranteeing indigenous rights to enjoy their own
culture and to preserve customs and legal traditions).
540. See Convention on the Rights of the Child (Children's Convention), Nov. 20, 1989, art.
3(l), 28 I.L.M. 1448 (requiring the "best interests of the child" be a primary consideration in
all actions taken by public and private actors); id. at art. 9(1) (ensuring that a child shall "not
be separated from his or her parents against their [sic] will" except in case of abuse); id. art. 9(3)
(requiring state parties to permit a separated child "direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis"); id. art. 10 (requiring provision of information regarding whereabouts of parents unless
contraindicated); id. art. 13 (1 )(guaranteeing children the right of freedom of expression); id.
art. 14(1) (requiring state parties to respect the right of the child to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion); id. art. 30 (guaranteeing the minority child the right to participate in
the cultural, religious, and linguistic life of the minority group).
541. See ACHR, supra note 415, at art. 12(4) ("Parents... have the right to provide for the
religious and moral education of their children[.]"); Children's Convention, supra note 540, art.
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largely of treaties the United States has not ratified and declarations of CIL
unimplemented in U.S. law and therefore carries mere moral -not legal -
force.4 2 Just the same, imposition of legal disability upon Indian religion 3
is without remedy, and recourse to domestic courts for relief from legal
imperialism, political domination,5" and suppression of ethnodevelop-
ment,5 45 is just as certainly futile.54  Despite a proliferation of hortatory
14(2) (requiring states to respect parental rights to guide children's exercise of religious rights).
542. Separation of indigenous children from their families in order to destroy their
enculturation and replace it with majority values and beliefs - an ongoing global practice -
generates intense moral opprobrium. See Pritchard, supra note 44, at 259. However, although
it is far more protective of Indian children than it once was, federal law adheres to a negative
conception of rights that disavows the full protections of the Children's Convention. See
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-97 (1989) (limiting
affirmative State obligation to ensure children against deprivations of life or liberty).
543. See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text (highlighting denial of constitutional
protection to Indian religions).
544. See supra notes 267-84 and accompanying text (detailing U.S. policies of political
domination of Indian tribes).
545. See Ved P. Nanda, Development as an Emerging Human Right Under International
Law, 13 DEN. J. INT'LL. & PoL'Y 161 (1984) (noting languid incorporation ofethnodevelopment
as a right).
546. The United States may have accepted a CIL obligation to promote Indian self-
determination. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 252 (Dec. 20) ("declarations made by
way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may... creat[e] legal obligations"
when the declaration is "specific, public, and intended to create binding obligations"). The
United States has long conceded that Indian tribes are indigenous "peoples" within the meaning
of international law. Bravo, supra note 353, at 560. Moreover, the U.S. delegation to the
WGIP expressed support for the "basic goals" of the Draft Declaration and stressed that "[s]ince
the 1970s, the U.S .... has supported ... self-determination for Indian tribes[.]" See Observer
Delegation of the United States of America, Statement to the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, Geneva (July 26, 1994). Likewise, in its official report to the UNHRC submitted
pursuant to obligations under the ICCPR, the U.S., attempting to establish compliance with
rights affirmed in Article 1, offered an extensive discussion of federal Indian laws and policies
ostensibly supportive of Indian Self-Determination. U.S. Department of State, Civil and
Political Rights in the United States: Initial Report of the United States of America to the U.N.
Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, Jul. 1994, at 36-46, Dept. State Pub. 10200 (1994).
Still, the argument that the indigenous rights regime is binding as CIL would be stillborn in U.S.
courts, for, although the political branches have solemnly vowed to respect tribal sovereignty,
translation of expressed political intent into protective legal instruments for the violation of
which judicial remedies are available is but a dream. See William J. Clinton, Remarks to Indian
and Alaskan Native Tribal Leaders, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 941, (May 9, 1994)
(pledging support for Indian "values, . . . religions .... and ... sovereignty.") [hereinafter
Clinton Remarks]; Janet Reno, Speech to American Indian Sovereignty Symposium, Tulsa,




declarations excoriating forced relocation and assimilation,547 nonjusticiable
law fails would-be Indian plaintiffs in checking the crush of these
practices. 48
(d) Breach of Trust
As the United States perpetuates the status of Indian tribes and people as
wards of the state under the trust doctrine, 49 an Indian claim for reparations
could conceivably suggest that domestic55° and international5 ' legal
547. International law waxes critical of state assimilative policies. See Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516
(outlawing "mass forcible transfers"); ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 27 (requiring states to not
interfere with rights of minorities "to enjoy their own culture,. . . practise their own religion,
[and] use their own language"); Racism Convention, supra note 379, art. 5(d)(i) (committing
parties to guarantee rights to freedom of movement and residence); Draft Declaration, supra
note 192, art. 7(d) (recognizing indigenous right to protection from "assimilation or
integration"). However, even as states abandon forced relocation, "indigenous cultures remai[n]
threatened as a result of [its] lingering effects[.]" ANAYA, supra note 37, at 56. Assimilationists
still harry indigenous self-determination. See C. Tomuschat, Protection of Minorities Under
Article 27 of the ICCPR, in RAINER BERNHARDT ET AL, VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHSTORDNUNG
INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE 971-74 (1983) (denying group rights
to separate schools, languages, and habitation). Further, CIL declarations of indigenous rights
are still supportive more of participation than dissociation, while their legal force in U.S. courts
is nil. Daes, supra note 284, at 9.
548. International law has evolved to recognize duties to protect conquered and occupied
populations against forced relocation and internal displacement, obligations heightened during
times of internal conflict. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, ICTFY99 (Indictment)
(May 22, 1999), at count 1 (charging Yugoslav "deportation" of Kosovar Albanians as grave
breach of Fourth Geneva Convention requiring humane treatment of noncombatants during
armed conflicts "not of an international character" and prohibiting "forcible transfers, as well
as deportations of protected persons[,]" and as a crime against humanity under Article 5(d) of
Statute of the Tribunal); UN ECOSOC Res. 1999/47, EICN.4/RES/1999/47 (Apr. 27, 1999)
(confirming forced relocation and "ethnic cleansing" as matters of grave international concern);
Internally Displaced persons, G.A. Res. 48/135, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 254, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (calling for comprehensive solution to problems of internally displaced
persons). Nevertheless, even if Congress implemented such instruments, the original acts of
forced deportation and assimilation of Indians occurred long ago, and the doctrinal defense of
ex post facto would preclude litigation in U.S. courts. See supra notes 417-19 and
accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 298-99 (outlining theory and practice of the trust under federal Indian
law).
550. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980) (holding that
a tribe can sue United States for compensation of land taken in breach of the trust doctrine, and
interest is paid on such claims).
551. The international law of trust responsibility provides much to which to aspire but little
enforceable law for citizens seeking positive rights to benefits from states in their own domestic
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obligations consistent with assumption of that responsibility provide a cause
of action for breach of that trust. However, given a reliance on
nonjusticiable "soft law" and a presumption that seizure of Indian land is
undertaken with the federal government acting as faithful trustee, this
argument, however artfully presented, is unlikely to persuade a domestic
court to grant relief.
(2) Doctrinal Obstacles to Indian Reparations
(a) Standing
As its gravamen would allege a series of interrelated group harms
committed by the U.S. government against Indian tribes and individuals, the
claim for Indian reparations would be tailored with the latter as members of
the plaintiff class seeking relief against the U.S. government as perpetrator.
Indian claimants, alleging that every non-Indian citizen has benefitted from
expropriation of Indian lands and resources and the continuing effects of
land theft and genocide-at-law, to the detriment of every Indian person and
group, would assert standing to sue in reliance upon the theory of group
responsibility and entitlement."' Foes of Indian reparations, whether
captive to a binary view of race, ignorant of the harms inflicted by federal
Indian policies past and present, or hostile to race-conscious remedies, will
courts. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 3, at art. 25 ("Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing, medical care and necessary social services .... "). At a minimum, recent cases indicate
that the law is ripe for restatement of greater protection for those recognized by states as entitled
to special provisions of benefits. See Settlement of the Case in the International Court of Justice
Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Aug. 10, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1471 (suggesting that
had the Court reached the merits it might have pronounced a CIL principle, based on the
Trusteeship Agreement and the U.N. Charter, art. 76, that a trustee is required to discharge an
"international fiduciary duty" to the benefit of the beneficiary); see also Guerin v. R., (1984) 2
S.C.R. 335 (Can.) (finding a judicially enforceable fiduciary relationship with respect to
management by Canada of the lands of its First Nations). Still, it is unclear whether a future
restatement, even if predicated upon the principle of international fiduciary duty, would redound
to the benefit of Indian claimants in U.S. courts.
552. Matsuda, supra note 51, at 378-80. As Mezey notes, Indians present perhaps the
strongest case for standing of any aggrieved racial minority group as
[t]he historical abuses are well-documented, the victimized group is identifiable
because it has remained largely unassimilated both culturally and geographically,
and the current members of the group continue to suffer harm in that the vitality
of each tribe's cultural identity and autonomy is threatened by the social and
economic desperation of life.




assert that present-day members of Indian tribes cannot prove a nexus
between any injury in fact and any specific individual wrongdoers. Courts,
unwilling to stretch back in time to link the problems bedeviling
contemporary Indians with acts of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide, will
likely follow precedent and grant a defense motion to dismiss for a lack of
standing to sue."'
(b) Causation
Even if opponents of Indian reparations lost a dismissal motion asserting
a lack of standing, they would challenge the causal link between the acts and
injuries alleged, deny the foreseeability of the injuries," and assert the
interposition of intervening or confounding acts on the part of Indian
plaintiffs.5" While exposition of the historical record by Indian plaintiffs
ought to compel an impartial jury to conclude that genocide, land theft, and
ethnocide are the proximate causes of the depopulation and seizure of Indian
land, the denial of Indian self-determination, and the marked disparities
between non-Indian and Indian socioeconomic status, there are legal and
political limits to the temporal and remedial gap the doctrine of causation is
permitted to cross: membership in a aggrieved racial group is simply a bridge
too far. Absent proof that commission of specific injurious acts by specific
tortfeasors legally caused specific compensable injuries, critics will attack the
theory of causation offered by Indian plaintiffs they may accuse of "playing
the race card,"556 and, resting on the twin cushions of precedent and
administrative convenience, courts will be favorably inclined to tilt the legal
553. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-09 (1995) (dismissing African American
claim for reparations on ground of, inter alia, lack of standing).
554. See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
555. Claims of intervening or confounding acts, though baseless, are effective. Thus, to the
claim of genocide, critics of Indian reparations might assert that many deaths occurred in
conflicts conducted without violation of the laws of war as they then existed; to the claim of
land theft, they might counter that government negotiators were simply more shrewd or ruthless
than their Indian counterparts; to the claim of ethnocide, they might explain circumscription of
tribal governments, religions, and resources with claims of tribal mismanagement, the
incompatibility of Indian culture with bureaucratic capitalism, a lack of bad intent on the part
of the government, or the inherent inferiority of Indian culture in a competitive marketplace of
ideas.
556. See LINDA WILUAMS, PLAYING THE RACE CARD (2001) (suggesting that the dominant
perspective is inclined to view a claim for racial remediation as unfounded attempts to browbeat
whites and exploit old persecutions to secure unwarranted benefits for racial minority groups
in the present - a gambit termed "playing the race card").
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playing field in favor of the dominant political actor, the United States."'
(c) Time-Bar and Laches
Much of the Indian claim for reparations would be predicated upon actions
plaintiffs would allege to have occurred in past centuries. Claiming an
inability to defend an action that accrued so long ago that it is now impossible
to marshal evidence, including long-dead witnesses and vanished documents,
the United States will assert that the doctrine of laches..8 and the equitable
principle of procedural fairness"5 9 require that the claim be forfeited for a
failure to be brought during the period established by applicable state and
federal statutes of limitations."W Indian claimants will counter that the federal
equitable tolling doctrine should permit adjudication despite failure to sue
within the time period established by law, particularly because the defendant
was solely responsible, through its failure to provide a forum 6' and sources
of law,562 for the delay and because the defendant"fraudulently concealed" '63
557. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 405-08 and accompanying text.
559. See Landgrafv. U.S.I. Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (elaborating equitable
principle of procedural fairness to defendants served by judicial refusal to hear claims that
should have been brought earlier).
560. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (holding that precedent and
equity require that a statute of limitations be strictly enforced where the legislature "explicitly
puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it enacted").
561. The argument for federal equitable tolling is particularly sound with respect to Indian
land claims, which the United States statutorily precluded from adjudication in the federal Court
of Claims for nearly a century. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
562. See supra note 516 (noting absence ofjudicial forum for Indian plaintiffs).
563. To access federal equitable tolling, plaintiffs are required to demonstrate the following:
(1) that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct designed to conceal evidence of his
alleged wrongdoing; (2) that the plaintiff was not on actual or constructive notice of that
evidence; and (3) that the plaintiff exercised due diligence and did not "sleep on his rights." J.
Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245,1255 (1 st Cir.
1996). Satisfaction of the first prong, the "fraudulent concealment" test, has long required the
plaintiff to demonstrate with substantial particularity the affirmative actions whereby the
defendant fraudulently concealed his whereabouts.
A complainant, (to avoid the statute of limitations), must state in his bill distinctly
the particular act of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, must specify how,
when, and in what manner, it was perpetrated. . .And especially must there be
distinct averments as to the time when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or
misrepresentation was discovered, and what the discovery is, so that the court may
clearly see, whether, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, the discovery might not
have been before made.
Steams v. Page, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 819, 829 (1849). Federal case law with respect to this
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol27/iss1/1
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his whereabouts for purposes of suit while preventing, by the very acts of
which plaintiffs complain, the gathering of necessary evidence with which to
develop a theory of the case.'" However, federal courts have held that
equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy to be "used sparingly 565 and
without regard to "sympathy... for particular litigants,"5' and it is altogether
forbidden where "inconsistent with the legislative purpose. 5 67 Although
Indian plaintiffs could prove specific U.S. conduct that constitutes fraudulent
concealment that prevented the gathering of evidence as the basis for equitable
tolling of the FTCA, 68 the FTCA and applicable state statutes clearly
demonstrate legislative intentions to limit the period in which claims may be
brought upon accrual, and Indian claimants have had notice" 9 of their claim
for at least several generations. Although no credible argument that Indian
claimants have slept upon their rights could be sustained, case law is unkind
to reparations litigants seeking to toll statutes of limitations.5 70
requirement comports with FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), requiring the plaintiff who seeks to prove the
fraudulent concealment necessary to toll a statute of limitations, to plead "all averments of fraud
or mistake... with particularity" lest dismissal be otherwise required. J. Geils, 76 F.3d at 1255.
564. See Bell v. Fowler, 99 F.3d 262, 266 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[E]quitable tolling is
appropriate when the plaintiff, despite all due diligence, is unable to obtain vital information
bearing on the existence of his claim."); Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson, 931 F.2d 590, 595
(9th Cir. 199 1), rev. on other grounds, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (equitable tolling permissible where
extraordinary circumstances beyond plantiffs control made it impossible to file timely claims).
565. Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11 th Cir. 1993) (citing Irwin v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).
566. Portis v. World Omni Finance, 2000 WL 726220, at $4 (S.D. Ala .May 16, 2000).
567. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974); see also Cook v.
Deltona, 753 F.2d 1552, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("equitable tolling is a matter of congressional
prerogative and can be read only in the absence of congressional intent to the contrary").
568. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000) (providing for a two-year statute of limitations under
FrCA).
569. Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1984) ("a claim does not
accrue until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of both
the injury and its cause."); Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 255,
266-73 (1985)(Stevens, J. dissenting) (suggesting the Oneida did not "adequately justify their
delay" in bringing a claim nearly two centuries after its accrual).
570. See Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (1984) (barring reparations claim due to
running of statute of limitations); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.
1995). Time may work against Indians with respect to their legal capacity to assert rights in
land, particularly if the claims are not recognized by treaty. See Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
at 266-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding nearly two centuries of delay in bringing a
claim to quiet title coupled with the "legitimate reliance interests" of owners of property on
disputed Indian lands was sufficient to bar a claim by the doctrine of laches); (State v. Elliott,
616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (holding that Indian title is
extinguishable by the "increasing weight of history" and that the longer tribal rights are ignored,
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(d) Res Judicata
As the doctrine ofres judicata prohibits subsequent decision of claims and
issues that were or could have been raised and decided in a prior forum, 71 the
United States may argue that payments made under treaties and statutes,7 2 the
IRA, 1 3 and the Indian Claims Commission" prohibit adjudication of the
Indian claim for reparations, particularly with respect to land theft.575
the greater the reason for construing [U.S.] failure to protect Indian interests as an affirmative
intent to extinguish Indian title); see also United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 649 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding laches can defeat Indian rights in land not recognized by treaty).
571. See Kyler v. Montezuma County, No. 99-1052,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1145 (10th Cir.
Jan. 28, 2000).
572. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48 (1831) (noting that although
they ceded Indian territories to the United States, many Indian treaties either recognized Indian
title to unceded lands, provided tribes in lieu lands west of the Mississippi River, and granted
compensation); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 372, 424 (1980) (holding
that 1877 act removing Black Hills from Lakota ownership was a taking of recognized title
under the Fifth Amendment and upholding Court of Claims judgment for monetary damages);
ANILCA, supra note 38 (providing $1 billion compensation to Alaskan Natives for takings of
335 million acres); Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 12, at 484 n.22 (listing
compensations of takings of Indian lands including $32 million to Ottawa, $81 million to
Klamath, $31 million to Chippewa, $12.3 million to Seminole, and $105 million to Lakota).
However, for at least one tribe res judicata may not preclude a claim for land theft even though
compensation was ordered. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1621 (noting that
the Black Hills Treaty Alliance, a Lakota NGO, asserts that the 1868 Treaty guaranteeing use
and occupancy of the Black Hills in perpetuity, is still good law and refuses to accept
compensation from Court of Claims). Taking an expansive view of res judicata, some
commentators suggest that passage of IGRA- federal legislation simplifying and standardizing
the process whereby Indian tribes can secure the permission of States to operate reservation
gaming operations - is a form of reparations preclusive of subsequent litigation of Indian
claims as matters resjudicata. See Stephanie Dean, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should The
Federal Government Be Able To Take Native American Gambling Revenue?, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PRoBs. 157, 180 (1999) (noting that the Pequot totaled gross profits of $800 million in
1994 and have guaranteed every member a house, an salary of more than $50,000, and lifelong
paid education). However, if only because relatively few tribes operate gaming enterprises and
even fewer earn profits, this is an exceedingly weak legal argument. See Mezey, supra note 291,
at 713 (evaluating Indian gaming).
573. See Bryant, supra note 477, at 151 (noting that the IRA provided for limited reparations
to Indian tribes in the form of recognition of mineral and other resources rights).
574. See supra note 516.
575. The organic statute creating the ICC provided that any individual tribal member had
standing to sue on behalf of the entire tribe. See Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, 60
Stat. 1049 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. (70-70(vX3)) (expired Sept. 30, 1978). As a result,
the adjudication of a tribal claim is arguably res judicata, and where one tribal member has




Although Indian claimants will likely assert that prior payments were partial,
expedient settlements paid to desperate individuals rather than reparations
oriented toward affording justice to tribes, res judicata is an imposing
doctrinal hurdle susceptible to clearance only by political, rather than judicial,
machinery.
(e) Stare Decisis
Not only does the settled corpus of federal Indian law generally militate
against the interests of would-be Indian claimants, 76 but where there are
conflicting precedents, courts of the United States, and parties who litigate
before them, are effective in exploiting "convenient ambiguities" to narrow
interpretations of Indian rights while offering up those very precedents as a
scapegoat for such judgments.5" In so doing, courts, wittingly or no, extend
the "racist legacy" of federal Indian law5" and further marginalize the
underprivileged position of Indian rights within the domestic hierarchy. 79
Even if the quest for Indian reparations is not inescapably a rigged game,
580
selective judicial wielding of precedent will render this result.58'
(0) Exhaustion of Remedies
In addition to the other legal impediments, claimants for Indian reparations
must first exhaust administrative remedies ostensibly available through
recourse to the various federal agencies that administer organic statutes and
a separate action.
576. See Williams, Algebra ofFederalIndian Law, supra note 158, at 363 (branding federal
Indian law an "instrument of racial domination and discrimination against indigenous tribal
peoples' rights of self-determination").
577. Singer, supra note 133, at 529-30 (applying CLS critique of liberalism to federal Indian
law).
578. Williams, Algebra of Federal Indian Law, supra note 158, at 363 ("Because of their
lack of familiarity with the racist origins of the core doctrines of... Federal Indian law, most
.. do not realize that every time the... Supreme Court cites to any of the core principles to
uphold one of its Indian law decisions, it perpetuates and extends the racist legacy brought by
Columbus to the New World[.]").
579. See Resnik, supra note 9, at 686 (demonstrating the marginal position of federal Indian
law and Indian rights scholarship in both federal jurisprudence and scholarly literature).
580. See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 38, at 759-60 ("[The] perception
among some Indian people and advocates for Indian tribal rights [is] that the.., court system
is rigged... to favor the [U.S.]").
581. Legal maneuvers of this sort - the hallmark of the Rehnquist Court for a quarter-
century - has left Indian tribes little hope for legal remediation. See WELLS, supra note 152,
at 18.
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programs governing Indian affairs, even if any such remedies are rendered
either unavailable or illusory by the plenary power of Congress and its
immunity from judicial review in disputes between Indian tribes and the
United States. Moreover, Indian claimants alleging present-day effects of past
acts of injustice would be obligated to exhaust available civil rights remedies
prior to filing a reparations claim. 82
(g) Ex Post Facto Application of the Laws
Because genocide, land theft, and ethnocide were legal as a matter of
international and domestic law at the time of their commission, "
constitutional hostility to retroactive legislation,"H coupled with the common
law doctrine proscribing ex post facto application of the laws,5" will conspire
to deprive federal courts of subject matterjurisdiction to hear a cause of action
for Indian reparations alleging these acts as the basis for the claim.
(h) Sovereign Immunity
Although the historical conduct of the United States towards Indian tribes
and individuals inspires many Americans to harsh moral criticism, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity,5" a prerogative codified in federal law cloaking the
federal government with near-absolute legal immunity for its intentional
torts,58 ' will preclude claims for Indian reparations under the FTCA unless
Congress unequivocally consents to suit." Consent would be as remarkable
as it is unprecedented.
(i) Political Question
An Indian claim for reparations triggers several Baker characteristics and
582. See supra note 414 (discussing domestic requirement of exhaustion of remedies).
583. See supra notes 167, 510, 539-545. (While a cause of action could be maintained for
conquest and genocide had such acts been committed subsequent to their formal proscription,
the Indian claim for reparations is predicated primarily upon acts that occurred prior to that
date).
584. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto law shall be passed.").
585. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
586. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
587. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
588. See United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987) (holding recovery on a reparations suit
barred by federal sovereign immunity with exception of a takings claim under the Fifth
Amendment). The Indian claim for land theft, though it would perhaps not be precluded by a
defense of sovereign immunity if pled under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, would




constitutes perhaps the archetypic case for reflexive judicial abstention and
dismissal under the political question doctrine." 9 Although international
disputes may arguably be "not as separable from politics as are domestic legal
disputes,"'" many Indian claims arise from official acts committed during an
era when Indian sovereignty had not been entirely extinguished and relations
with tribes not yet conquered were indisputably a matter of foreign
relations.59' U.S. courts have reinforced the absolute power of the political
branches over tribes along with the immunity of such actions from judicial
review. 92 In a real sense, Lone Wolf v. Hitchock5 93 - the intractable Dred
Scott of federal Indian law594 - diminishes the meaning of citizenship for
Indians.
6f) Inability to Render Fair Damage Assessment
Although the United States is experienced in determining eligibility and
methods with respect to Indian redress,95 a court may find it impossible to
attach a monetary value to the welter of damages - the murder of millions,
the seizure of billions of acres, and ongoing cultural suffocation - arising
from genocide, land theft, and ethnocide. Any cash payment, no matter how
large, will grossly undervalue the injuries suffered. Still, even if the Indian
reparations claim is advanced solely through tribes, thus disposing of some
589. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing prongs under which the political
question doctrine is triggered, requiring judicial abstention and dismissal, including, inter alia,
invocation of issues constitutionally committed to determination, and previously decided by,
political branches).
590. See Scoble, supra note 433, at 182.
591. For purposes of analysis under the political question doctrine,judicial imposition of the
status of"domestic dependent nations," although it has diminished Indian sovereignty, reserves
some measure of political independence, and despite their travails Indian nations continue to
exist in a twilight zone between full and extinguished sovereignty. See Johnson v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
592. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984) (noting that, under the political question doctrine,
the Supreme Court has upheld essentially every exercise of federal regulatory power over Indian
affairs).
593. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,565 (1903) (holding disputes challenging
federal power to regulate Indian tribes are political questions immune from judicial review and
subject to the presumption that the United States will always act in good faith).
594. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding African Americans are not
U.S. citizens under the meaning of "citizen" as contemplated by U.S. Constitution); Singer,
supra note 133, at 483-84 (noting Lone Wo/fhas "aptly been characterized as the Dred Scott"
of federal Indian law).
595. See Newton, Compensation, supra note 167, at 457 (discussing ICC determinations of
eligibility and redress).
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conflict over membership in the remedial class, critics will recoil at the
transfer of as much as several trillion dollars5" ' to fewer than two million tribal
members, many of whom are of mixed heritage.597 The transformation of
every individual claimed as a member by an Indian tribe into a
multimillionaire would be so unpalatable to whites that preclusion of suit, on
596. Specific demands for damages are speculative, but compensation of the two million
living Indian individuals in the amount of $1 million each for the wrongful death of a single
ancestor would cost $2 trillion. Compensation for expropriated land could conceivably be as
costly.
597. "Who is an Indian?" is a problematic question. After centuries of forced assimilation,
most of the two million Indians are of mixed heritage. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status
of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV.
HuM. RTS. L.J. 57, 65 (1999). However, Indian identity has political, cultural, and linguistic,
as well as racial, dimensions, and the status of an individual claiming to be an Indian is
irreducible to a simplistic determination of his degree of "Indian blood." See Robert N. Clinton,
Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense ofFederal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-
Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1009-18 (198 1) (distinguishing racial, hybrid, and political
classifications); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 53, at 169 (same); David C. Williams, The
Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as 'People, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991)
(suggesting "Indian" is a racial, as well as a political, term). Moreover, the undisputed,
exclusive power of Congress to recognize Indian tribes is a nonjusticiable political question.
See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power "To regulate Commerce with... the
Indian Tribes[.]"); 25 C.F.R. ch. 1 §83.3-11 (1998) (listing BIA "Procedures for Establishing
That An Indian Group Exists As an Indian Tribe"); Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117
F.3d. 1489, 1499-1500 (D.C.C. 1997) (reiterating that federal recognition of an Indian tribe is
a political question immune from judicial review). Accordingly, each recognized tribe self-
determines membership criteria consonant with its historical development and contemporary
needs. Passamaquoddy v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975). For some, individuals with
any degree of linear descent from early tribal members are members even absent contact with
the reservation, whereas for others even those with one hundred percent blood-quantum who
intermarry or abandon community ties are nonmembers. Michael Haederle, Trying to Draw the
Line, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1992, at El (describing variance of membership criteria across
tribes). Although a one-fourth or greater blood quantum requirement was once a common
standard, in recent years cultural identification has gained acceptance as more constitutive of
Indian identity and thus more important in ascertaining membership. Michelene Fixico, The
Road to Middle Class Indian America, in AMERICAN INDIAN IDENTITY: TODAY'S CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES 55, 72 (Clifford E. Trafzer ed., 1989). Still, this shift toward culture strikes some
as unfair in the sense that reparations to tribes granting membership to individuals with but a
small blood quantum compensates persons lacking standing to complain of injuries to which
they are linked, by virtue of the fact that most of their ancestors are non-Indian and thus
members of the perpetrator group, by the most fragile of causal connections. Moreover,
gatekeepers ofmajoritarian political institutions can terminate tribes whose membership criteria
do not suit their remedial interests, thereby shrinking the remedial class. For a thorough
discussion of the complex legal, political, and sociological questions that emerge from an
attempt to answer the broader 'who is Indian?' question, see William Trapani, Re/Cognizing




the ground that it is impossible to fairly assess damages, is a handy hook upon
which to hang vigorous objections.
(3) Political Objections to Indian Reparations
(a) Nature of and Remedy for Indian Disenfranchisement
Most Indians would probably grant that most white Americans are not as
racist as are the precedents and policies upon which federal Indian law is
crafted. However, an absence of malice does not translate into an abundance
of insight: by the early 1970s, the most well-intentioned non-Indians, self-
assured that if injustice had yet to be fully remedied it had been consigned to
an inglorious past and overwritten by a host of visionary federal programs
assured to make necessary amends in the very near future, encouraged Indian
tribes to "begin looking forward and to forget the injustices of the past" even
as federal seizures of Indian land continued apace.598 Although many Indian
tribes lauded a succession of federal policy statements supporting
reconstitution of tribal cultural, political, and economic self-sufficiency,5 the
relative intractability of Indian socioeconomic disadvantage over the past
several decades revealed Indian Self-Determination as, at best, a half-empty
promise." °
"Friends of the Indian" have ventured scant distance toward the legal
reforms and institutional endowments necessary to alleviate the poverty and
politico-economic insufficiency badgering Indian tribes and individuals."°
Where successful Indian claimants for reparations would infuse significant
sums into tribal institutions and thereby create the preconditions for genuine
self-determination, including land restitution and legal reform, the dominant
society would retain Indian tribes on strings tied to politically-contingent
annual grants, thereby reining in the drive for self-government in favor of the
present asymmetrical relationship in which tribal initiative and existence are
subordinate to and dependent upon the laws, institutions, and beneficence of
the conqueror. In sum, reparations as a tool to facilitate unmediated
investment in Indian institutions, businesses, and communities is, for the
dominant society, a remedy altogether too promotive of genuine self-
determination.
598. See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 38, at 473.
599. See Indian Self-Determination, supra note 280.
600. See id. (detailing origins and development of Indian Self-Determination).
601. See infra notes 752-65 and accompanying text (introducing reforms necessary to enable
Indian Self-Determination).
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(b) Sufficiency of Existing Civil Rights Legislation and
Broader Liberal Legal Aspirations
Although remedies available through reparations and existing civil rights
legislation are largely identical - both provide for money damages ' - the
diligent enforcement of existing civil rights laws holds even less promise for
the remediation of Indian claims. Contrary to a central tenet of liberalism, the
legal and political interests of Indians are divergent from most, if not all, other
racial and ethnic groups in the United States. For Indians, the question is not
merely whether the rights theory of remediation at the core of liberal
jurisprudence can conjure forth equal participation in the benefits and
privileges of American society through formal and positive civil rights
legislation or whether, as CRT insists, something more responsive to the
eradication of persistent racial hierarchy is necessary to guarantee non-
discrimination and equality. Rather, the Indian quest for self-determination
implies a degree of measured separatism that does not correlate with the
integrationist tendencies of liberalism and, to a slightly lesser degree, of CRT:
with respect to many issue-areas, a great number of Indians seek the legal right
to opt out?"
3
Prudence thus counsels for the adoption of a political strategy cognizant of
the fact that liberal law itself,' and in particular federal Indian law and its
doctrines of plenary power and the trust responsibility, is behind the
systematic suppression of tribal self-governance'4" and the persistent legal
disabilities attached to the expression of Indian culture and religion. Efforts
toward the attainment of genuine self-determination are therefore best directed
602. Injunctive relief - available to civil rights plaintiffs - is beyond the scope of
reparations.
603. See SVENSSON, supra note 221, at 39 (noting that the principle of Indian self-
determination is in tension with the integrationism informing the civil rights movement and
liberal law). Although some minority groups claim rights to a separate cultural identity, only
Indians can claim the right to political autonomy by virtue of their status as indigenous peoples
- a distinct political classification that under international law recognizes rights transcending
those that inhere in "mere" minorities even if U.S. policymakers conflate the boundary as a
matter of domestic law. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1650-51 (comparing
superior rights of indigenous peoples with rights of minorities under the ICCPR).
604. See David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 423-24 (1994) (stating that, when
"pervasively dissimilar cultures are yoked together" within a liberal nation-state, minority
cultures, particularly where organized along communitarian rather than individualist principles
as are Indian tribes in the United States, will systematically lose rights to self-determination).
605. See supra notes 143-154, 158, and accompanying text (describing how plenary power




not in charting and navigating the proper route to integration but in defining,
asserting, promoting, and protecting that self-determination; although these
missions are served, if indirectly, through the infusion of monies that either
reparations or enforcement of civil rights laws would offer, reparations,
particularly the legislative variety, avoids the trap of forcing Indian claimants
to resort directly to the very legal system precluding redress while
simultaneously altering the dimensions of that system through remedial
legislation.
Nevertheless, because it would not only strike a blow at the foundation of
the liberal legal order but also introduce the material preconditions for Indian
self-determination - a process fairly interpreted as a partial dis-integration
of the social fabric - Indian reparations provides fodder for critics of
perceived racial separatism while alienating liberal whites.'
(c) Hostility to Group Remedies
Although the U.S. legal and political system remains generally hostile to
recognition and defense of group rights, the special position of Indian tribes
in the constitutional order is made manifest inasmuch as relief of a sort has
long been accorded by the political branches to harmed Indian groups qua
groups. While federal jurisprudence interpreting the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs has gradually shifted toward support for the
liberal principle that all individual persons are entitled to formal equality
before, and treatment under, the law, remedies for Indian tribes do in fact
incorporate the concepts of group harm, responsibility, entitlement, and
blame. Whereas upon judicial review a remedial program for the benefit of
an aggrieved racial group has to withstand strict scrutiny to determine whether
it is conducted by an institution guilty of past discrimination while serving a
compelling state interest,"° Indian tribes are considered political
classifications sharply differentiated from racial groups, and programs of a
"remedial" character designed for their benefit are recognized governmental
interests under the trust doctrine, exempt from standard Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence and subject merely to a rational (and deferential)
standard of review. 8 Although the question of whether federal programs
designed to benefit Indian individuals not members of federally recognized
606. Pyle, supra note 361, at 789-90.
607. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
608. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53, 554 n.24 (1974) (describing policies
favoring Indian tribes as "political" rather than "racial" classifications because of a "special
relationship" with the United States, and exempting Indian tribes from normal equal protection
jurisprudence).
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tribes are entitled to the same rational standard of review has recently
arisen,' firm constitutional support exists for reparations to Indian tribes qua
tribes.
Still, in the post-Adarand era some of the most vociferous critics of Indian
rights invoke equal protection language to assert that Indians should not be
able to claim rights reserved under treaties or granted by statute.610 To the
609. Some commentators insist that only Indians organized into recognized tribes possess
the "special relationship" with the United States that justifies evaluating programs for their
benefit under the rational standard of review. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and
the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537, 558-92 (1996)
(noting that the language in the Indian Commerce Clause and Mancari "drew a sharp distinction
between American Indians as aracial group and members of Indian tribes as apolitical group.").
Several courts have rejected the position that programs aiding non tribal Indians must endure
strict scrutiny, ruling instead that the expenditure of federal monies on remedial projects for
Indians logically designed to protect or promote self-determination or culture does not violate
the Constitution even where it appears arbitrary or where the funding is given to an organization
other than an Indian tribe because the legislative body is entitled to weigh competing arguments
and make necessary judgments regarding allocation of resources. See Delaware Tribal Bus.
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 91 (1977) ("Congress must have a large measure of flexibility
in allocating Indian awards[.]"); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 212 (1974) (holding that
Alaskan Natives are "Indians" as if members of recognized tribes for purposes of determining
the appropriate level ofjudicial review of programs in their benefit); Alaska Pacific Fisheries
v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1918) (same); Loudner v. United States, 108 F.3d 896,
901 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the trust relationship extends to Indians who were lineal
descendants of tribal members but who themselves are not members of any tribes). However,
post-Adarand cases suggest a judicial reversion in the standard of review of Indian benefits
programs, even where such programs are directed to recognized tribes, at least where such
programs are not logically related to Indian lands, government, or culture, or where the
programs are the creation of state, rather than federal, legislation. See Williams v. Babbit, 115
F.3d 657, 664, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that Adarand may place some boundaries on
when the Mancari rational basis test will apply to preferential programs for Indians, such as if
such programs were to give Indians "a complete monopoly on the casino industry or on Space
Shuttle contracts"); see also Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (invalidating, as an
impermissible substitution of ancestry as a proxy for race in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment, a Hawaii statute by which only Native Hawaiians were allowed to vote for trustees
to the State Office of Hawaiian Affairs, despite District Court finding that Congress specifically
targeted Native Hawaiians for "rehabilitation" of harms inflicted by the United States, because
native Hawaiians are not a federally recognized Indian tribe) (citing Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)). Whether Congress, as opposed to a state, retains the prerogative
post-Rice to pass statutes granting preference or benefit to nontribal Indians remains a question
for future resolution.
610. See, e.g., Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty
Abuse-Wis., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (W.D. Wis. 199 1) (noting harassment tactics ofnon-





extent that critical jurisprudence is correct in positing that adjudications of
rights are partly determined by the places occupied in the social hierarchy by
the adversaries seeking to defend and challenge them and that minority groups
systematically lose such contests, Adarand and Rice61" ' are harbingers of
judicial retreat to a stricter standard of scrutiny of remedial legislation
benefitting Indians. Proponents of Indian reparations cannot rest upon prior
judicial deference to Congress, nor can they be sure that future Congresses,
mindful of this judicial yaw, will be as forthcoming with such remedies.
(d) Resistance to Fundamental Redistribution of Economic
and Social Power
Until the majority comes to accept not only the role of the United States
and its laws in the deliberate destruction of Indian populations, property
rights, and cultures but also the responsibility to repair the interdependent
relationship between Indian self-determination and U.S. legitimacy, Indian
reparations, a moral shibboleth through the shadow of which the dominant
social group is unwilling to tread, will be viewed as nothing more than a
underserved handout to the losers of a long-ago struggle for the continental
landmass.612 A destabilizing reallotment of the American economic and
territorial pie on this basis is likely to provoke violent political backlash at
flashpoints along a wide spectrum of self-interested white Americans,6"3 as
well as ethnic elbowing"4 from uncompensated and as-yet-aggrieved minority
racial groups, including, inter alia, African-Americans and Hispanics."
611. Rice, 528 U.S. at 495.
612. Although official policy statements are supportive of the right of Indian tribes to self-
determine, for many domestic and foreign critics threats to territorial integrity lurk behind every
assertion of the right. See JAIMES, supra note 95, at 78. The Indian right to self-determination,
expressed in a reparations claim, may thus provoke contestation reminiscent of the nineteenth
century Indian Wars, albeit on the political, rather than the military, field of battle.
613. Assuming, arguendo, that the total value of the Indian claim for reparations was
assessed at nearly $4 trillion for the wrongful death and land theft elements alone, the burden
of taxation, after redistribution across the approximately 100 million taxpayers, would exceed
$40,000 per capita, an amount sufficient for a working couple to make a substantial down
payment toward the purchase of a home. Absent a compelling argument on behalf of such a
costly demand, framed in terms and replete with symbols that resonate deep within the moral
consciousness of the non-Indian majority, Indian reparations will inevitably generate significant
political contestation.
614. See supra note 475 (defining and discussing the phenomenon of "ethnic elbowing").
615. The likelihood that other racial groups might respond to an Indian claim for reparations
by elbowing their way to the head of the reparative line may be easy to overestimate. Scholars
of many hues concede that, as prior occupants of the soil and as the victims of some of the most
egregious yet uncompensated injustices, Indians deserve a place at or very near the head of the
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Moreover, any claim for payment of greater than symbolic compensation
to Indian claimants" 6 will not only threaten opponents with personal financial
loss and national fiscal crisis,6 7 it will stoke the argument that any debt has
been at least partially, if not completely, discharged through Indian benefits
programs legislated and appropriated under the trust responsibility. Indian
claimants can simultaneously allay fears of personal and national insolvency
while redeeming dependence for emancipation by presenting measured claims
for more limited compensation over a period of time and by demonstrating
that payments would be reinvested in the U.S. economy. However, unless the
dominant social group understands the relationship between the trust doctrine
and the web of legally-enforced political, economic, and cultural dependence
spun to ensnare Indian self-determination, it may prove impossible to defeat
the offsetting of payments under the trust doctrine against the value of the
Indian claim.
(e) Inability to Transform Racial Attitudes, Alter Legal
Structures, or Restore Land
Although a claim for Indian reparations would present a potentially
transformative national moment wherein to challenge and upset the
assumptions and normative judgments of Indian inferiority and United States'
infallibility, a lump-sum payment, although it might materially enrich Indian
tribes, would be unlikely to advance the progressive perfection of the
American social and legal order. Although Indian tribes seeking to obtain a
remedial queue. See Westley, supra note 17, at 436 ("In arguing... for Black reparations, this
article does not suggest that Blacks should receive reparations either exclusively or even first.
In all justice, indigenous peoples should probably be compensated ahead of any others."); see
also Brew, supra note 28, at 195-96 ("violation of the human and civil rights of Native
Americans... has spanned the course of [U.S.] history subjecting them to discrimination much
earlier and much longer than [other groups]"); Matsuda, supra note 51, at 385 ("[A]ny
conclusions the rest of us may come to about law and social change are subject to the special
priority of indigenous Americans."). Furthermore, "cross-racial project[s] of social change[,]"
in which linkages are formed between communities deficient in social justice - those that,
regardless of their biological race, are "raced black" in the political sense -may dampen ethnic
elbowing in favor of a commitment to broader social transformation inclusive of all
downtrodden groups, including Indians. LA'i GUNIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MiNER'S
CANARY 12-13 (2001).
616. Interestingly, the use of financial means to compensate beneficiaries can nevertheless
redound principally to the benefit of those paying reparations, as the remedial method is
susceptible to quantification and therefore to fixed and finite limits. Bryant, supra note 477, at
149-50.





measured separatism might be less concerned than other social groups about
the prospect that reparations would permit the United States to relax
enforcement of civil rights laws on their behalf or to withdraw from the more
general struggle for fourth-tier democracy,6 ' payment of reparations might
obviate recognition of any continuing responsibilities under the trust doctrine,
including programs to aid tribes in the transition to self-determination." 9
Moreover, Indian reparations would thrust Indians and non-Indians into
contending camps and lock them in political and legal combat in which
anything goes in the fight over the wealth and power of the state.62 In so
doing, Indian reparations would miss a key opportunity to employ moral
argument 62' to creatively restructure attitudes and institutions and reconcile
interdependent peoples, processes that are almost certainly necessary
conditions precedent to the award of Indian reparations and, even more
significantly, to the reinvestiture of legitimacy in the nation.6" Furthermore,
money cannot be directed to the satisfaction of the harms of which Indians
complain: most seek to exercise the rights to self-determine and to express
their unique cultures and religions upon sacred ancestral lands.6" Only land
restoration and legal restructuring to permit development of separate political
identities can potentiate these fundamental human rights and relieve the
economic deprivation and emotional pain borne inter-generationally by Indian
tribes and individuals. In sum, because reparations are a far-too-costly and -
618. See supra note 477 (discussing progressive development of race-based rights in a
democracy as evolution from the first to the fourth tier). While sympathetic to the objectives
of the Civil Rights Movement, Indian tribes are less interested in professing victimhood and
framing their claims to fit the African American boilerplate of oppressed racial group seeking
integration in the dominant culture than they are in developing a theory of legal mobilization
that jibes with the political goal of self-determination. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED, supra note 52,
at 168.
619. For a discussion of these potential programs, see infra notes 727, 761.
620. If past is prologue, even if a battle for reparations were to result in Indian victory, an
increase in Indian economic prosperity, without reform of the laws and institutions that suppress
Indian autonomy, will invite a corresponding increase in the degree of external interference with
and manipulation of tribal institutions. See LOPACH ET AL., supra note 179, at 5.
621. Morally central to the Indian claim for redress is the idea that treaties impose upon
parties the ongoing moral obligation to act in fairness and in good faith. See Tsosie, Sacred
Obligations, supra note 49, at 1620-21 (noting the Indian philosophy that treaties with the
United States are "multicultural agreements that impart duties of good faith and fair dealing.")
(quoting WnILAMS, LINKIG ARMs, supra note 115, at 112).
622. See Magee, supra note 38, at 875-76 (contrasting reparations with a "cultural equity"
method of racial redress that requires acknowledgment of and respect for the "cultural-
experiential differences" between whites and nonwhites and offers not merely compensation but
a "host of creative public and private policy initiatives" to enhance minority participation).
623. Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 38, at 765.
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improbable remedy toward which to commit their resources,624 because
reparations portends more racial strife than reconciliation and fixates on cash
rather than justice or healing,625 many Indian tribes and indigenous rights
groups' oppose it as a remedy.
B. Reconciliation
1. General Theory
Reconciliation, or "restorativism,"627 is a nonpunitive,62 s eclectic629
paradigm that reorients redress from money ° toward healing,63" ' via
624. Brew, supra note 28, at 198-99 (noting that the expense of the legal and political tactics
necessary to win reparations exceeds the capacity of most, if not all, Indian tribes).
625. See Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the
United States Through Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 195, 217-21 (2000).
626. WGIP, concerned about coerced sales of tribal resources by co-opted leaders, would
deny to indigenous peoples the right to alienate group property. See Matsuda, supra note 5 1,
at 396 n.291 (castigating such "devil's compacts"). Indeed, some Indian leaders "have as their
primary goal cooperation with non-Indians" rather than protection of the claims of past and
future generations. BOLDT & LONG, supra note 64, at 77. Moreover, factionalization (multiple
tribes can inhabit a single reservation, religion, membership, and development questions divide
tribes) prevents any pan-tribal consensus behind reparations as remedy. LOPACH ET AL, supra
note 179, at 5-6.
627. "Restorativism" refers to legal processes that draw upon communitarian, non-
adversarial, and healing traditions of indigenous legal systems. Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking
Alliances: Agency, Responsibility, andInterracialJustice, 3 ASIANPAC. AM. L.J. 33,65 (1995)
[hereinafter Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances].
628. See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) (ascribing to reconciliation the notion that
"punishment adds to the amount of hurt in the world, [and] justice has more meaning if it is
about healing .... ).
629. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 627, at 69 (tracing theoretical roots of
reconciliation to theology, psychology, and indigenous knowledge); HENRY STEINER, TRUTH
COMMISSIONS 12 (1997) (suggesting reconciliation praxis commingles law, theater, and
therapy).
630. Because closure, rather than heightened tension, is the purpose, any compensation
allotted to augment reconciliation is subjected to public consensus-building. Minow, NotOnly
for Myself, supra note 32, at 679.
631. While reparations makes only lukewarm gestures toward palliating relationships and
psyches, reconciliation reposits great faith in its capacity for "healing injured bodies, minds, and
spirits[.]" Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 627, at 65; see also DAVID M. FISHER,
HEALING THE WouNDs 38 (1993) (describing group healing via reconciliation). Reconciliation
liberates victims from worthlessness and self-blame and frees perpetrators from guilt and
animus. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with





demythification632 and exchange of apologies633 for forgiveness,634 a wounded
body politic.635 Remedies636 are jointly crafted 637 to encourage the dominant
group to recognize 63 moral responsibility
639 for past injuries, to reconstruct640
632. Groups and nations "filter and twist, recall and forget 'information' in refraning
shameful past acts[.]" Horn & Yamamoto, supra note 9, at 1758. Understandings of what
happened are collective memories transmitted inter-generationally as cultural property. See
generally IWONAIRWIN-ZARECKAFRAMESOFREMEMBRANCE (1994). Particularized collective
memories too often become justificatory mechanisms for subordination and domination. KEN
CHRISTIE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH COMMISSION 44(2000). Where the collective memory
of one group has long dominated another, reconciliation begets national catharsis to reveal
mutual humanities, intertwine proprietary memories, and reconstruct history. Robert S. Chang,
Facing History, Facing Ourselves, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111 (1999).
633. "The most difficult words [to utter] are, 'I am sorry."' DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE
WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 260 (1999). Still, the healing attendant to reconciliation can only
commence from a sincere apology. Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1177-78 (1997) (stressing ameliorative capacity of a sincere apology).
634. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 54 (characterizing apology in
consideration for forgiveness as "mutual performance"). Although forgiving does not equal
forgetting, reconciliation imposes reciprocal duties: while a victim may condition forgiveness
upon an apology, a victim who fails to forgive a truly repentant wrongdoer "release[s] [him]
from further [obligation]." Samuel Levine, Teshuva: A Look at Repentance, Forgiveness and
Atonement in Jewish Law and Philosophy andAmerican Legal Thought, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1677, 1692 (2000).
635. See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 10-11 (enumerating "Recognition,
Responsibility, Reconstruction, and Reparation" as "four Rs" of reconciliation); see also Levine,
supra note 634, at 1681 (noting obligation of wrongdoer to repent, apologize, repair, and do
penance in order to publicly repudiate the act, expiate guilt, induce forgiveness, and restore
community).
636. Whether motivated by the desire for "purification" from sin or by secular commitments
to justice, reconciliation must be voluntary: in contrast with reparations, it requires willing
parties on both sides of the moral equation. Levine, supra note 633, at 1685 n.38.
637. See Braithwaite, supra note 628, at 1743 (noting that reconciliation requires agreement
on how to repair the harm "in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.").
638. See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 10-11 (numbering "recognition" -
requiring a perpetrator group to acknowledge suffering, confess responsibility, and embrace a
duty to heal victims - as step one of reconciliation). In most ethical traditions, recognition
must precede forgiveness. Theresa Kiosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth
Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 833, 838-39
(1998).
639. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 11 (maintaining in step two -
"responsibility" - that acknowledgment and remediation of systematic injustice is presently
possible).
640. MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 66 (1998) (noting "reconstruction" of connections between
victims and communities through empathetic dialogue in step three).
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and repair," by affirmative measures," 2 the dignity and position of the
aggrieved group," 3 and to usher in a "new moral economy" in which repetition
of the past is unthinkable. 4 Although there may be no legal obligation
incumbent upon a state to reconcile social groups,"' by ushering in a "right
relationship""6 and a multicultural ethic of trust and respect, 647 reconciliation
641. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at I I ("reparation... attenuate[s] one
group's power over another"). Although its focus is moral, step four structurally alters the
relationship between groups to accord victims a "share of the economic pie." Barkan, supra
note 27, at 53-54 (holding that, even if not all injustice is resolvable and a "primordial, pre-
injustice stage" is a fiction, reconciliation requires "fair [re]allocation of the basic resources that
ensure full citizenship").
642. Such measures include public apologies, memorials and days ofremembrance, legal and
constitutional reform, creation of educational and medical trusts, and other acts of"self-imposed
suffering[.]" Garvey, supra note 76, at 1813-22. Measures to foster intersubjective
understanding are encouraged by CIL declarations. See UDHR, supra note 3, art. 26(2)
("education shall be directed to... promote understanding, tolerance and friendship"); ICESCR,
supra note 3, art. 13(1) (same); Racism Convention, supra note 379, art. 7 (committing parties
to adopt measures "in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information" that "promot[e]
understanding, tolerance and friendship"). Although self-imposed penance may leave a
wrongdoer diminished and self-resentful, it purifies stigma and offers inner peace.
643. Whereas objections to organizing concepts of group rights and harms dog reparations,
reconciliation, as it "negotiates between the extremes of individual rights to the exclusion of all
other rights on the one hand, and the privileging of tradition and community standards above
individual rights on the other[,]" is more attractive to individualists. Barkan, supra note 27, at
54.
644. Reconciliation incorporates prevention and deterrence by adopting the theme "Never
Forget" closely linked to Jewish remembrance of the Holocaust, that commits victims and
wrongdoers to study the past, learn its lessons, and resolve to do better. See Wacks, supra note
625, at 207.
645. Although states are increasingly bound by customary and conventional obligations to
prosecute, or at least investigate, violations of human rights, any such obligations remain "soft
law." See, e.g., Challenges to Fragile Democracies in the Americas: Legitimacy and
Accountability, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 319, 358-61 (2001) (suggesting that despite gradual
emergence of a CIL norm, functional forms of redress of human injustice fall to political, rather
than judicial, processes and as such cannot properly be construed as constituting binding legal
obligations); Steven Ratner, New Democracies, OldAtrocities: An Inquiry In International Law,
87 GEO. L.J. 707 (1999) (distinguishing legal and non-legal state obligations to afford redress);
IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-91 (4th ed. 1990) (same).
646. See SALLY E. MERRY & NEAL MILNER, THE POSSmILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE 360
(1995) ("Right relationships are those that honor mutual human worth, that redress past wrongs
.. , and in which... neither fear nor resentment play dominant roles.").
647. Reconciliation elaborates trust and respect as foundational principles for co-existence.
See Tsosie, Negotiating, supra note 187, at 92 (defining an "ethic of respect" as a philosophy
of mutual dignity and worth in which differences in a pluralist society are tolerated and
solutions to conflicts are negotiated, rather than coerced). For a renewed social contract




"hasten[s] the day when people actually think in a color-blind way"" and a
relegitimized"9 nation moves forward with all its social groups65° marching
in step.65
2. Praxis
a) Institutions, Procedures, Remedies
As a non-law centric process, reconciliation proceeds not through courts652
but through an ad hoc6" institutional framework known as a "truth and
reconciliation commission"("TRC"). 654 Although it is deeply imbedded in and
CIVIL WAR AND RECONCILIATION 16 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 1999) [hereinafter PEACE IN SRI
LANKA].
648. Chisholm, supra note 367, at 681.
649. An unwillingness to grant redress to victims of gross human injustice is perhaps the
greatest source of national delegitimization. See FOREST MARTIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RGHTS LAW & PRACTICE 1076 (1997) (noting that failure to grant redress is itself a
cause of political instability and further violations of human rights); see also CHRISTIE, supra
note 632, at 93 (suggesting that national legitimacy is reflective of the degree of peacefulness
of the process whereby disputes between social groups are resolved). Moreover, the failure to
grant redress festers in the national conscience as "toxic guilt" that degrades the attractive force
ofcitizenship. Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 49, at 1664-66. By initiating intergroup
dialogue and denaturing pernicious group attachments in favor of mutual identification with past
tragedies as well as a collective stake in the future, reconciliation encourages "a politics of
reidentification" in which relegitimized national citizenship and universal concepts of justice
become chief repositors of individual loyalties and a nation is "born again." Robert Mesiter,
Forgiving and Forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics of National Recovery, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN PoLTIcAL. TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 137 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds.,
1999).
650. Reconciliation is touted not merely as a device to soothe the national soul after civil
conflicts but as a bridge between modem liberal and conservative ideology that crafts a new
moral economy without overwhelming expenditure of public funds. Barkan, supra note 27, at
53.
651. Reconciliation does not come easily, and "believing it does will ensure that it will never
be." TUTU, supra note 633, at 2. However, the "matrix of guilt and mourning" holds within
it the promise of healing and national renaissance. Barkan, supra note 27, at 54.
652. Courts, as sites of adversity and hierarchy, are almost inherently unfit fora in which to
reconcile. Still, at least one has ordered remedies sounding in reconciliation theory. See
Aloboetoe v. Suriname, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser. C) No. 15 (1994)
(ordering, as remedies for indigenous victims of state torture and wrongful death, a public
apology by the President of Suriname, compensatory relief, and naming of a park and square
after the parent tribe). Nevertheless, reconciliation is ultimately apolitical, rather than judicial,
process.
653. For an argument favoring a permanent intemational TRC, see Michael Scharf, The Case
for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375 (1997).
654. Since 1974 more than twenty TRCs have been initiated on nearly every continent in
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reflective of the "contested site of history" where it is born,6 5 a TRC is
typically a political organ created by a post-authoritarian government to
investigate656 the gross human injustices of the previous regime, construct and
publicize an unflinching historical record,6" provide a forum for catharsis658
and penitence, and guide the national transition69 to democratic unity.'
states as diverse as Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, the
Phillippines, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and still more have been
demanded for Bosnia, Mexico, South Korea, Honduras, and Sri Lanka. CHRISTIE, supra note
632, at 2. Though a lack of cash and courage has impinged many TRCs, several have aided
reconciliation processes. See id. at 54-55 tbl. 2.1, 58-59 tbl. 2.2 (providing dates, objectives,
and accomplishments for TRCs 1974-1999); Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions
- 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597,600-03 tbl. I (1994). TRCs have
been instituted as alternatives to, as well as complements of, other modes of redress, including
amnesty for individual perpetrators at one extreme and criminal prosecution at the other. In
recent years Uruguay augmented reconciliation with an amnesty policy, Argentina employed
a combination of prosecutions, exonerations, and pardons, and Chile and El Salvador instituted
an investigation and disclosure model to publicize past injustices. For a discussion of hybrid
models of national reconciliation, see Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
655. CHRISTIE, supra note 632, at 7. While there is theoretical interest in a generalized
description ofTRCs, "no architect of these institutions has proceeded by deduction from general
principles." STEINER, supra note 629, at 8-9. Because each state that has created a TRC has
imparted unto it a distinctive form, composition, and mission, in contrast to the more
standardized remedy of reparations it is difficult to abstract analyses of their construction and
operation. See TRUTH AND RECONCIUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NETHERLANDS (Robert
Dorsman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter DORSMANETAL] (cautioning against abstract definitions
of TRCs as "each is a construction [that] gain[s] and lose[s] meaning in the context of time and
place").
656. The investigative mandate of TRCs varies broadly, with some restricted to simple
investigating of facts and others tasked with causal analysis and explanation of the origins of
intergroup conflicts. STEINER, supra note 629, at 7. Most TRCs are endowed with powers to
access sensitive and secure information, either independently or in conjunction with the state,
although investigative competencies range from powers of search, seize, and subpoena, to
reliance upon voluntary, and unverifiable, testimony. CHRISTIE, supra note 632, at 7-10.
657. TRCs typically publish an open record or final report, and in the interests of
transparency public hearings are often broadcast on national media. See Wacks, supra note 625,
at 205-7.
658. Reconciliation theory provides that the very act of telling the story of suffering and
oppression in a public forum is an act of healing and empowerment. See id. at 197 ("Giving the
• ..microphone to individuals who have experienced [injustice] ... facilitate[s] their
empowerment.").
659. See STEINER, supra note 629, at 9 (stressing that despite variance across cultures and
contexts, TRCs are invariably meant to launch radical departures from the moral principles and
ideologies of past regimes and thus must be understood as transitional mechanisms).
660. CHRISTIE, supra note 632, at 91 (noting that the overarching purpose of a TRC is to




Although their powers, membership criteria, and competencies vary, TRCs are
typically staffed by citizens from a cross-section .of racial, ethnic, and
confessional groups, and nearly all permit direct victim testimony. After
hearing evidence and making findings, TRCs draw upon any number of
principles"' to urge the state to adopt remedies, including systematic
compensation or restitution, lustration in the case of individuals to whom
responsibility is attributed, 2 and legal reform." 3
(1) South Africa: Reconciliation After Apartheid
As apartheid crumbled around them, F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela
declared that "[rleconciliation between whites and blacks is a fundamental
first step toward healing historic wounds and rebuilding the nation."' In
1995 South Africa passed legislation, with strong white support,6 5 creating
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa ("TRCSA") to (1)
establish a comprehensive record of the nature, causes, and extent of the gross
human rights violations between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994; (2)
establish the fate and whereabouts of victims of apartheid and restore their
dignity; (3) determine the motives of the perpetrators; (4) decide on whether
to grant amnesty; (5) recommend measures of reparation and rehabilitation;
Desmond Tutu, from "Healing a Nation" Index on Censorship, No. 5, 38 (1996)).
661. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa employed criteria derived
from international humanitarian law, international human rights principles, and democratic
values inherent in the South African Constitution in determining violations and identifying
violators and victims. I Report of Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa,
1998, at art. 64.
662. "Lustration" is the legal process wherein prior involvement in a discredited government
renders individuals ineligible for government or other positions. TRCs have implicated
individuals, including heads-of-state, for serious crimes including torture, rape, and
disappearance.
663. Part of the theoretical attractiveness of reconciliation is its flexibility in tailoring of
remedies. Whereas reparation is narrowly confined in its remedial sweep to issues of
compensation, reconciliation permits implementation of political and legal safeguards, including
constitutional reforms such as equal rights and nondiscrimination provisions. See PEACE IN SRI
LANKA, supra note 647, at 182 (discussing reconciliatory proposals for reform of Sri Lankan
and South African constitutions). Societies attempting reconciliation can redefine power
relations by promoting the self-determination and autonomy, if not secessionism, of minority
groups and indigenous peoples; similarly, national unity can be enhanced by increasing
indigenous and minority representation in legislatures to protect devolutions of power. Id. at
176.
664. John W. DeGruchy, South Africa's Past: Crimes and Reparations, 111 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 1102 (1995).
665. CRISTIE, supra note 632, at 7.
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and (6) recommend measures to establish a culture of human rights and
prevent further abuses.' The diverse, seventeen-member TRCSA," 7 chaired
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu,"8 heard direct and indirect testimony"9 first
from more than 14,000 victims and then from alleged perpetrators for a period
of almost two years in a victim-friendly yet fair and transparent forum.670
Animated by the African principle of "ubuntu," or interconnectedness,
67 1
TRCSA, which published a five-volume final report in October 1998,
recommended that the government appoint an entity to oversee
implementation of the following: (1) individual remedies, including issuance
of death certificates, exhumations and reburial of the disappeared, clearing of
criminal records, and granting of compensation in acknowledgment of
suffering; (2) community remedies, including construction of memorials and
repair of damaged medical, educational, and housing infrastructures; and (3)
national remedies, including renaming public facilities, designation of a
national Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation, and reform of institutions
to prevent future abuses.7 Most of the recommendations, including creation
of the monitoring body and constitutional reform in recognition of the self-
determination of black South Africans, have been implemented.673
666. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act ("PNURA") (No. 34),
GG16579 of July 26, 1995. TRCSA was granted no powers to order remedies or enforce laws.
Id.
667. Commissioners of TRCSA were representative of the South African population in race,
gender, and political affiliation, though most were lawyers, doctors, and clergy. CHRISTIE,
supra note 632, at 90. Commissioners were required to be "fit and proper persons who are
impartial and who do not have a high political profile." PNURA, supra note 666, at art. 10.
668. Chairman Tutu was appointed by the President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in
consultation with the National Cabinet. Wacks, supra note 625, at 202-03.
669. TRSCA established an e-based "register of reconciliation" to record the sentiments of
the reticent and broadly extend catharsis and healing. See http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/ror/index.
htm.
670. Although victims were permitted to testify in their own languages, TRCSA labored to
preserve impartiality, and hearings were open to the public and broadcast on national media.
The perception of fairness and transparency was heightened by the moral authority of Chairman
Tutu, a "man-of-God who would fearlessly hold both the oppressor and oppressed to account."
DORSMAN ET AL., supra note 655, at 17.
671. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 51-52 ("Ubuntu is the idea that no one
can be healthy when the community is sick: [u]buntu says... [i]f I undermine your humanity,
I dehumanise myself.").
672. TRCSA, Recommendations, 5 FINALREPORT ch. 8, http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs
commissions/1998/trc/5chap8.htm.
673. See S. AFR. CONST. art. 235 ("The right of the South African people as a whole to self-
determination ... does not preclude ... the right of self-determination of any community
sharing a common culture and language heritage"). DORSMAN ET AL., supra note 655, at 21.
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(2) New Zealand/Aotearoa: Waitaingi Tribunal
In 1975 New Zealand - successor state to Great Britain - created the
Waitangi Tribunal in acknowledgment that the indigenous Maori had been
injured for more than a century by British cultural assault and land seizure in
violation of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. 7 Amended in 1985 to grant any
Maori6" claiming prejudice by any government policy standing before it,676
the Tribunal is charged with investigating legislative or executive actions that
violate Treaty principles, reporting facts, and making recommendations for
For an evaluation of TRCSA, see Kader Asmal, International Law and Practice: Dealing With
the Past in the South African Experience, Address Before the American Society of International
Law's 94th Annual Meeting (Apr. 5, 2000), 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1211 (2000).
674. See REPORTOF THE WAITANGITRIBUNALON THE ORAKEi CLAIm (WAI-9), at 12 (1987).
The English-language text of the Treaty granted Great Britain sovereignty over New Zealand
in consideration for permitting the Maori "full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their
lands and estates." Treaty of Waitangi (Maori-Gr. Brit.) art. 2 (1840). However, the Maori text
grants to Great Britain kawanatanga, a form of dominion inferior to sovereignty, while
reserving rangatiratanga, or rights to own, use, and manage lands; the Maori thus continue to
assert that the Treaty is a paipera tapu - "sacred paper" - that recognizes their sovereignty
and entitles them to remedies for its breach. SIMON REEVES, To HONOUR THE TREATY 13
(1996). The complex legal dispute over the Treaty continues. See New Zealand Maori Council
v. Att'y Gen. (1987) 1 N.Z.L.R, 641 (holding that the Maori either ceded sovereignty or
affirmed British annexation of New Zealand). Without much concern for legal obligations,,
Great Britain purported to extinguish Maori customary rights of occupation through legislation
transforming lands for sale to non-Maoris; appeals to the judicial system were doctrinally
precluded. ALAN WARD, UNSETTLED HISTORY 4 (2000) (describing Crown seizures as
"legalized rapacity"). However, by the mid-twentieth century New Zealand came to view the
Treaty as having established a quasitrust relationship, a view given judicial notice in 1987 by
the High Court. Huakina Dev. Tr. v. Waikato Valley Auth. [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 188) (declaring
Treaty part of the "fabric of New Zealand society"). The trust obligation was recognized by
Parliament in 1993 with an Act referring to the Treaty as "establishing] the special relationship
between the Maori people and the Crown" involving an "exchange of kawanatanga for the
protection of rangatiratanga." Te Ture Whenua Maori Act (1993 N.Z.).
675. In the context of eligibility for government benefits, the question, "Who is a Maori?"
is as difficult to answer as the question, "Who is an Indian?" See supra note 597 (discussing
difficulties in identification of Indian status). In the framework of the Waitangi Tribunal it is
answered through domestic legislation that defines "Maori" as simply a "person of the Maori
race of New Zealand" and descendants of any such person. REEVES, supra note 674, at 50.
Practically, Maori status is determined by the Maori themselves. Moreover, few, if any, claims
have been brought by individuals - the Maori, as with Indians, advance claims as violations
of group rights.
676. See Treaty ofWaitangi Amendment Act of 1985 (providing individual standing for any
claim that is neither trivial nor "vexatious"). Findings of the Tribunal can be appealed to the
Privy Council in London. See WARD, supra note 674, at 176.
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redress.6" Once a claim is registered the Tribunal initiates research,
separately orjointly with the claimant,678 prior to formal hearings. If findings
support the claim, the Tribunal recommends remedies.679
From 1985-1998 the Tribunal, a public body with Maori and Paheka
members,680 accelerated its research and claim evaluation process, 68 ' and its
expertjurisprudence fostered an enhanced public "understanding,... not only
of Crown actions and Maori losses, but also of Maori society and interactions
with the Crown and with settlers."6 2 Although critics point to a fiscal cap of
$1 billion on the aggregate compensation available under the organic
legislation and call for a series of reforms, " ' a number of settlementss4
providing land restoration, apologies,"' and promises of political and legal
reform 6 have led to a "growing confidence that historical grievances can be
677. The Waitangi Tribunal is not a court and lacks jurisdiction to determine issues of law
or conclusively resolve questions of fact. See Te Rununga o Muriwhenua Inc. v. Attorney-
General, 2 N.Z.L.R. 641, 650 (Ct. Appeal 1990) (providing that a Tribunal finding lacks res
judicata effect unless implemented by a court).
678. Funding for the research of claims before the Tribunal is provided by the New Zealand
government and by legal aid organizations. WARD, supra note 674, at 41.
679. One of the first claims presented to the Tribunal alleged a wrongful taking of 700 acres
and requested restitution to the tribe of those lands remaining in public ownership. See REPORT
OF THE WAIrANGI TRIBUNAL ON THE ORAKEI CLAIM (WAi-9). The Tribunal found "various
breaches of the Treaty by the Crown" including "continuing denigration of [tribal identity],"
failure to "secure an adequate economic base for the tribe to ensure its continued presence[,J"
and uncompensated takings of tribal lands. Id. The Tribunal then urged the government to
consider remedies, including restitution of lands, assistance in restoring tribal self-government,
$3,000,000 compensation for lost land use and missed development opportunities, passage of
appropriate legislation, and preferential housing policies. Id. at 180-95. By the 1990s, many
of these remedies had been approved and implemented.
680. "Paheka" is the Maori word for non-Maori New Zealanders.
681. WARD, supra note 674, at I (noting that by late 1998 more than 770 claims had been
brought to the Tribunal, with new claims registered at a rate of seventy a year).
682. Id.
683. Id. at 176-7 (proposing removal of compensation cap of$ I billion over life of Tribunal,
provision of guidelines for case resolution, and drafting of legislation to aggregate claims).
684. Perhaps the most impressive settlement occurred in 1996 when the Ngai Maori accepted
a comprehensive package of land, lakes, $117 million, and an apology. See New Zealand Settles
Claim by Maori Tribes, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 6, 1996, at Al 8. The previous year, the
Ngai rejected a cash settlement as it was not negotiated with all tribal leaders, it excluded claims
to lands and resources, and the sum was paltry. Frantz, supra note 537, at 519.
685. In addition to land restoration and compensation, the Waitangi Tribunal has initiated
a process of gradual reinvestiture of tribal sovereignty and resources in the Maori people. Id.
686. A Royal Commission is considering proposals whereby to increase Maori political and
social power while creating a more secure legal position for the Treaty in the constitutional




worked through in ways that are manageable."" 7
(3) Hawai'i
On November 23, 1993, President Clinton signed a joint resolutione8
formally acknowledging and apologizing for the overthrow of the Hawai'ian
monarchy and the annexation of Hawai'ian territory by U.S. military forces
in support of agricultural interests." 9 A broader commitment to the
reconciliation of U.S-Hawai'ian relations developed when in March 1999
Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Cal.) requested the Secretary of the Interior and the
Attorney General to commit their respective agencies to a process of
reconciliation between the United States and Native Hawai'ians.6  In
December 1999, the United States, through the Departments of Interior and
Justice, held a series of public meetings to lay the foundation for this process
arrangement that would increase Maori representation in the Paheka-dominated government,
would allot equal seats to Maori and Paheka legislators in a revised Parliament. Id. at 52.
Another proposal, recognizing that the first might be repealed on a simple majority vote, would
amend the constitution to devolve power to a newly-created Maori Congress of appointed elders
and elected representatives with competence to actively form Maori policy. See F.M.
BROOKFIELD, WArrANGI AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: REvOLUrION, LAW AND LEGITIMATION 173-5
(1999) (calling for a Maori Congress as a revising chamber with power to delay, and even reject,
measures it finds contrary to principles of the Treaty) (referencing Constitution Act of 1982
(Can.), at §35(1) (protecting indigenous rights against legislative or administrative acts through
constitutional reform).
687. See WARD, supra note 674, at 2 (noting ongoing work of "researching and hearing
claims,.. . identifying issues requiring redress... further clarifying the principles governing
levels of reparations, and ... framing structures to ensure that as many Maori as possible
benefit").
688. As the legislation was styled as ajoint, rather than a concurrent, resolution or a "sense"
of Congress, it has the full force of federal law. See Ann Arbor R.R. Co. v. United States, 281
U.S. 658,666 (1930) (treating joint resolution as equivalent to any other legislation enacted by
Congress).
689. See Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893
Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510, 1514. For a detailed
discussion of U.S. violations of law in the overthrow and annexation of Hawai'i, see Lisa Cami
Oshiro, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV. 65, 86
(1995); Francis Anthony Boyle, Restoration of the Independent Nation State of Hawaii Under
International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 723, 723 (1995) (stating the U.S. government has
"officially conceded... that Native Hawaiian people have the right to restore the independent
nation state that you had in 1893 when the [U.S.]... came and destroyed it.")
690. See John Berry & Mark Van Norman, From Maukato Makai: The River of Justice Must
Flow Freely (Report on the Reconciliation Process Between the Federal Government and Native
Hawaiians) at i (Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Hawaiian Reconciliation Report] (urging the United
States to take action to "rectify the injustices" and create a "better future" for the Native
Hawai'ian people.
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at a "crucial time" in Native Hawai'an history.69 By August 2000, the United
States acknowledged, in a Draft Report released for public notice and
comment, 92 a pattern of dishonorable dealings with Native Hawai'ians and
stated, "as a matter ofjustice and equity," that Native Hawai'ians were entitled
to self-determination and to the benefits of a trust relationship with the United
States693 The final report, although it insists that "[c]ase-by-case litigation
would not be the most productive avenue for reconciliation," acknowledges
the harms inflicted by the United States'" and recommends proposals,
summarized as follows, to effect redress: (1) passage of federal legislation to
create a relationship with Native Hawai'ians predicated upon consent and
mutual sovereignty,69 (2) establishment of a Native Hawai'ian Advisory
Commission to consult with all federal and state agencies that manage
Hawai'ian land or affect cultural issues, and (3) recognition of an ongoing
moral responsibility to supervise reconciliation of U.S.-Hawai'ian relations
and provide for the general welfare of Native Hawai'ians. 96
Skeptics question whether reconciliation between the United States and
Native Hawai'ians can ever yield a revised history and remedies on the basis
of that history.697 The final version stops short of recommending
establishment of a Native Hawaiian Advisory Commission to "serve as the
representative voice of the Hawaiian people" and provide social services in
culturally-appropriate fashion. 98 However, despite its failure to recommend
land restoration, and notwithstanding the fact that it creates no legal rights or
obligations, the Hawaiian Reconciliation Report is merely a progress report:
examination of "the full nature and extent of the rights and obligations that
Congress could consider in legislation to formally extend Federal recognition,
691. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Native Hawaiian Reconciliation Draft Report
Released 1 (Aug. 23, 2000), available at http://www.doi.gov/nativehawaiians.
692. See Hawaiian Reconciliation Report, supra note 690, at 2 (urging "congressional
confirmation of a political, government-to-government relationship between Native Hawaiians
and the Federal government pursuant to Congress' plenary authority over Indian Affairs.").
693. See Press Release, supra note 691, at I (quoting John Berry, Assistant Secretary for
Policy, Management and Budget, Department of the Interior).
694. See Hawaiian Reconciliation Report, supra note 689, at 3.
695. Id. at 3-5 (stressing right of Native Hawai'ians to economic, educational, health, and
cultural self-determination and recommending relationship with the United States akin to that
of Indian tribes).
696. Id. at 4.
697. See STEINER, supra note 629, at 1223 (stating that in the United States the use of
reconciliation to revise history and provide remedies to victims of history is an "especially
controversial" project).




self-determination, and self-governance to Native Hawaiians" lies ahead.6'
Moreover, given the doctrinal and jurisprudential obstacles to the redress of
injuries suffered by racial groups at the hands of governmental actors, for
Native Hawai'ians, reconciliation, though it may be imperfect, is the only open
road to remediation.
3. Criticism of Reconciliation, and Responses to Critics
Critics present a litany ofclaims to denigrate reconciliation as more fantasy
than viable remedial model, including embedded racism, the costliness of
effective redress, the likelihood of reopening old wounds, the inadequacy of
remedies, and the impossibility of uniting diverse racial, ethnic, and political
groups behind one national history and future.
a) Imbedded Racism Precludes Sincere Redress
For CRT theorists, reconciliation, a remedy akin to reparations if only in
that it requires the consent of the political branches of government in order to
skirt numerous claim preclusions available to defendants in judicial tribunals,
is doomed by the fundamental principle of politics and law: the persistence
and pervasiveness of white racism.' ° If the dominant social group will not
relax control over the levers of political, economic, and social power, and the
scope of minority rights is conditioned by the will of the majority, advocates
of reconciliation must acknowledge the wisdom of Frederick Douglass:
"Power concedes nothing without a struggle. It never did, and it never
will."' ' Observations of TRCSA and the Waitangi Tribunal feed the mills of
critics.
Although F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela committed their respective
racial and political groups to national reconciliation, many white South
Africans refuse to accept any involvement in or responsibility for the official
policy of apartheid despite a vast trove of evidence implicating their tacit
knowledge of and support for the policy, 2 and some whites have exhibited
699. Id. at 5.
700. See Magee, supra note 38, at 909-10.
701. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN
AMERICAN SLAVE (1845). Unlike reparations, which "communicate[s] counter-narratives to
dominant stories about the racial order" in order to seed political terrain before adversarial
claims, reconciliation holds out hope for an interdependeht national identity. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 12, at 493.
702. CHRISTIE, supra note 632, at 26-28, 144 (differentiating Afrikaaner reactions to TRCSA
findings into four categories in approximate order of frequency: (1) shock, (2) claim to have
been part of resistance to apartheid, (3) outright racism, and (4) desire to be responsible and
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little or no contrition but rather a great deal of denial and anger. °a Moreover,
although De Klerk offered a grudging apology for apartheid on behalf of the
state, in his summary of government policies and practices he categorically
denied knowledge of human rights abuses, alleged that if such abuses occurred
they were attributable to the African National Congress, and asserted that
black South Africans had "benefitted enormously" from apartheid.7 For
many critics the failure to fully and accurately acknowledge apartheid as a
gross injustice truncated the reconciliation process and emptied the apology
of any meaningful content. Similarly, some Pahekas, frustrated with the
proliferation of Maori claims and the prospect of restructuring the legal and
political architecture of New Zealand, are pressing for termination of the
Waitangi Tribunal.0" Racial animus, though more muted than in South
Africa, is one of several engines driving attempts to curtail reconciliation with
the Maori.
Although they concede the continuing salience of racism, proponents of
reconciliation do not despair that attempts to acknowledge historical truths,
recognize moral responsibility for past harms, and restore victims and
wrongdoers alike to health and unity confront not only the doubters but the
defiant. The victory conditions appurtenant to the implementation of
reconciliation can be defined as narrowly as merely commencing public moral
instruction about the ongoing and pernicious effects of racism, a phenomenon
the present generation is apt to ascribe to history.7" Moreover, reconciliation,
offer redress). Against the grain of months of publicly-broadcast victim testimony, many white
South Africans rejected victim stories as hearsay with an eye toward a financial windfall.
DORSMAN ET AL, supra note 655, at 20. TRCSA thus effectively granted a fair percentage of
white South Africans the irresistible opportunity to officially assert ignorance and state betrayal
of their trust - in effect, to assume for themselves the status of co-victims - instead of
accepting complicity in and responsibility for the injustices undertaken for their benefit. Id. at
38.
703. See CHR STIE, supra note 632, at 156, 166-71 (referencing empirical data that indicate
many white South Africans are more angry post-reconciliation, that few listened to public
hearings, and that even fewer commented on the web-based register established to glean their
insights); id. at 26-28 (noting that one of two Afrikaaner members of TRCSA wrote a report
defending apartheid while the other resigned oyer the decision to require Botha to testify).
704. De Klerk tacitly offered the argument that "separate but equal" schools and housing
constructed by the government for black South Africans were preferable to no housing at all.
See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 57 (discussing 30-page De Klerk Report).
705. See WARD, supra note 674, at 178 (noting that "[many [white New Zealanders] no
doubt wish that the whole process would somehow go away.").
706. See Wacks, supra note 625, at 253-4 n. 189 (quoting Facing Race, The NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer (MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Angela Oh) ("And I've
actually had young ... college-educated people tell me that, you know, this [racism] is just not




a relative newcomer to the pantheon of remedies for gross human injustices, 7
must begin the conciliatory journey of a thousand miles with a single step:
advocates stress that even if the perpetrator group offers nothing more than a
grudging apology, "faked remorse is better than nothing," for "doing the right
thing, even for the wrong reason, can sometimes lead to doing the right thing
for the right reason."7°8 Finally, reconciliation proponents recognize that,
though theirs is a plea for resolution, rather than intensification, of social
conflict, slaying the dragon of racism may require doing battle against forces
of oppression and/or pacification.7 Reconciliation does not terminate racism
any more than the fall of the Berlin Wall yielded world peace: victims must
remain vigilant.
b) Inflames Racial Tension
Reconciliation implies a return to normalcy, and without a compelling
argument that the status quo is undesirable it is all too easy for critics, whose
numbers are drawn most frequently from the former perpetrator group, to be
dismissive.71° Even where the necessity for redress manifests, critics scoff at
the notion that reconciliation heals injured psyches and group identities and
suggest rather that it "[e]xacerbates old issues that have been dug up anew. '
For opponents of reconciliation, kicking through the leaves of history to air
grievances is a disquieting, selfish exercise that calcifies group allegiance and
suppresses pluralist affiliations.7"2 According to this view, reconciliation,
particularly when actuated as a TRC with the power to recommend broad legal
and political overhaul, conjures up the ghosts of Nuremberg and Tokyo and
707. See Levine, supra note 634, at 1692-93 ("Despite the prominent position it has held for
millennia in religious and moral thinking, [reconciliation] is relatively new to... legal theory.").
708. Garvey, supra note 76, at 1850.
709. See Nader & Ou, supra note 158, at 40 ("[re]conciliation may lead to conflict as well
as peace; and resolution may lead to injustice as well as justice[.]").
710. See Levine, supra note 634, at 1687 n.51 (warning that "obtuseness of the heart" - the
self-satisfaction of those comfortable with the status quo - is deadly to reconciliation).
711. See Hayner, supra note 654, at 609.
712. Minow, Not OnlyforMyself, supra note 32, at 697. For anxious Pahekas, the Waitangi
Tribunal created a "grievance industry fostered by hasty and poorly drawn legislation" which
leads to sharper divisions, turning "history into a permanent bleeding sore that threatens the
political consensus on which [New Zealand] is based." WARD, supra note 674, at 1. Whether
and how such historical retrospection might venture across some invisible boundary into the
counterproductive is the question: "Is there a golden mean, some 'proper' degree of collective
memory appropriate for bearing in mind the cruelties and lessons of a troubled past, while not
so consuming as to stifle the possibilities of reconciliation[?] How might one imprint such a
memory on a people's or state's conscience? What purposes might be served by a detailed
recording of gross abuses[?]." STEINER, supra note 629, at 7.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
threatens to disrupt or even destroy nations.713 Rather than discover the truth,
experience catharsis, and heal, participants - victims and perpetrators - are
wounded yet again.1 Moreover, critics posit that, particularly where multiple
groups lay claim to victim status, reconciliation can stimulate squabbling over
the title of "most victimized;" rather than fixate upon an unsavory past, peace
is served by disengagement from history and an abstract acknowledgment of
mutual -perhaps inevitable - injustices.715 In short, peace, an objective not
found in the national rear-view mirror, will elude us all until we forgive,
forget, and move forward.7t
Similarly, victims are frequently unwilling to forgive their former
oppressors, particularly where economic and social inequalities post-date the
formal end of inter-group hostility and inequality.7t 7 Victims' refusals to
forgive the most egregious of human injustices deserve a large measure of
respect, 18 even if victims' interests in healing are more generally served by
forgiveness, for those who have not suffered the indignities visited upon the
victims would presume far too much in attempts to delineate the precise
boundaries between the forgivable and the unforgivable. Moreover,
forgiveness, just as apology, cannot be the subject of compulsion.
In response, reconciliation advocates stress that justice is a necessary, if
insufficient, condition for peace, and, in turn, that attitudinal transformation
of all parties is a prerequisite ifjustice is to be secured." 9 Without unraveling
713. Proposals for constitutional reform in particular are threatening to the dominant social
group where modifications to current legal and political structures erode privilege, dilute
electoral and representational powers, trim the margin for direct domination, and enfranchise
formerly unrepresented constituents. See WARD, supra note 674, at 1-2 (noting that Pahekas
nearly unanimously oppose alteration of parliamentary democracy and common-law
adjudication as currently practiced as threats to the unity and identity of New Zealand).
714. See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 68 (referencing political science
research); see also Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass
Atrocity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 429,430 (1999) [hereinafter Minow, Re-Membering] ("How
we remember must not mistakenly produce narratives of collective guilt lying ready to be ignited
by manipulative demagogues.").
715. HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1228
(2000).
716. See id. (presenting the "forgive and forget" critique that privileges peace over justice
where, when everymember of the dominant social group received benefits under the discredited
regime, this universal culpability renders individualized justice a practical impossibility).
717. Ward, supra note 674, at 147.
718. See Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and the Unforgivable, 36 AM. PHIL Q. 59, 71 (1999)
(concluding that while "no one is absolutely unforgivable, whatever he or she may have done
in this world," perpetrators of the most "ghastly" offenses who refuse to acknowledge or repair
their wrongs may be "conditionally unforgivable").




the underlying origins of intergroup enmity and providing opportunities for
the confession of and atonement for unjust acts, any attempts to attain present-
day social peace will founder on the absence of any genuine acknowledgment
of, and forgiveness for, historical wrongs: peace requires justice, which
requires the guilty to admit to, accept responsibility for, and repair unjust acts,
while requiring the victims to grant forgiveness in exchange. Although the
pursuit of justice may be a painful venture for all concerned, ° mere
declarations of social peace do not suffice: every link in the chain of peace
must be forged in truth and tempered in pain, and to reject responsibility for
justice at any point is a pernicious election of efficiency and comfort, or
perpetual victim-status, over reciprocal moral obligations, with implications
for the ultimate integrity of the society in which such a choice is made."'
Victims are no more entitled to revenge than perpetrators are entitled to
commit further acts of injustice, and, responsibilities to atone and forgive are
reciprocal. Reconciliation directs wrongdoers and victims to atone and
forgive and makes possible secular absolution of the nation.2 By teaching
everyone to remember the past in such a way as to collectively resolve not to
repeat it while refusing to grant any group the right to arm itself with the past
as a weapon with which to exact revenge on another group, reconciliation
bears only the promise for genuine national healing and reunification on less
exclusivist grounds.
c) Too Costly, or Insincere Half-Measures that Buy History at a
Discount?
Reconciliation draws further fire from those who generally brand racial
peace "healing the.., divide, without addressing the underlying sources of... animosities, as
unlikely as healing a festering wound by applying bandages, without first cleaning away the.
pus").
720. See Wacks, supra note 625, at 208 (insisting that public expressions of wrongdoing,
though intensely painful, are essential to mythic deconstruction, catharsis, expiation, and
healing).
721. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1685, 1706 (1976) (arguing that failure to consider the benefits of the moral development
of society in analyzing the costs of administering justice sets the stage for the "cheaper and
cheaper production of injustice and social disintegration").
722. Reconciliation can demonstrate to members of the perpetrator group that the suffering
of the victim group has earned them a rightful place in the nation while binding both groups
even closer together. See DORSMAN ET AL., supra note 655, at 31 ("out of all this, the
wrangling, lying, squirming, blaming, posturing, politicking, the vanity, the moral arrogance,
the shortcomings, rose the soul of my country... and every time I hear that I know I belong
nowhere else...").
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redress an "unproductive complaining, free-for-all which wastes the taxpayers'
money.""' Redistribution of material resources may strain the confines of the
politically possible, particularly in materially-deprived societies. In stark
contrast, many advocates of inter-group justice fear that reconciliation,
particularly where unaccompanied by weighty compensation, functions as
"hush money" that liberates wrongdoers too easily from moral burdens"" and
purchases victims' silence with useless symbols and empty apologies while
'offering little of consequence - i.e., monetary compensation - to the most
needy. " ' More radical victim-critics, seeking restoration of lands and
sovereignty, may reject political compromises attendant to negotiation and
demand not only significant financial compensation but full control over
natural resources, power-sharing agreements, separate representation and
taxation, rights to secede, or even restoration of indigenous sovereignty over
the entirety of national territory." 6 This group-based separatism feeds on the
perception of reconciliation-as-pacification and compounds the struggle
toward a unifying national identity and citizenship.
Despite the foregoing, advocates remain sincere in their conviction that
reconciliation is not only a cheaper but a more effective path to harmony and
justice, and if they win the hearts of minds of neither the most stingy or
callous of perpetrators nor the most vindictive or separatist of victims they can
723. Wacks, supra note 625, at 251-52. While certainly not as costly as reparations,
reconciliation might lack the approbation of politicians whose fiscal conservatism blinds them
to its social benefits. Acknowledgment and recognition of state responsibility for past injustice
are cheap, but repair can founder on the shoals of lucre. See Rosewood Case Takes Wrong
Path, PENSACOLA NEWS J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A6 ("'l object only to the money,' stated one state
representative, 'but a recognition that something terrible happened, I could support that."').
724. See Wheeler, supra note 44, at 55-56 (indicating that reconciliation absent adequate
compensation deeds to perpetrators the benefit of the victims' "validation of their right to hold
on to the unjust gains" accruing during the previous regime).
725. See Timothy Garton Ash, South Africa: True Confessions, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jul. 17,
1997, at 34 ("[It] was usually the more well-off individuals for whom the symbolic act of telling
their stories and symbolic reparations would suffice... [F]or those who were poor ... the main
motive coming was simply the hope of material compensation. The poor can't eat
tombstones."); see also Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 52 (contending that
"storytelling about personal trauma and words of apology" must be accompanied by companion
policies of structural and attitudinal reform, as well as material compensation); MARK OSIEL,
MASS ATROCITY, Cou.EcTIvE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 6-10 (1997) (suggesting that
reconciliatory approaches to redress of gross human injustices fail to provide closure and fail
to deter repetition).
726. See Michael Field, Bolger Gives Blunt "No" to Maori Seeking New Zealand
Sovereignty, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 15, 1995 (noting the most contentious settlement
demands of some Maori for claims against New Zealand); see also BROOKFIELD, supra note
686, at 175-76 (noting Maori proposals to split New Zealand into Paheka and Maori nations).
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still champion reconciliation as a mode of redress pregnant with opportunities
for both historical and moral correction, a claim unavailable to exponents of
any other remedy.
d) No Common Truth or Vision
Reconciliation can offer portage to only so many expectations, particular
in societies where conflict has only recently ended and the mission is not
simply to restore the status quo ante but to institute equal political citizenship
and justice on the site where once there was conquest and subordination. "7
Distinct peoples cling tenaciously to differing versions of the truth, as well as
contending ideas of what values, images, beliefs, and attributes are or ought
to be constitutive of the nation, and where peoples cannot yet agree about
what transpired, or where no common national identity can be sculpted from
competing collective memories,72 the time is not yet ripe729 for reconciliation.
South Africa has yet to arrive at a common understanding of history, of
responsibility for that history, or of how to transcend that history, and may
never.73 If the preconditions of community are incapable of satisfaction
through reconciliation, proponents of redress must search elsewhere for the
Holy Grail of justice and harmony between peoples.
Notwithstanding the impossibility of locating universalizable answers to the
existential questions, "What is truth?" and "Who am I?", and despite the fact
that reconciliation may fail more often than not,' supporters hold firm to the
conviction that reconciliation is the start of the journey toward intergroup
healing and the forging of a common national identity and vision. Whereas
727. Timing may be a variable of cardinal importance in that there is an ideal window of
opportunity - not immediately following regime change when there has been insufficient
cooling of passions and justice can be individualized, but not too long after a subsequent regime
assumes authority and memories of injustice grow dim and overbroad to the point where no one
bears a sense of responsibility - to bring a claim for reconciliation. See Minow, Not Only for
Myself, supra note 32, at 68 1; see also Jonathan Tepperman, Truth and Consequences, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 142 (suggesting that for societies recently riven by conflict it may be
impossible to achieve more than a mere "nonlethal coexistence").
728. In a profound sense, truth is not an absolute concept but one dependent upon group
identity and memory. CHIUSTIE, supra note 631, at 172.
729. The assumption that truth can be recognized as such by all contending social groups is
possibly the weakest unstated premise in the theory of reconciliation. Id. At least with
reparations or individual prosecutions of wrongdoers, truth, or a facsimile for truth, is
pronounced as a matter of law and policy. Id. at 49.
730. See Yamamoto, Race Apologies, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that TRCSA has failed
to produce a "societal narrative" to guide future reconciliation).
73 1. Garvey, supra note 76, at 1846.
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reparations, a status quo remedy narrow in its consideration of possibilities for
healing, marks the death of group interdependence and the demise of mutual
moral and political responsibility, reconciliation heralds a new social and
moral order.
IV. The Claim for Indian Reconciliation
A. Acknowledge Harm and Recognize Wrongs: National Demythification
and the American Indian Reconciliation Commission
"Legal amnesia," ignorance, and malignance stand between Indian claims
for redress and a legal and political system that has denied justice to the
original inhabitants of the United States for centuries.732 Even if most
Americans are not as racist as their forefathers733 they remain a remarkably
presentist people, particularly with regard to the factual and moral
understandings that inform their collective memory of the events marking the
"discovery," formation, and expansion of their nation at the cost of Indian
lives, lands, and cultural patrimonies." This ahistoricism has dire
consequences for Indian redress, particularly where claims arise on
732. See Avian Soifer, Objects in the Mirror Are Closer Than They Appear, 28 GA. L. REV.
533, 553 (1994) (labeling "failures of memory" to dismiss Indian claims for redress "legal
amnesia", an act of indeliberate injustice). Unconscious psychological processes shield
individuals from the pain of awareness of past atrocities and prevent them from having to
grapple with present obligations to provide redress. Minow, Re-Membering, supra note 714,
at 429.
733. While racism is still too much with us, there is reason to hope that its prevalence and
intensity are in gradual decline. Still, Indian tribes and people remain targets of legal, political,
and popular discourse that can properly be described by no other term. For an examination of
the infiltration of anti-Indian attitudes into legal and political spaces, see Robert A. Williams,
Jr., Documents ofBarbarism: The Contemporary Legacy ofEuropean Racism and Colonialism
in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 258-78 (1989).
734. For too long, the American national myth has swept genocide, land theft, and ethnocide
under the national rug. See Michael Schudson, Dynamics ofDistortion in Collective Memory,
in MEMORY DISTORTION: HOW MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 346
(Daniel Schacter ed., 1995). Addressing the conflict over ancient Indian remains, the author
notes:
If you recall the [Indian Wars] ... as part of the history of nation-building, it is
one story, if you recall it as part of a history of racism it is another. If you see the
skeletal remains of [Indians] from long ago as part of an impersonal history of the
human species, the remains are valuable specimens for scientific research; if you
understand them as the cherished property of their descendants, they deserve




"unfamiliar intellectual terrain" out of violations of complex historical
agreements "rather than being ignited by the fire of the moment[.]" 73
Compounding the majoritarian unwillingness to wrestle with its historical
ignorance are philosophical distortions built into the legal and political
framework that render Indian justice claims all the more difficult to
substantiate in the language of their colonizers. In short, the first step in U.S.-
Indian reconciliation must be dismantling of national myth of Indian
inferiority and white infallibility through retelling and re-envisioning U.S.-
Indian relations from the cultural viewpoint of the victims of that history.736
Indian claims stories - rich sources of truth that emerge from oral history to
contextualize and humanize the Indian experience while revealing the
inadequacy and falsity of the record as it now stands - can be a powerful
source of liberation and legitimization for all Americans.737
Thus, the first element of U.S.-Indian reconciliation should be
Congressional passage of legislation, ideally by bipartisan action, to establish
and fund a formal and independent TRC738 charged with (1) investigating
Indian claims afresh; (2) allowing Indian voices to enrich and debunk the
sanitized national record with oral histories uncomfortable to majoritarian
735. Charles Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights ofthe
Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wisc. L. REv. 375, 378.
736. See Soifer, Redress, Progress, supra note 394, at 526 ("The prevailing presumption is
that somehow, sometime - perhaps when we weren't paying attention - sufficient justice and
equality came to prevail. Therefore... we all now enjoy an equal, fair start in the cosmic race
of life. We hold tightly to this credo as if it were self-evident, no matter what the actual
evidence may be.")
737. Indian claims stories are emerging in contemporary literature and scholarship. See, e.g.,
PETER NABOKOv, NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY (4th ed. 2000) (presenting Indian claims
stories of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide); SHERMAN ALEXE, THE TOUGEST INDIAN IN THE
WORLD (2000) (presenting contemporary Indian struggles to preserve cultural identity).
However, a broader audience is necessary to effectuate reconciliation and relegitimization: were
the United States to assist the public airing of the Indian side of the story it would legitimize the
country as a nation committed to justice even where such a commitment is embarrassing or
implicates the moral foundations of its sovereignty.
738. See Wacks, supra note 625, at 221-24 (suggesting that although federal, state, and local
governments would assist with funding and logistics, any TRC created to advance the cause of
racial reconciliation in the United States must retain formal independence in order to preserve
neutrality and functionality); see also Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future:
Applying the Truth Commission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the
United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1017 (2001) (discussing proposal to create such a
TRC). Fears that AIRC might prove too costly should be seen for what they really are: excuses
not to consider reconciliation. The Warren Commission, a body created to investigate the death
of a single man - President Kennedy - cost more than $30 million. AIRC, a body intended
to explain the deaths of millions, cannot be refused solely on financial grounds.
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ears; and (3) persuading the United States to formally acknowledge the
wrongs inflicted upon Indian tribes and individuals over the period 1776-2002
in a new national creation-story.
73 9
Membership of the American Indian Reconciliation Commission ("AIRC")
would consist of equal numbers of Indians and non-Indians and include tribal
chairpersons and national elected officials; jurists, lawyers, and scholars
versant in federal Indian law, tribal legal systems, and indigenous rights
regimes; and clergy, with a secretariat versant in Indian issues. Drawing upon
the experiences of precedent TRCs, AIRC would identify sites across the
country, such as Indian reservations, major urban centers with significant
Indian populations, and universities, where fora would be established to which
tribes and individual Indians could submit requests to testify about
experiences past and present.' 4 Requests might be reduced to writing on a
standard form, filed with the closest forum, and considered by a committee
established for that purpose.
AIRC would broadcast hearings and testimony on public broadcast media
and an internet website, and transcripts would be circulated in newspapers to
facilitate transparency and the wide dissemination of Indian stories. Although
testimony might be shocking and difficult matter to which to listen, ' as
nothing could conceivably implicate living persons in any criminal activity,
AIRC need not keep secret witness identities, nor would it need to grant
amnesty. Victims would receive a certificate recognizing their contribution
739. Although the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs is beyond doubt, recent
case law suggests that the standard of review of federal legislation under equal protection
analysis may have created legal loopholes through which opponents of reconciliation might slip
to prevent redress of Indian claims. See supra Benjamin, note 609. Although Indian tribes are
political rather than racial categories, to avoid or mitigate the potential for litigation and
preserve a rational basis standard of review, Congress could clearly state factual findings
supporting Indian reconciliation in a series of "Whereas" clauses such as the following:
"Whereas the economic, social, and cultural effects of the deliberate web of dependency,
underdevelopment, and racial subordination established by the United States have been
devastating to Indian Self-Determination and to the physical and mental health, prosperity,
cultural patrimony, and general well-being ofIndian people and tribes [.1" See S. James Anaya,
The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedyfor Past
and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REv. 309 (1994)'(presenting template for congressional
findings in support of redress for Native Hawai'ians).
740. For those unable or unwilling to testify publicly, testimony might be taken through
deposition, affidavit, or by other means.
741. If testimony does not disturb, it does not serve truthtelling or deterrence. See Minow,





to truthtelling and reconciliation.742 Upon conclusion of its hearings, AIRC
would send a final report to Congress and the President with nonbinding
remedial recommendations, to include apologies, compensation, land
restoration, and other measures to promote and protect self-determination.
B. Apologize
After re-envisioning the history of U.S.-Indian relations persuades the
United States to acknowledge harm to Indian tribes and individuals, AIRC
should next direct the federal government toward relieving the burden of its
national guilt-complex" 3 while advancing the process toward forgiveness by
recommending in its final report that the U.S. government issue a formal
apology, on behalf of the United States and all its citizens past and present, as
symbolic recognition of the role of public and private actors in past acts of
genocide, land theft, and ethnocide.7 " National church and corporate boards
might apologize for acts in which these institutions were complicit.745 An
appropriate apology should incorporate recognition of a corresponding moral,
if not legal, obligation to negotiate repair.
C. Repair
The most difficult phase of U.S.-Indian reconciliation is likely to be the
process of repair and restoration. Even if the United States and its people,
through elected representatives, are moved to apologize and promise to afford
Indians "justice," it is far more difficult to reach agreement with Indian tribes
742. See Wacks, supra note 625, at 233.
743. WHITE, supra note 287, at 273.
744. An apology need not address contemporary effects of past discrimination to initiate
reconciliation; to do so might trench upon terrain too sensitive for a present-day majority whose
willingness to concede national fallibility maybe merely retrospective. An apology might track
with the letter accompanying compensation to Japanese Americans:
The United States acknowledges the historic significance of the illegal and
immoral actions of the United States and expresses its deep regret to Indian tribes
and people. Money and words alone cannot restore lost ancestors or lands, or
erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey American resolve to rectify
injustice, but the U.S. recognizes that serious injustices were done to Indian tribes
and people over the course of the creation and expansion of the United States. In
enacting a law calling for restitution and reconciliation and offering a sincere
apology, your fellow Americans have, in a very real sense, renewed their
traditional commitment to the ideals offreedom, equality, andjustice. The Nation
humbly asks for your forgiveness.
See supra note 28 (quoting letter from President Bush to Japanese-American internees).
745. Yamnamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 627, at 70.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
AMERICANINDIANLA W REVIEW
as to what constitutes a "just" result, and still more difficult to cobble together
specific legislation that satisfies all concerned.
1. Land Restoration and Legal Reform
a) Land Recovery or In-Kind Transfers
A combination of land restitution and, above all, legal reform occupies the
apex of the remedial pyramid desired by Indian tribes.'M Indian tribes and
individuals deserve and demand restoration of lands to the limits of reason and
equity, whether the specific properties taken from them by force-of-arms or,
if this proves so disruptive to the settled expectations of present landowners
that it threatens social peace,747 in-kind grants from vast federal land
holdings.74 Some scholars suggested in the immediate post-Cold War era that
746. This article is solely the assessment of the author and does not purport to stand as the
official proposal of any Indian tribe or individual. Indian opinion ranges as broadly as that of
any other political, racial, or ethnic group, and while many tribes and individuals surely
subscribe to the proposals and recommendations offered herein, others may prefer solutions that
are more or less supportive of group-based human rights such as collective self-determination,
more or less insistent upon the defense of reserved rights under treaties, and more or less
committed to legal reform as opposed to more radical means of change. Moreover, the use or
exclusion of the historical experience of certain Indian tribes and individuals in illustration of
particular points is intended with great respect. Part of the process of reconciliation will
certainly be reconciliation between, and within, Indian tribes, and each and every Indian voice
should be granted the opportunity to speak. Further, each Indian tribe should have the
opportunity to graft specific remedies onto whatever remedial package is developed.
747. Because the prospect of wholesale evacuation of white landowners from Indian lands
threatens the social peace, courts have been loathe to order the remedy of ejectment as
applicable to redress white encroachment on Indian lands. See Cayuga Indian Nation of New
York v. Cuomo, Nos. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 509442 (N.D.N.Y. 1999; Cayuga
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266 (2001) (refusing to order ejectment of
non-Indian possessors of land claimed by Cayuga Indians on grounds that the "public interest"
would not be served by disrupting settled reliance expectations of non-Indian improvers of land
and "prov[ing] all too vividly the old axiom: "Two wrongs don't make a right[,]" and that
enforcement would be a practical impossibility). But see Banner v. United States, 238 F.3d
1348 (Fed. Cir. 200 1) (ejecting white possessors who refused to accept Congressionally-ratified
leases from Seneca Nation from Seneca land within limits of City of Salamanca and declining
to compensate lessees for the lost value of improvements on ground that ownership of
improvements on land belong to the owner, rather than the improver).
748. More than 650 million acres of federal lands are held for purposes of grazing, forestry,
wilderness, and other uses and managed by federal agencies, in particular the Bureau of Land
Management. Current federal law provides that the homeless receive first priority for use of
"surplus" federal land and property. Stuart B. McKinney Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11411 (f)(3)(A)
(2000). The General Services Agency (GSA) administers conveyance of surplus federal land.




transnational rights-based arguments claiming the sanctity of private property
and objections to unjust enrichment would generate a more favorable political
and legal climate for restitution of Indian lands.749 This aspiration has yet to
be realized, in part because the United States is not yet the safe environment
for the coexistence of basic value- and cultural-differences that the liberal
legal order insists is already upon us. Moreover, although compensation for
the wrongful deaths of ancestors, the denial of the use of tribal lands and
resources, and legal assaults on Indian religions, languages, and cultures may
be in order, it is impossible to objectively quantify the value of those injuries
and morally odious to try,'" and compensation cannot reach, let alone
discharge, U.S. obligations to dispatch the set of institutionalized doctrines
and canons"' that smother contemporary Indian land ownership and strip
fundamental civil, political, economic, and social rights from Indian tribes and
people.
federal use, and surplus land is sold to the private sector for fair market value, either through
sealed-bid competition, public auction, or mail auction. Id. Although Indian tribes are
permitted to acquire surplus federal lands, the trust doctrine imposes, through extensive federal
regulations and Secretarial oversight and veto power, obstacles to land acquisition. See 25
C.F.R. § 151 (2002). The National Congress of American Indians Land Recovery Task Force
has proposed revisions to federal regulationi regarding tribal acquisitions of federal surplus
lands to facilitate expansion of the tribal land base. See Acquisition of Title to Land in Trust,
64 Fed. Reg. 17, 574 - 17, 588 (proposed Apr. 12, 1999)(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151
(proposing modifications to, inter alia, limit discretionary power of federal agencies and
officials, particularly with respect to the purposes for which such lands are acquired). More
extensive legislative reforms might provide that federal surplus lands be granted in fee simple
to Indian tribes in proportion to the acreage of their existing land claims against the United
States See generally ROBERT WARRIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM
ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED KNEE (1996) (describing early such discussions in late 1960s and
1970s). Millions of acres of Western States such as Nevada, currently under Federal control,
might be allotted to tribes for occupancy, sale, rental, or resource extraction. Although such a
proposal would not directly restore sacred lands, it would enable tribes to sell recently acquired
federal surplus acreage and resources for the purpose of purchasing sacred lands.
749. See Newton, Compensation, supra note 167, at 454.
750. For a rough attempt at quantification of the human costs of genocide, land theft, and
ethnocide, see supra note 596 (evaluating Indian claims at more than $4 trillion). However, the
harm suffered is inherently inestimable to peoples for whom ancestors, land, and culture are
spiritually interwoven and constitutive of identity in a manner irreducible to comprehension by
Western legal minds. Any proposed sum might stoke the perception of greed or suggest that the
real motivation for redress is vindictive and thereby goad the majority into political backlash.
751. Taken together, the international legal doctrines ofdiscovery and conquest, asjudicially
incorporated in domestic law, as well as the trust doctrine, plenary power, and judicial
subversion of reserved rights, constitute an interconnected matrix of legal disability that refers
Indian rights to property, culture, religion, development, and self-government to interpretation,
appropriation, and suppression by an oft-hostile non-Indian majority.
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b) Omnibus Indian Rights Act
A series of legal reforms is essential, including an Omnibus Indian Rights
Act ("OIRA")15 2 to (1) strengthen protection of Indian religious, cultural, and
property rights;753 (2) create specific remedial programs for the benefit of
Indian tribes and individuals;"" (3) tighten judicial canons of construction to
resolve ambiguities and construe treaty terms in favor of tribal reserved
rights;7" (4) incorporate, by implementing legislation, those principles of
752. See ANAYA, supra note 37, at 134-35 (advocating a legislative approach to securing
Indian rights where transformation of existing land tenure regimes or substantial reallocation
of resources or authority is at issue).
753. Process is at least as important as doctrine. Even if City of Boerne, Race Horse,
Employment Division v. Smith, Dion, Tee-Hit Ton, Lone Wolf, and all other case law burdening
Indian cultural, religious, and property rights were stricken in a single legislative fiat, failure to
alter the process by which laws are made in a democracy that enshrines the principle of
majoritarianism would sow the seeds of future Indian disability in the soil of the new legal
system. Although the precise mechanisms whereby to accomplish Indian participation in the
drafting of legislation trenching in Indian affairs is open to debate, and although mere
participation does not preclude truncation of rights through judicial review, Indian presence in
the U.S. legal process is essential. OIRA might enhance protection of Indian religious, cultural,
and property rights by (1) crafting explicit statutory exceptions to ESA for religious-based
takings of endangered species, (2) mandating inclusion of Indian representatives in U.S.
delegations to international organizations and quasi judicial bodies with competence over
subject matter that implicates indigenous rights, including, e.g., the International Whaling
Commission, the UNHRC, the General Assembly, and the Permanent Forum; (3) preempting
state laws imposing penalties for religious-based use of controlled substances by including
specific language in AIRFA to exempt Indian religions from the operation of state laws; and (4)
explicitly restoring lands and usufructuary rights reserved in original treaties with the United
States. Significant ethno-historical research would be required to lay a factual predicate for each
restoration; scholars and historians would thus assist in drafting OIRA.
754. The purpose of including specific remedial programs within OIRA is to free remedial
funds from the strings of dependence: recent federal block grants to tribes, though they have
increased opportunities for economic development, have all too frequently been accompanied
by a maze of regulations that defeats tribal initiative and substitutes legal accountability for
cultural appropriateness. A chapter of OIRA would streamline the grant process, reduce
management costs, and liberate future remedial programs from unnecessary federal oversight.
Greater consultation with tribes in the block-granting process would rationalize expenditures
of funds and lead to greater, and more culturally relevant, economic development. The forum
for such negotiations might itself be the object of constitutional reformation.
755. At least one commentator suggests that, as U.S. federal courts are precluded, by
institutional commitments to the legal doctrine of stare decisis and the political principles of
majoritarianism and separation of powers, from revising canons of construction in defense of
Indian reserved rights, any such reform can only transpire under the framework of a new
institution unfettered by such legal and political baggage. A separate Court of Indian Affairs,




international law supportive of the rights of indigenous peoples.""
Furthermore, Constitutional Amendment[s] may be necessary to (1) renounce
plenary power or permit devolutions of power that enhance tribal autonomy
and sharply limit the subject matter and issue-areas in which Congress may
treat Indian tribes as "domestic dependen[cies;] " 57 (2) shape the trust doctrine
relations, and in particular the process of treatymaking, might be a fruitful avenue for further
investigation and discussion. See VINE DELORIA, JR., & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, The Future of
Indian Nations, in THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY 244-64 (1984). This Court might be created by Congress under Article Ill with
appellate jurisdiction to hear cases sounding in federal Indian law and competence to award
restitution of Indian lands and rights. Further, administrative agencies, particularly those that
distribute benefits to tribes, should create rules that Article I courts, when adjudicating cases
affecting Indian rights, appoint a special master fluent in Indian legal issues to hear the merits.
756. Positive legal reform may be inadequate, standing alone, given the present commitments
of the dualist U.S. legal system to past moral judgments enshrined in legal precedents. See
supra notes 433, 529, 533, 546, 547 (discussing failure of U.S. courts to incorporate a
significant and growing body of CIL declarative of the group rights of indigenous peoples). In
addition to the incorporation of much of the Draft Declaration in domestic law, a necessary
outcome of any reformation of federal Indian law may be the recapture of the medieval
ecclesiastical humanism that "perceived a normative order independent of and higher than the
positive law or decisions of temporal authority" and "provided the jurisprudential grounds..
.to withhold the imprimatur of law from acts of earthly sovereigns found to violate th[is] moral
code."). ANAYA, supra note 37, at 10. A conference of jurists, scholars, and practitioners -
assisted by the American Legal Institute - might be convened to restate federal Indian law: a
Restatement of Federal Indian Law, ameliorated by the humanist tradition, might render unto
Indian tribes a more normatively attractive foundation upon which to base their legal and
political relationship with the United States. In sum, enhanced political and legal autonomy
must be accorded Indians if the ravages of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide are to be
transcended, and striking a balance between majoritarianism and moral obligations to afford
justice must enlist the concerted efforts of interested persons of all hues and creeds. For
advocacy of human rights treaties as persuasive legal sources, see Dorothy Thomas, Advancing
Rights Protection in the United States: An InternationalizedAdvocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 15 (1996).
757. Precedent exists with the inter-American system for a Constitutional Amendment in
recognition of indigenous rights to self-determination: several American states have expressly
adopted constitutional or statutory provisions to implement elements of international
declarations regarding indigenous peoples. See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982)
sched. B. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) Part 1, § 26 (guaranteeing that
interpretation of the Constitution does not abrogate or derogate from aboriginal rights); CONST.
OFARG. art. 75 (1994) (recognizing indigenous peoples, their distinctive cultural identities, and
their ancestral land rights, and directing the legislature to act accordingly); CONST. OF NICAR.
art. 5 (as amended 1995) (affirming that the indigenous people of Nicaragua have the right to
live and develop according to the forms of social organization that correspond to their customs,
language, beliefs, and aboriginal rights to land). States across the globe are considering similar
measures. If plenary power were abridged by constitutional amendment to grant tribal
autonomy in all issue-areas save for defense and foreign relations, arguments for its retention
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in the direction of judicially-enforceable guarantees of Indian welfare, or
eliminate it entirely as a relic of colonialism and paternalism, rife with
potential for abuse and dereliction;758 (3) recognize Indian property as within
the full meaning of the protections of the Fifth Amendment Takings and Just
Compensation Clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (4) restore or confirm the
status of Indian tribes as entities superior to the states in the federalist
hierarchy. 9 Preceding reforms might be fostered by legislative deconstruction
would be easier to marshal. Whether devolutions of power might lead to separate Indian
legislative bodies or merely to the constitutionally-enforceable guarantees that negotiations be
conducted on the basis of a respect for mutual sovereignties and that tribal governments would
be permitted much greater freedom from external interference or mediation, would be
negotiated. It is not inconceivable that the process of constitutional amendment might pave the
road to an eventual resumption of treatymaking with Indian nations that would incorporate the
substantive protections of proposed constitutional reforms within new sacred texts. Such an
approach - the rejection of plenary power as a barrier to enforcement of constitutional
guarantees with respect to the rights of the nonwhite "Other" in favor of the incorporation of
international legal principles within the domestic legal order - has been referred to by scholars
as a "metaconstitutional" approach to the governance of nations within. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor
Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the "Other": Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and
Why US. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POLY REV.
427, 467 (2002).
758. Legislation or constitutional amendment to grant federal courts, or a Court of Indian
Affairs, subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases concerning breaches of duty under the trust
doctrine would resituate that doctrine on a more stable moral and legal foundation. See supra
notes 303, 304 (noting narrow grounds under which suit by Indian claimants for breach of duty
can be maintained against the United States). Corresponding measures to strip doctrinal
defenses from the United States would be necessary; amendments to the FTCA should be
considered. See supra notes 552-97 and accompanying text (discussing doctrinal defenses to
Indian claims for redress). Although opinion is divided as to whether the trust doctrine ought
to be preserved with enhanced judicial enforcement provisions or jettisoned entirely as a
colonialist remnant, a pan-Indian consensus supports major revision, Another transformative
proposal might shift central administrative authority over tribes from Congress to the trusteeship
of the UN under an Article 73 mandate for the international community to aid non-self-
governing Indian tribes in reacquiring their lands and developing their rights to and capacities
for self-determination. ANAYA, supra note 37, at 83-84. Although this measure more directly
challenges U.S. authority than the preceding proposal, precedents support internationalization
of domestic trust responsibilities under similar circumstances. See Karl J. Irving, The United
Nations and Democratic Intervention: Is "Swords into Ballot Boxes" Enough?, DENV. J. INTL
L. & PoL'Y 41, 69 (1996) (noting establishment under international law of ad hoc trust
administrations under League of Nations and UN systems in, inter alia, Crete, China, South
America, the Middle East, the South Pacific, Europe, and Africa).
759. Although nothing in the U.S. Constitution mandates the inferiority of Indian tribes to
state and federal governments, practice has rendered them so, and a constitutional amendment
to specify their co-equality with, at a minimum, states, would free Indian tribes of the obligation




or decomposition of the BIA7" and tribal governments,"' as well as by other
measures that restructure U.S.-Indian relations.
Endowment of pan-Indian legal organizations, such as the Native American
Rights Fund, the Institute for the Development of Indian Law, and the
University of New Mexico Indian Law Program, would draw additional
Indians into the legal profession and enhance the autonomous Indian capacity
to frame and defend Indian rights and interests in U.S. courts.762 Similarly,
investiture of tribal colleges and charter schools for Indian children with
See Dean, supra note 572 (describing subjection of Indian gaming to veto through state
compacting processes); see also supra notes 208-22 and accompanying text (describing
restriction of Indian religion by operation of law). In recent years, the executive branch has
verbally supported an enhanced tribal position in the federalist system, but practice has not
followed promise. See Clinton Remarks, supra note 546, at 942 ("We must.., become full
partners with the tribal nations."). Indian tribes remain the least powerful in the tripartite
system of federal, state, and tribal governments, and moral and legal obligations arising under
the trust doctrine are subject to majoritarian political preference at multiple levels of
governance. More expansive reform proposals that would relate Indian tribes to the surrounding
state by altering the current federalist structure, such as a separate Indian legislature with power
to veto legislation, or the set-aside of seats in Congress for Indian representatives, though
radical departures from the domain of the politically possible, merit discussion in subsequent
work.
760. If the BIA still serves an important lobbying function by securing allocations of funding
under the trust responsibility, its positive contributions are more than offset by negatives: most
Indian scholars conclude that the BIA, a top-down institution, has undermined traditional tribal
structures, coopted tribal autonomy and resources, and reinforced a relationship ofdependency.
See, e.g., AMERiCAN INDIAN POuCY, supra note 349, at 99-100. So long as Indian political and
economic initiatives must travel through the BIA and external interests drive analyses of
priorities, culturally appropriate development cannot proceed. An Indian Assembly, consisting
of representatives from all Indian nations and placed outside the U.S. political and legal
framework, might be created as a quasi legislative body by OIRA with powers to negotiate
directly with Congress and executive agencies as to the legal and substantive contours of the
trust.
761. Reformation of Indian institutions to enhance their benefit to Indian people requires
considerations of the goodness of fit of goals and political and economic strategies. In some
instances, the near-total reconstitution of tribal governments may be a necessary condition
precedent to the creation of fully independent, culturally integrated, and functional Indian
societies. Friedman, supra note 84, at 526 (correlating an increase in the incorporation of the
principle of indigenous self-determination in formal institutions with increases in indigenous
health and social welfare). Rather than accept as permanent fixtures the tribal governments and
constitutions created by the IRA and modified by subsequent federal legislation and regulation,
Indian people, as part of their rights to self-determination, must be permitted to define their
governance structures and processes as they see fit. Federal financial assistance in this
reconstruction is welcome where it aids, rather than derails, Indian Self-Determination.
762. See Nader & Ou, supra note 158, at 22.
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sufficient funds to allow their expansion, curricular development,763 and
maturation is also essential if the next generation of Indian leaders is to
develop the skills necessary to lead their tribes to economic development,
political independence, and legal sophistication without non-Indian
intermediation.'" Because passage of appropriate legislation will be hotly
contested and require political horse-trading, inclusion of language
committing the United States to a reasonably specific process of legislative
reform in the authorization of AIRCA will suffice at the outset of
reconciliation.765
For much of the non-Indian majority, this agenda resonates not as the legal
obligation of a constitutional republic descended heavily upon prior
sovereigns but rather as an existential threat. Non-Indians are Americans too,
and they have nowhere to go if transformations in land tenure regimes evict
them from their homes. Broaching the subject of land restoration with a non-
Indian can trigger defensive backlash: as a white businessman huffs, "I didn't
persecute anybody at Plymouth Rock... This is the 1990s. We didn't do
anything to them, and we don't owe them anything."' " Similarly, the
suggestion that tribal self-determination be bolstered with legal significance
evokes reactions to "Indian separatism" verging on enmity, even when offered
by the U.S. President767: a U.S. senator angrily proclaims that "[c]itizens of the
763. A UNESCO study indicates that fewer than 150 of the more than 500 Indian languages
have survived in any form. See Virginia Fention, Study Warns 3,000 of World's Languages
Could Go Silent, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2002, at Al 8; see also MICHAEL KRAUSS, THE
WORLD's LANGUAGES IN CRISIS (1992) (estimating that 135 of the 155 Indian languages still
spoken in the United States are essentially moribund). Teaching tribal language and culture to
the youngest Indian schoolchildren is an important antidote to the poison pill of ethnocide that
serves the legislative purpose of the Native American Languages Act of 1990. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 2901 (2000) (committing United States to preservation of Indian languages). Programs
established in metropolitan education centers to instruct off-reservation and non-member
Indians in tribal languages, cultures, and histories would be of similar remedial benefit.
764. See Daniel Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV.
893, 931-32 (1994) (suggesting that ethnic colleges and universities can play an important role
as institutions of community-enhancement and development); see also Suagee, supra note 9,
at 746 (noting that tribal colleges, the leading institutions of higher learning on reservations, are
essential to Indian capitalization and self-determination).
765. The following clause might suffice: "The Congress of the United States (1) pledges to
pass necessary legislation to permit Indian tribes and Indian people to reconstitute their political
and economic institutions as they see fit without external interference as befits the right of
foreign sovereigns and in keeping with their extensive human rights as indigenous peoples."
766. Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at Al.
767. See Clinton Remarks, supra note 546, at 942 ("This then is our first principle:









If a theory of justice is to span the chasm between peoples, ideas, and
objectives, its enunciation and implementation will require negotiation.769
Although their resilience is unquestionable after a half-millennium of extreme
challenges, Indian tribes are now too numerically and militarily inferior to
impose solutions by force; on the other hand, reason, principle, moral
obligations, and the aspirational values of a constitutional, republican form of
government erected upon prior sovereigns with whom it is interdependent, if
not the force of law, conspire to restrain the United States."0 While the
conflict between the United States and Indian tribes has been waged primarily
on battlefields and in courtrooms, the origins are rooted largely in cultural
differences difficult to exaggerate: the "problem of learning how meaning in
one system of expression is expressed in another" is one of the "most difficult
tasks we confront in a multicultural world. 77' Recognition of mutual
sovereignty - a companion obligation to a multicultural ethic of respect -
President William Clinton).
768. Egan, supra note 766, at A16 (quoting Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.)).
769. Currently, a federal statute prevents recognition of Indian tribes as nations with whom
the United States may contract by treaty. See 25 U.S.C. §71 (1994). Repeal of this statute -
a demand of many Indian tribes - would revive the principle of mutual sovereignty and infuse
negotiations with the ethics of mutual respect and consent so vital to the process of atonement,
forgiveness, and reconciliation. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and
the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 Aiz. L. REv. 963, 970-72, 979-80 (1996) (arguing that the
historical treatyprocess should serve as atemplate for a contemporary framework of U.S.-tribal
negotiations between mutual sovereigns).
770. See ANAYA, supra note 37, at 130 (stressing that where a state acquired its sovereignty
by displacing original sovereigns it incurs the obligation - moral if not necessarily legal - to
"foster the capacity of Natives to govern their own communities as well as contribute to the
development of all our peoples, indigenous or immigrant."). Constitutional republics are
particularly committed, at least as a matter of political theory, to tolerating dissent as a bulwark
against repressive hierarchy. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Richmond and Republicanism,
41 FLA. L. REv. 623 (1989) (noting commitments of neo-republican governments to tolerance
of dissent and negotiated compromise). Persuasion, in contrast to domination, is currency of
the realm in the liberal constitutional republic, and the most convertible denomination is U.S.
See de Tocqueville, supra note 73, at 107 (stating that because in democracies the laws are
reflective of the will of the people, those who wish to modify the laws must "either change the
opinion of the nation, or trample upon its decision").
771. WuIjAMs, LDMING ARMS, supra note 115, at 1139-49.
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will require a "cultural hermeneutics," which in turn mandates the clearing of
barriers to communication and the sharing of stories, fears, hopes, and dreams.
By restoring the full and equal legal personality of Indian tribes,' creating the
conditions for trust and identification of shared interests obscured now by
history and emotion, tempering tendencies toward extremism,773 and tutoring
both parties in the common humanity of each other, U.S.-Indian negotiations
can usher in a "North American vision of law and peace"774 that relegitimizes
the United States and offers an impeccable example of intergroup justice to
an attentive international community.7 Fittingly, the ancient Indian method
of dispute resolution known as Tribal Peacemaking ("TPM")776 can guide this
restorative journey toward reconciliation.
2. Tribal Peacemaking
TPM, the ideal-typic form of horizontal justice, heals wounds by publicly
772. See Frickey, supra note 56, at 1783-84 (arguing that negotiation on neutral sites, in
contrast to adjudication in the courts of the conqueror, grants subordinated groups equal
ownership of, and responsibility for, the resolution of their disputes with the dominant power);
see also Tsosie, Negotiating, supra note 187, at 35-37 (contending that because the exercise of
majoritarian political preference dictates that tribal rights cannot be fairly adjudicated in courts
of the United States, negotiation, though also risky, is the only path through the minefield of
power and prejudice). Still, while the post-Cold War era is a fruitful moment to discuss
enlargement of the international legal personality of nonstate actors as international law
becomes ever-more concerned with the "ought" and not simply with the "is," the United States
has not fully committed to the vision of mutual sovereignty advocated by Tsosie, Williams,
Anaya, and other Indian scholars.
773. ANAYA, supra note 37, at 130.
774. WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS; supra note 115, at 181.
775. See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 9, at 1778 (noting that the international indigenous
rights regime is currently being negotiated by a panoply of states, indigenous NGOs, unions, and
corporations in multiple sites across the globe).
776. See Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience, The Dynamic Challenge of
Lawyers'Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 821, 825 (1996) (defining TPM as
"any system of dispute resolution used within [an Indian] community which utilizes non-
adversarial strategies ... [and] incorporates some traditional or customary approaches.., the
aim of which is conciliation and the restoration of peace and harmony."). TPM, an ancient
method of Indian dispute resolution that weds ancient and abiding values to dispute resolution
techniques appropriate to the pluralist context in which tribes are now situated, has profoundly
transformed Indian conceptions of justice since its reintroduction in the 1970s. Although the
particular dispute resolution methods employed by any particular Indian tribe are distinct as
from every other Indian tribe in that they are the experiential products of the unique culture,





and ceremonially deploying spiritual777 norms and collected tribal wisdom,
listening compassionately to the widest possible circle of people, and
reminding participants of their relational and cooperational obligations to one
another.778 Rather than address only disputants, TPM balances the
intellectual, emotional, and physical dimensions of the entire tribe on its
journey toward restoration. 79 Despite its nonpunitive foundations,8 ° TPM
can provide effective redress for offenses as serious as robbery, rape, and
murder.I
a) Procedures
TPM reflects the interests of parties against the backdrop of tribal norms,
and behavior-altering mechanisms - anger, shame,78 2 embarrassment, and
777. TPM recognizes no separation of religious and secular, and supernatural power is
directed to overcome disharmony and reestablish order. Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion,
Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATIOn Q. 327,332
(1993).
778. See Dianne LeResche, Editor's Notes; Native American Perspectives on Peacemaking,
10 MEDIATIONQ. 321, 321 (1993).
779. Id. at 321-22. TPM is rarely used in disputes between members of different tribes. See
Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and
Change in The Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 16 (1993) (noting
that where outsiders are involved in disputes with members of Indian tribes, particularly where
physical injuries are involved, the absence of common ties ofkinship, religion, community, and
ethos that drive the process of Indian dispute resolution and encourage parties to remove the
conflict from the adversarial plane tend to preclude the success of such an enterprise); see also
Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV.
53, 55 (1998) (noting that while elements of TPM, termed "restorative justice," have been
introduced into non-Indian contexts such as family group conferences, "community injury," and
victim/offender mediation, these efforts have not met with anticipated success, largely because
urbanized, atomized settings do not offer the "spiritual glue" of communal obligations to
condition individual conduct). In essence, so central to the successful functioning is the
commitment to shared tribal values and responsibilities that extension of TPM beyond the
boundaries of the reservation or beyond the subject matter of disputes between tribal members
is inherently problematic. Nonetheless, where individuals are linked not by membership in a
political community but by common commitments to justice and to restoration, TPM retains its
potential to heal. For a discussion of the application of TPM across political boundaries, see
generally Bradford, Reclaiming, supra note 265.
780. TPM is decidedly nonpunitive in its philosophical underpinnings. In contrast to state
adjudication, no central authority can directly apply coercion to enforce the collective will. Id.
781. See Lieder, supra note 779, at 17-18.
782. See Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in
Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1997) (describing how, within the tightly
interconnected tribe, the technique of shaming- calling down personal criticism upon one who
deviates from group norms - can induce those who wish to remain accepted within the tribe
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encouragement - modify negotiating positions and guide parties toward
harmony. Neither lawyers nor judges are present. All who know the parties
or are familiar with the history of the dispute are required to sit together in a
circle.783 The oral procedure is supervised by a "peacemaker" who has lived
a long and exemplary life in spiritual and temporal terms."8 Nevertheless, the
"peacemaker" has merely persuasive rather than compulsory powers: his
obligations do not extend further than inducing people to talk to one another
by speaking and thinking well and exemplifying tribal values and ways.'"
The peacemaker is not neutral: he or she has the respect of the parties, who are
frequently related to him or her by blood or marriage.786 Thus, the parties are
strongly inclined to follow proffered "guidance"7 7 that encourages people to
live up to their communal responsibilities, requests apologies, suggests means
and amounts of restitution,7 and ensures that all parties depart "with their
tails up [rather than one] with a tail up, one with a tail down."
78 9
to modify contrarian positions in order to bring themselves into a state of harmony with others).
783. See Bernard, supra note 776, at 830.
784. See LeResche, supra note 778, at 321 (demonstrating that one of the most important
criteria in the selection of "leaders" of traditional Indian tribal societies was skill in mediating
intragroup hostility). Research suggests that selection as leaders of those with skill in dispute
resolution may be a common characteristic ofthe tribal level of sociopolitical organization. See,
e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the
"Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323,352 (1993) (identifying the main criteria for chiefdom among the
Roma as "intelligence and a sense of fairness" in resolving group disputes).
785. See Costello, supra note 228, at 887.
786. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 777, at 329 (explaining that the "core of common
law" of most Indian legal systems is the "lineage system," a method of tracing relationships and
adjusting disputes between people with the assistance and intervention of clan and family
members whose influence constituted a form of "ingrained emotional cement"). Thus, in
contemporary TPM the peacemaker is often a blood relative of one or both parties.
787. See id. at 332. For the peacemaker there is explicit stress upon an affirmative,
interventionist role in maneuvering parties back to harmony by reference to traditional values.
In the language of mainstream alternative dispute resolution, the TPM peacemaker can be cast
as a directive and activist mediator whose expertise in the particular substantive domain in
which the dispute occurs permits him to thrust himself into the conflict and make judicious use
of persuasion, influence, and judgments to achieve concrete settlement of an otherwise elusive
problem. Nevertheless, TPM is neither mediation nor arbitration as understood by the Western
mind as such terms do not capture its inherently spiritual, communal, and restorative essence.
Id. at 335.
788. See Jennifer Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, andIndian-Anglo Relations, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES, supra note 315, at 35 (noting that TPM almost never offers
the guilt of the accused as the "question presented"; rather, the gap separating parties is
generally the amount of restitution, either material or services, to be paid, and this amount is the
subject of bargaining, negotiation, and intervention by the peacemaker).





The peacemaker typically enters the peace circle7 to lead a prayer
summoning the aid of the supernatural and fiaming the attitudes and
relationships of the parties. The peacemaker then listens to all subjective
points of view to determine the reasons for disharmony. In this open, loosely
structured discussion, feelings and emotions are recognized as equally
important to reason, and all persons, though they are offered emotional
support, are required to directly confront the full consequences of their
actions, including the injustice done and the resultant harm. 9' Emphasizing
future relations rather than the legal consequences of past events, the
peacemaker then (1) presents a lecture on how or why the parties have
violated tribal values and breached tribal solidarity,7 92 (2) leads a discussion
of practical means whereby the parties can end the dispute, and (3) suggests
how all can conform future conduct to values reflective of tribal relational
aspects and rights to justice and harmony.
c) Remedies
Remedies in TPM are generally implemented without resistance or resort
to the traditional instruments of the penal system, even in cases concerning
790. The circle is sacred in many Indian religions as the circle of life, a "delicate thread that
unites all living things." Darla J. Mondou, Our Land is What Makes Us Who We Are: Timber
Harvesting on Tribal Reservations After the NIFRMA, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 259,259 (1997).
The path of life follows not a linear but a circular progression and thus life does not have a
beginning and an end in linear time but is part of a journey connected to all other lives and
things. Use of the circle in TPM expresses spiritual connectedness and rootedness to all
creation: in the horizontal model of dispute resolution employed by many traditional Indian
societies, every person sitting in the circle would focus upon the peacemaker, would move the
dispute from the circumference to the center so that all four quadrants (spiritual, emotional,
physical, and intellectual) would reenter balance and recomprise a united whole.
791. According to Zion and Yazzie:
[TPM] addresses denial, minimalization and externalization in ways that
[mainstream] systems cannot do. In a given [mainstream] system, proving the
facts of a case is difficult and burdensome. In criminal systems with the privilege
against self-incrimination, defendants cannot be compelled to discuss motives,
attitudes . . . or causes of misconduct. In [TPM], which does not utilize
punishment, people are free to "talk out" the problem fully and get at the
psychological barriers which impede a practical solution.
Zion & Yazzie, supra note 37, at 80-81.
792. See Zuni Cruz, supra note 195, at 581-82. Breaches of tribal solidarity are occasioned
by individuals who place greater emphasis upon their needs and desires than they do upon the
interests of the tribe. Id.
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criminal conduct. As agreements are the product of a consensus that includes
the wrongdoer(s), the personal honor and communal obligation of the
wrongdoer(s) is pre-enlisted in support of compliance. Further, TPM enlists
extended family and friends as "probation officers" with "responsibility to the
victims and communities to prevent the wrongdoer from causing further
harm." '793 Moreover, given the powerful psychological sanctions available to
the tribe in the form of ridicule, ostracism, and banishment, a wrongdoer's
need to remain in good stead is easily manipulated. 9
d) US.-Indian TPM
United States-Indian TPM ("USITPM") would be conducted shortly after
AIRC concluded its final report and before drafting of proposed legislative
reforms. USITPM might enlist the most respected elder Indian and non-Indian
statesmen as peacemakers to supervise, lead, and guide negotiations as to
remedies for the redress of Indian claims.795 Such persons would collect and
merge spiritual and secular values common to both Indian and non-Indian
cultures and urge Indian and U.S. negotiators to envision a future when all
U.S. citizens, Indian and non-Indian, are full and equal members of one great
nation with corresponding rights and duties toward that nation. Peacemakers
793. Costello, supra note 228, at 899-900.
794. Research at the intersection between political economics and anthropology suggests that
the tribe performs an essential insurance function by facilitating fundamental survival tasks that
can only be performed in teams: tribal members, in exchange for this insurance, grant their
loyalty unreservedly. As a product of these mutually advantageous, continuous, and critical
intratribal interactions and the ease of observing and transmitting information and norms within
the small community, the problem of monitoring to prevent free-riding inherent in team
production disappears. Not only does the tribe reduce or eliminate bad-faith incentives to
opportunism or cheating, but expulsion, ostracism, and other forms of collective refusal to deal,
highly effective sanctions given the importance of individual reputation and face-saving in a
small interdependent circle, are far more efficient than formal legal enforcement mechanisms.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 245-47 (1979). Research into other tribal legal systems supports the finding that
psychological pressure is at least as effective in securing compliance as the formal institutions
of state coercion. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 784, at 358-59 (noting that among the
Roma, the permanent sentence of marime - "impurity" requiring ostracism - is the equivalent
of a death penalty since the permanent outcast, subjected to the shunning of the entire Roma
community, is frequently driven to suicide); see also Landes & Posner, supra, at 182 n. 144
(describing how Amish wrongdoers are required to make public confessions lest they be
shunned, a fate which results in the deviant member becoming a social pariah with whom no one
will eat, speak, or do business).
795. Peacemakers would not be granted authority to commit their respective nations unless




would urge the United States to confront again the history of genocide, land
theft, and ethnocide, renew the apology to Indian tribes and people, and
suggest remedies that would restore dignity and demonstrate a genuine desire
to live up to the highest American aspirations enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence. Peacemakers would also encourage Indian nations to express
their suffering but to be forgiving and willing to start relations with the United
States anew, freed of the burdens of a painful history. USITPM might meet
at a series of venues, including sacred tribal lands and U.S. retreats such as
Camp David in Maryland. Although the recommendations of USITPM would
not be binding, remedies agreed upon would be committed to paper and
transmitted to Congress as the basis for legislative action.
E. Commemoration
Commemoration of the history of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide is
necessary to "ensure that future generations will not forget... [or] perpetuate
the American legacy" of injustice toward Indian tribes and people.7 Erection
of monuments at sites of Indian genocide797 and on the National Mall,79
796. Brew, supra note 28, at 198.
797. The value of memorials to the preservation of history and to the attitudinal reform of
citizens is inestimable. In 1881 the United States set aside land to honor soldiers of the 7th
Cavalry who fell with Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn River in 1878. No mention was
made of the Indian soldiers whose victory checked, even if for a short time, the advance of
settlers into their lands. However, in 1991, the U.S. renamed Custer Battlefield as Little
Bighorn Battlefield and hired an Indian as Superintendent, and in November 1999 ground
breaking for the Indian Memorial at Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. The Indian
Memorial, funded entirely by private donations, will include a "spirit gate" to welcome all the
dead and, according to its designer, to "symbolize the mutual understanding of the infinite all
the dead posses." See Bert Gildart, Two Sides of Little Bighorn, Mu. HIST., June 2001, at 25.
According to curator Kitty Deemose, "Everyone feels more welcome now for the story includes
comments from those who won rather than by just those who lost. Ironically, people from all
ethnic groups seem to like that." Id. Many more such memorials could dot the U.S. landscape:
AIRC should recommend sites to Congress where memorials to other gross injustices can be
created.
798. Critics might label the above proposal an example of a "memorial fever" sweeping the
nation and causing interest groups to "fiercely compete for space on the most hallowed
memorial space in the nation[.]" Elaine Sciolino, Fighting For Space in Memorial Heaven,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 28, 2001, at A24 (noting critics who claim that a "growing tendency to
memorialize individual groups" and to "car[ve] the nation in ever-thinner slices of hyphenated
Americans divides rather than unites the country."); see also Edward T. Linenthal, The
Contested Landscape ofAmerican Memorialization: Levinson's "Written in Stone", 25 L. &
Soc. INQUIRY 249, 260-62(2000) (book review). While the object of reconciliation is indeed
to unite rather than to divide peoples, the mythical version of history from which the genocide,
land theft, and ethnocide of the first inhabitants of the United States is purposefully redacted,
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naming of public buildings and parks after Indians of historical significance,
renaming of offensively-named professional sports teams,' and creation of
a wing in the National Museum of the American Indian with specific focus on
the gross human injustices suffered by Indian people will serve these
transformative and deterrent purposes."° Posthumous pardons should be
granted to Indians executed for resisting genocide and land expropriation."0
Establishment and funding of cultural, historical," 2 language, and religious
no longer functions as political adhesive. Historical revision, in the most visible and tangible
manner possible, is necessary to restore the gravitational force between disparate groups in the
American polity, and, particularly where history has not been co-authored by subordinated
groups, memorials are an appropriate way to initiate re-envisioning and reunifying.
799. Since 1968 the National Congress of American Indians has campaigned to eradicate
racist stereotypes of Indians, including offensively named athletic teams such as the Cleveland
Indians, Washington Redskins, and Atlanta Braves. Chryss Cada, In Colo., Fightin' Whities
Play Hardball, Basketball Team Picks Unusual Nickname in Protest of Indian Mascots,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2002, at A2. Although more than 1200 scholastic teams have altered
their names in the past thirty-eight years, more than 600 teams have not, and many Indians find
the use of Indian caricatures as mascots or monikers deeply offensive. Id. For a discussion of
the controversy over Indian-themed athletic teams and the Indian claim that such names are
pejorative, denigrating, and racist, see Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation, supra note 209,
at 1007; see also Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the Use oflndian Team Names
and Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 HARv. L. REv. 904, 904-06 (1999) (arguing that
naming sports stadium "Redskins Stadium" violates the federal public accommodations law,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(a); Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1705, 199 WL 435108 (P.T.O
1999) (stripping federal trademark registration from Redskins football organization on ground
the name was "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous" (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2000)).
800. The National Holocaust Museum, an institution commemorating the Jewish Holocaust,
might serve as a model for a planned National Museum of the American Indian. See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 80q 1-15 (2000) ("National Museum of the Indian Act") (Supp. 1990). Exhibits might
include original copies of U.S-Indian treaties along with subsequent histories and specific dates
and circumstances of U.S. breaches. Histories of tribes, from first contact to dispossession and
genocide to the present, could- be preserved in rich detail. Names of Indian individuals
murdered might be inscribed on a national register, and certificates could be issued to
descendants of each victim commemorating the circumstances of each death. Indian curators
with tribal cultural and historical knowledge would play an important role in the establishment
and development of all aspects of the Museum, which is scheduled to open in fall 2004.
801. See Steven Braun, Clemency for Hanged Man Delivers Justice Long Awaited, L.A.
TIMEs, June 2, 2001, at Al0 (2001 WL 2492036) (noting Maryland gubernatorial grant of
posthumous pardon to black man executed for rape of white woman in 1917 after a trial held
in a climate of mob violence); Chomsky, supra note 106 (discussing execution of Dakota
warriors for defending their territories from invasion by the United States in violation of a
treaty).
802. Existing institutions might be assisted in discharging this function, possibly as a central
archive with satellite branches across the United States and in tribal colleges or in consortium




centers 3 will regenerate sources of tribal cohesion while offering non-Indians
the opportunity to adjust their perceptions of Indian culture and religion
toward understanding and tolerance.'"
F. Compensation
Direct wealth transfers to Indian individuals are indicated as a symbolic act
in recognition of U.S. responsibility as well as to compensate loss, grief, and
trauma, particularly for the poorest of Indians and for off-reservation Indians
wh6 do not presently enjoy the legal, medical, and educational entitlements
their tribal counterparts receive."05 However, the gross human injustices
experienced by Indian people over history can never be adequately
compensated with money. While material compensation may well be an
appropriate component of redress, because Indian claims are effectively group
claims, and because the expression of Indian sovereignty occurs through
institutions rather than individuals, remedial measures involving cash are best
directed toward tribes. Establishment of an independent fund sufficient to
create and endow the institutions proposed, purchase some lands, and serve
as a social support net for the poorest Indian individuals, would be an
important contribution to redress. The amount of such compensatory relief,
though significant, is certain to be far less than the $4 trillion sum potentially
claimed as reparations. Something on the order of $20 billion might suffice.'
the Newberry Library, the foremost institution for Indian studies, http://www.newberry.org.
803. As the cost of higher education is one of the greatest obstacles to Indian students,
scholarship grants to attend the thirty-three Indian tribal colleges and universities would be
appropriate. The American Indian Higher Education Consortium, an organization founded in
1972 by presidents of tribal colleges to support higher Indian education, might be tapped to
administer an Indian Educational Trust to benefit financially needy Indian students. See
http://www.aihec.org.
804. See Pritchard, supra note 44, at 263.
805. See id. at 264 (contending that monetary damages for racial discrimination, arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, pain and suffering, physical and emotional abuse, disruptions of family
life, loss of cultural rights and fulfillment, loss of native title rights, economic loss, and loss of
opportunities is inappropriate as redress for indigenous claims); see also Howard Schneider,
Canada ApologizesforAbusing Native Peoples, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al (announcing
establishment of"healing fund" to compensate native Canadian children "who suffered physical
and mental abuse at the government-run schools"); Wacks, supra note 625, at 209 (suggesting
cash is the most desirable remedy for the poorest victims of injustices).
806. Compensation at a per capita rate of$10,000 for the nearly two million Indians would
total $20 billion. Some or all might be paid through grants in fee simple of federal surplus lands
and resource rights to Indian tribes. Revenue-sharing from sales of leases of natural resource
rights on former Indian lands, abeyance of taxation on Indian incomes (presently, most Indian
income, whether earned on or off-reservation, is taxable, see Superintendent of Five Civilized
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G. Forgive, Heal, and Forge a Common Cause
If the United States acknowledges, recognizes responsibility for, and repairs
the gross injustices suffered by Indian tribes and individuals over the course
of its creation and expansion, Indians must find it in their hearts and minds to
forgive. Despite its rapacious, sanguinary history, if the United States restores
a meaningful measure of land to Indian tribes and amends its legal and
political order to ensure respect for and protection of fundamental Indian
rights to self-determination, a new regime of peace and justice worthy of
emulation and export will be rewarded with the most precious gift that could
ever be bestown: forgiveness. Although their pain is indelibly etched in their
collective memories, by forgiving the United States and all its people in a
solemn ceremony," 7 broadcast globally to symbolize the dawn of the new
relationship, Indian minds, spirits, and relationships will finally be allowed to
heal, and all Americans will be released from the chains of history and freed
to forge a better tomorrow.
V. Conclusion
In August 2001, the UN convened the World Conference Against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance in Durban, South
Africa.s" The conference, called to address causes of and remedies for racial
discrimination, imploded8" under the pressure of states interested less in
combating racism than in waxing rhetorical." 0 Still, although "you do not
Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935)), as well as other negotiated solutions would be
considered.
807. See Marg Huber, Mediation Around the Medicine Wheel, 10 MEDIATION Q. 355 (1993)
(offering traditional Indian medicine wheel ceremony as a model for contemporary intergroup
peacemaking).
808. See World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and
Related Intolerance, http://www. un.org/WCAR (last visited Sept. 18, 2001).
809. Douglas Blackmun, US. and Israel Pull Delegates To Race Talks, WALL ST. I., Sept.
4,2001, at A12.
810. For months, the United States vacillated over whether to participate in the Racism
Conference: reparations was but one issue that threatened to derail the Conference - efforts to
equate Zionism with racial discrimination were even more divisive of regional, confessional,
and ideological blocs. See Dafna Linzer, Forum on Racism Draws Mixed Feelings, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2001, at Al. On August 27, 2001, after domestic furor over a Draft
Declaration minimizing the significance of the Nazi Holocaust and equating it with Israeli
policies in the West Bank and Gaza, the United States indicated it would not attend. N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 28, 2001 (referencing Draft Declaration, Racism Conference, UN. Doc.




combat racism by conferences that produce ... hateful language,"8 " ' neither
do great nations refuse opportunities to redress past injustices.
Even as the United States labors to diffuse liberal humanism and
democratic freedom through civil rights legislation and humanitarian
intervention, the smoke from the Indian Wars occludes the national moral
landscape. Two centuries of genocide, land theft, and ethnocide have stripped
away the fundamental human rights of its indigenous people, and the nation
decorated in the laurels of champion of the international human rights
movement seems to have forgotten that justice begins at home. Rendering
justice unto Indian tribes and people will resolve this national conundrum,
honor the American creed of liberty and justice for all, and legitimate the
international leadership of a nation becoming more faithful itself to the
standards it does not shy away from imposing abroad. At the dawn of the Age
of Apology, the moral coherence of the nation in the watchful world it so
frequently seeks to mold is at stake, and if Indians continue to slip through the
interstices of law, policy, and convenience, the lessons communicated far and
wide will return as specters to haunt U.S. policymakers who look outward
without first looking within.
For the United States, justice will not come without a painful re-
examination, acknowledgment, and communication of its hidden history.
Binary thinking prevents linking genocide, land theft, and ethnocide to the
status of the original Americans as the most materially deprived, politically
cleansing of... Arab[s] in historic Palestine ... must never be forgotten.")). Although many
states and Jewish groups supported the United States' withdrawal, human rights NGOs and
African American groups suggested the'action was prompted by text characterizing slavery as
a crime against humanity and offering succor to reparationists. Rachel L Swains, At Race
Talks, Delegates Cite Early Mistrust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,2001, at Al. Although reparations
claims would likely be nonjusticiable in U.S. courts, U.S. officials cited concern that formal
apology might trigger litigation as a second basis for withdrawal. Rachel Swarns,
Overshadowed, Slavery Debate Boils in Durban, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 6, 2001, at Al. Although
the impending collapse of the Conference forced several African leaders to openly criticize
reparations as counterproductive, efforts to draw blocs into accord confronted the seeming-
impossibility of harmonizing pan-Arab demands for mention of the "plight of the Palestinian
people," African demands for an apology for trans-Atlantic slavery, and EU-U.S.-Israeli refusal
to countenance anti-Zionism. Associated Press, Arab States Reject Compromise Proposal at
Racism Forum, MImI HERALD, Sept. 7, 2001, at 5A. Although the "Zionism is racism"
language was stricken and participants agreed to brand slavery a crime against humanity, the
Declaration abjured resolution of the ideological morass, simultaneously terming the
Palestinians a "people under foreign occupation" while refusing to commit participants to
apologize or pay reparations for slavery. Id. Questions of racial injustice and racial redress
linger post-Durban as sources of international systemic conflict. Rachel Swarns, Racism Talks
Still Seek to End Impasses on Israel and Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2001, at Al.
811. Blackmun, supra note 809, at A12 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell).
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and economically dependent, and legally exposed social group. Displacement
of a mythical version of national genesis in favor of the truth will pierce the
domestic veil of ignorance, upset the non-Indian majority, and erode
theoretical bases of U.S. sovereignty and control over Indian people, culture,
and land. On the other hand, continued refusal to confront the past and
provide redress for Indian claims will corrode the national soul.
Redress of Indian claims need not be the wedge that drives peoples further
apart. Although some recommend reparative justice, a paradigm that fixes
upon compensation, money alone will not solve Indian problems, nor will
zero-sum philosophies, conflictual principles, and preclusive legal doctrines
serve the moral interests of Indian or non-Indian parties. The relationship
between Indian and non-Indian is one of interdependence. While various
peoples may take different paths on their collective and individual journeys,
all share the same destination: a nation conceived in respect for the right to
autonomous self-determination. Justice is proprietary to no one race,
ethnicity, or political group; it is universal. Where past relations between
constituent American peoples have given rise to grievous wounds, the
reestablishment ofjustice requires not only formal commitment to the rule of
law but a broader commitment to restoration. This cannot occur in an
atmosphere of distrust, resentment, and lingering hatreds.
By treating the relationship between Indian and non-Indian as the cardinal
objective of redress, reconciliation will allow fashioning of expansive
remedies, such as land restoration, legal reform, and reinfusion of tribes with
powers of self-determination, in such a manner as to nurture, rather than
destroy, rapprochement. Though expression of justice in palatable policy
prescriptions is possible, however, reconciliation implicates the existential
direction of the nation. Persons of good faith must align a constellation of
political, moral, and legal forces to induce acknowledgment, recognition of
responsibility, apology, repair, commemoration, compensation, forgiveness,
and healing. Painful stories and lessons will have to be told and learned.
Insecurities will have to be addressed, consciences assuaged, fears allayed,
courage mustered. Reconciliation is difficult to commence and easy to
abandon. Social groups unwilling to repair past harms may be unwilling to
reconcile; it may be hopelessly naive to think otherwise. However, if Indian
and non-Indian peoples can fashion a common historical understanding upon
which to ground a more peaceful joint future, the frontier of justice will be
thrown far further than could have been imagined even a generation ago, and
a new American Manifest Destiny as exemplar and defender of global human
rights may well be carried to all corners of the earth.
The prognosis for U.S.-Indian reconciliation is good. The United States is
an exceptional nation, far more just than the one the Framers created, and
[Vol. 27
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol27/iss1/1
No. 1] AMERICAN INDIAN REPARATIONS 175
committed to, if slow to render, justice. Its moral sextant is sound, if in
occasional need of calibration. Moreover, Indians are forgiving and patient.
Although reconciliation will consume time, courage, resources, and faith, our
histories and futures on this land are inescapably enmeshed. Our destiny is to
live together in the justice and peace we deserve as inherent aspects of our
dignity. The tocsin has been sounded; the offering of peace with justice has
been extended; the time for U.S.-Indian reconciliation is now.
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